AUGUST, 1967

Commentary

VOLUME FORTY-FOUR, NUMBER TWO

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ISRAEL: LETTER FROM THE SINAI FRONT Amos Elon

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Paul Goodman

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Robert Garis

AN INTERVIEW WITH HO CHI MINH—1923
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

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

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Commentary

AUGUST 1967
NUMBER 2
VOLUME 44

Israel and World Politics	19	THEODORE DRAPER
Israel, the Arabs, and World Opinion	49	WALTER LAQUEUR
Letter from the Sinai Front	60	AMOS ELON
Israel and American Jewry	69	ARTHUR HERTZBERG
Observations		
Two Issues in Planning	75	PAUL GOODMAN
Art-Movie Style	77	ROBERT GARIS
An Interview with Ho Chi Minh—1923	80	OSIP MANDELSTAM
Letters from Readers	6	
Books in Review		
The Reactionaries: A Study of the Anti-Democratic Intelligentsia, by John Harrison	82	DENIS DONOGHUE
Most Notorious Victory, by Ben B. Seligman	86	ROBERT LEKACHMAN
Contemporary Synagogue Art, by Avram Kampf	88	CECIL ROTH
A Roman Marriage, by Brian Glanville; Against Entropy, by Michael Frayn; Casualties of Peace, by Edna O'Brien	90	ROBERT KIELY
The Poorhouse State, by Richard M. Elman; Ombudsmen and Others, by Walter Gellhorn; When Americans Complain, by Walter Gellhorn	93	LEONARD CHAZEN

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

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

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LETTERS FROM READERS

Social Equality

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . George Lichtheim referred to "the oddities of Doctor Nkrumah" and "tribal bloodletting in Nigeria" ["Race Wars in the Making," January]. Surely this is a magnificent understatement. Nkrumah's oddities reduced the prosperous colony of the Gold Coast to virtual bankruptcy as the state of Ghana, which the military regime is trying to rebuild with vast outside aid. The description of the murders and massacres in Nigeria as "tribal bloodletting" is underplaying this particular tragedy. Mr. Lichtheim ignores the other unpleasant happenings in Africa, such as the genocidal civil war in the Sudan which has been going on for years, the instability of the Congo (Leopoldville), Red Chinese infiltration of the Congo (Brazzaville), the Communist takeover in Zanzibar, and the turning of Tanzania into a Socialist state modeled on Red China, as President Myerere admits. He ignores the facts that since independence, no African government has been changed by peaceful means and that, since January 1965, ten military dictatorships have taken over in Africa.

He prefers to dwell on the mounting tension in South Africa and Rhodesia when, in reality, these countries are oases of peace on a troubled continent, as the hundreds of Americans who have visited them in the first few months of this year can testify. The only trouble during the past year has been caused by terrorists infiltrated from Zambia and armed and equipped chiefly by Red China. One-hundred fifteen of these have been captured, tried, and convicted in Rhodesia. This could not have been done without the active help given to the Rhodesian forces by the black Rhodesians.

Mr. Lichtheim talks about British attempts to "mediate" the Rhodesian quarrel—but Britain can hardly mediate a dispute to which she is a party, as she is in this case. He suggests that Rhodesia's declaration of independence pitted "two hundred thousand whites against four million blacks," but there is no quarrel in Rhodesia between white and black who have lived together in harmony since 1897. Taking African support of the Rhodesian Government at its lowest, 61 per cent of the Rhodesian blacks live in the Tribal Trust areas and their spokesmen are their traditional chiefs who have expressed their support for the Rhodesian government on many occasions.

Possibly the most important fact about Rhodesia is that the African population, totally illiterate, numbering under 400,000 in 1890, has multiplied more than tenfold and that 95 per cent of African children are now receiving five years of education; by 1970, all African children will receive a full seven year course of primary education—and this without aid or handouts from the great powers. The increase in the African population was made possible by the introduction of law and order in place of tribal wars and raids; the establishment of modern farms which has banished famine; the development of mines, industries, and commerce providing employment; the development of modern medical techniques for arresting endemic diseases.

This is the country that the British government, supported by the United States and the United Nations, is trying to destroy. The object of sanctions is to ruin the economy, no matter what the cost in human misery and wealth, in order to induce the people of Rhodesia to overthrow their chosen government. This would lead to a breakdown in law and order and probably the establishment of conditions like those prevailing in the Congo. Is this what the "humanitarian" governments of Britain and the U.S. want? . . .

In view of its actions against Rhodesia, it is hypocrisy to suggest that the British government is concerned with the well-being of Rhodesians, black and white; it is obvious that Britain's sole concern is its own amour-propre, the image it presents to the Afro-Asian bloc in

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

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the United Nations, and its relations with the left wing.

Rhodesia has been condemned to suffer mandatory sanctions by the Security Council under Articles 39 and 41 of the UN Charter. It is pertinent to ask what breach of the peace or what act of aggression Rhodesia has committed. The answer is none.

Is Rhodesia then a threat to international peace? With all her neighbors except Zambia, Rhodesia is on friendly terms and she would like to be on friendly terms with that country as well. Zambia tries to wage the sanctions war against Rhodesia and continually calls for the use of force to overthrow the Rhodesian government. That seems to pinpoint the threat to international peace—Zambia.

Why then does not the Security Council take action against Zambia?

R. B. PAKENHAM
Ministry of Information
Salisbury, Rhodesia

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

George Lichtheim tells us that "A modern industrial base cannot be constructed without a large degree of social inequality." He offers no evidence or reasoned argument to support this assumption, save the equally dogmatic contention that "Technicians and scientists must be given special privileges, and the emergence of something like a class society must be tolerated." Why is social inquality and special privilege a *sine qua non* of industrial development? And why should Mr. Lichtheim, whose writing is usually careful and scholarly, think this point so self-evident as to warrant no justification?

One suspects that he is here being guilty of the "fallacy of accident." It is true that in a possessive market economy industrial progress depends on the use of economic incentives, which in turn lead to social inequalities. Acquisition and competition are the twin pillars of a market economy, so it is hardly surprising that in such a society industrial development requires that special privileges be given to an industrial elite. Mr. Lichtheim's error seems to be in supposing that what is true of men conditioned by life in one form of social organization must be true of men in any society. I submit that this simply is not so. Human nature is not fundamentally altruistic and cooperative. Men can be made to respond either to social incentives or to private privileges. If one believes that the salient features of a market economy society are morally repugnant, then one may strive to achieve industrial development through a classless society, one in which hierarchies of authority and special privilege are eliminated. It seems to me that we shall be closer to the truth if we reverse Lichtheim's verdict on Mao's "cultural revolution": class privilege is a luxury China cannot afford.

ARTHUR M. SCHAFER
Department of Philosophy
University of Manitoba
Winnipeg, Canada

Human Aggression

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In his review of Konrad Lorenz's *On Aggression* [February], Werner J. Dannhauser has done yeoman service in spotlighting the book's most important issues. In my opinion, however, he has taken untenable positions on all but one or two of these issues. . . .

Konrad Lorenz's deservedly stel-



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

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lar reputation is not . . . due to his discovery or explication of trivial, "cocktail-party" facts. In part it is due to those "ingenious experiments" which Mr. Dannhauser passes over so condescendingly. He should try to understand that to many minds such experiments are aesthetically pleasing; they are literally beautiful, and their beauty does not depend on their results, however curious. To appreciate this fact is to understand what a scientist means when he purports to love the *process* of science.

To a greater extent, Dr. Lorenz's reputation is due to his seminal mind, his never-ending quest for a synthetic generalization. Engaged in this activity, Lorenz has made his greatest contributions to man's knowledge. Yet it is precisely this kind activity which Mr. Dannhauser feels he could well do without. . . .

There is overwhelming evidence that *Homo sapiens* differs from other animals in a merely quantitative and not a qualitative way. Mr. Dannhauser lapses into a hoary Kantian error when he points out that people seek reasons for acts of aggression. What Lorenz has made the world understand (and what Kant did not understand) is that people will not act merely on grounds of reason—they must be motivated to act. They must have the drive to perform a deed, and then they will perform it for any random reason, good or bad. "Rationalization" is usually a better description of such thought than "reasoning." Mr. Dannhauser is correct in pointing out that Lorenz's maintaining the "superiority [of man] over the lower animals" is not consistent with the view that human aggression is animalistic. He is, however, fixed upon the wrong horn of the dilemma. . . .

But perhaps Mr. Dannhauser's most serious error is to take Lorenz to task for limiting himself to evolutionary "what-fors." . . . True teleology is the province of the philosopher and the theologian, . . . The only biologically relevant meaning of "good" is: that attribute of an organism which statistically improves its rate of leaving fertile, adult progeny. In other words, the good is the fit. Further, it does not beg the question to admit that no one has yet explained the reason for the evolution of this or that fact. Those who have discovered non-selective differences in the membership of a species have

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

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

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time and again been forced to retract their discoveries. . . .

Very few, if any, of the attributes of plants and animals are wholly good or bad. It commonly takes a man of the genius of Lorenz to explain the causes for one thing or another's being an overall good. It is, in fact, a great intellectual challenge to a biologist to design tests or formulate theories which will predict or at least explain the evolution of life in all its marvelous complexity. I am sorry that Mr. Dannhauser does not appreciate this sort of endeavor. I am sorrier that he calls it crude functionalism. To me, a practicing traditional Jew and a practicing evolutionary biologist, such pursuits are really attempts to understand how God has wielded His chief tool of creation, natural selection. I assure you this is an immensely satisfying and an electrically exciting occupation.

MICHAEL ROSENZWEIG
Department of Biology
Bucknell University
Lewisburg, Pennsylvania

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I enjoyed Werner Dannhauser's perceptive review, but cannot understand why or how he can object to Lorenz's idea that men and animals are both aggressive by instinct. "The main trouble," Mr. Dannhauser writes, "is that Lorenz views human aggression much as he views aggression in animals. . . . He sees it as an instinctively determined non-rational drive." Isn't the discovery of the laws of the non-rational element of personality precisely what Freud was all about? And isn't man's natural tendency toward aggression confirmed by Robert Ardrey's findings in *The Territorial Imperative*?

One further expects that the government's so-called "Iron Mountain Report," though much talked-about, . . . has not yet seen publication precisely because it recognizes, with Hobbes, that man is not by instinct a loving or disarmed creature. To be aware that life is short, nasty, brutish, a war of all against all, is not to condone it; on the contrary, such understanding is imperative if this condition is to be changed.

MARY CASE
New York City

MR. DANNHAUSER writes:

I did not deny the scientist's love for the *process* of science, or even that the process is lovable; I

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Loans	857,866,794
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Customers' liability on acceptances	9,427,716
Other assets	21,368,178
TOTAL	$1,460,965,292

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Deposits:		
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Acceptances outstanding		10,636,874
Accrued expenses and other liabilities		14,365,717
Unearned income		17,686,534
		$1,337,671,834
Reserve for possible loan losses		$ 27,165,568
Capital accounts:		
Capital notes and debentures	$ 26,240,500	
Common stock ($5.00 par value)	24,995,835	
Surplus	35,004,165	
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

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merely pointed out that the process need not involve complicated instruments or abstruse statistical calculations, but can consist of painstaking observation by the naked eye.

Mr. Rosenzweig goes on to assert that there are merely quantitative, not qualitative, differences between man and the other animals, and he charges me with falling into the hoary Kantian error of supposing that people seek reasons for their acts. Well, they do. Animals do not reason, or even rationalize; doesn't that constitute a significant qualitative difference from human beings? Moreover, I do not see how Mr. Rosenzweig, who describes himself as a "traditional Jew," can deny the uniqueness of man with such evident ease.

Nor do I quite see how it is such a serious error to take Lorenz to task for omitting teleological considerations. If such considerations are biologically irrelevant—a dubious point, by the way—it merely means that the purely biological perspective of human problems is of very limited usefulness.

Miss Case errs in thinking that I object to Lorenz's idea that men are aggressive by instinct; it is an idea that might have dawned on me even without having read Lorenz, Freud, or Hobbes. I object rather to taking oversimplified views of man which are no less inadequate for presenting themselves as hard-boiled and unpleasant.

Illusion & Reality

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I am just as eager as Robert Garis was in his review [April] to avoid reducing *Blow-up* to a banal moralism: by so reducing it, one simply blinds oneself to its newness and violates it completely. But that does not absolve one from dealing as best one can with what is palpably there. Perhaps Mr. Garis is more influenced by the illusion-reality ambiguity than he realizes. He rightly dismisses the theory that the murder might only have taken place in the hero's imagination. Yet at the end of his article he comes close to denying that this crucial and, I daresay, central episode is really part of the film. He does acknowledge its presence, but since it can be only tangentially related to what he narrowly takes to be *the* point of the film (the photographer's character taken almost in isolation), he treats it as if it were somehow peripheral and minor: "It is, then, just a special and single event, obviously exciting and puzzling, but just as obviously unrepresentative and perhaps inauthentic." Unrepresentative of what? That it is unrepresentative of the photographer's life, or of people's lives in general, does not make it unrepresentative of *Blow-up*, especially since about half the film is devoted to it. In a similar way, and for similar reasons, Mr. Garis also dismisses the two scenes involving the mimes which frame the film.

Writers frequently use the phrase "of course" as a substitute for reasons. "It is, of course, nonsense," writes Mr. Garis of the whole episode involving the murder, "to say that this mysterious melodrama is the real life of significant human relationships into which the photographer cannot enter responsibly. On the contrary, this event conveys almost no depth of feeling, nor does the character played by Vanessa Redgrave. . . ." This seems to me preposterous, unless Mr. Garis has some special definition of "depth of feeling." (By using such phrases as "depth of feeling," "significant human relationships," and "enter responsibly," although it is hard to find better ones, Mr. Garis tends to beg the question by making those who disagree with him sound like Dr. Rose Franzblau.) The Vanessa Redgrave character is obviously desperate to get hold of the pictures the hero has taken—to the point of obsession (and although we never know her precise role, the murder makes this obsession entirely plausible). This is certainly feeling in depth if not in breadth. It is the photographer who, whatever his compensating charm, lacks depth of feeling. Unmoved by the girl's desperation, or rather moved only to callow adolescent cruelty, he first taunts her with his possession of the film ("I need them," he says of the pictures with chilly audacity, when they are clearly a hundred times as important to her as they are to him), then tricks her into giving herself to him (partially if not entirely) in return for a phony roll of film. We cannot know what would have evolved between them if he had been sympathetic and cooperative, but certainly he makes any relationship between them impossible until she disappears and it is too late.

An imagined tennis ball which

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is treated as real; an abstract painter whose pictures yield their meaning to him only several days after he has painted them; a mysterious murder for which all the evidence (body, photographs, girl) has disappeared; a rich hero who pretends to be a bum in order to take pictures of real poverty to be relished for their aesthetic value in a book for rich people, and who plans to close the book with "something peaceful" which is in fact the scene of a murder involving the most intense feelings—these elements may not combine with the exactitude of a mathematical equation, but they certainly arouse certain feelings and thoughts connected with reality and unreality: thoughts and feelings all the more authentic, intense, and new in that the film eschews all the cinematic clichés of mystery and unreality (black and white film, shady composition, dark castles, and weird characters) in favor of presenting ambiguities which exist in full color, in broad daylight, and in modern dress. To put all these elements to one side because they cannot be fitted into a strictly logical pattern is as much an error as to force them into such a pattern.

Blow-up is certainly a difficult film, but the difficulty lies not in denseness or complexity—it is actually a very simple and transparent film texturally—but in its "openness." When I went back to it a second time, looking consciously and deliberately for the answers to various questions, I saw almost nothing on the screen which I had not seen the first time—and the questions remained as puzzling as before. The elements of the film, although neither gratuitous nor unrelated to each other, just do not form the kind of closed system which can be reduced to a simple paraphrase of theme or moral. The film thwarts our attempts to situate and have done with it, and this is why it stays on, alive and resonant, in the memory.

PAUL WARSHOW
New York City

MR. GARIS writes:

According to Mr. Warshow's interesting letter, my treatment of the illusion-and-reality theme in *Blow-up* was narrow and unfair because I was imposing my own inappropriate interest in neat logical organization on the movie—I am said to want a movie to be a closed system. On the contrary, it is Antonioni who, in the episodes involving the pantomimers and the question they pose about illusion and reality, has imposed the neat structure. I argued that these episodes were not worth taking seriously, and when Mr. Warshow says that I "rightly" dismiss the theory that the photographer only imagined the murder, he is agreeing with me that the question posed by the pantomimers isn't something that "stays on, alive and resonant in the memory." And I think he would agree with me too that this question intends to bring to focus, and to fruition, all the earlier hints of the theme. For Mr. Warshow these earlier hints remain alive and resonant despite the failure of the ending. For me, they are not impressive in themselves, and whatever life or resonance they might have had in another kind of structure is completely killed off by the shallow trickiness of the structure which Antonioni has in fact imposed on them.

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

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

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

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tographer and his way of life was exactly to point to and describe what seemed to me genuinely alive and resonant in the movie, not just what was intended to be. This is not being narrow but, rather, relevant; it is not only a legitimate way of proceeding but in fact an obligation. Mr. Warshow seems to me insensitive to the distinction between what an artist intends to achieve and what he actually achieves.

On the other hand, Mr. Warshow is quite right in saying that my treatment of the murder and of Vanessa Redgrave was not fully enough argued. Yet it seems to me that he has read my few remarks on these subjects without common sense, and again without interest in the distinction between artistic intention and artistic achievement. When I called the murder "just a special and single event" and so on I was defining its *quality* in relation to the photographer's uncommitted way of life, not saying anything about what proportion of the movie was devoted to it. And actually I gave it due emphasis by saying that it helped define that way of life in a "particularly interesting way" because it was "convincingly hard for the photographer to deal with." Mr. Warshow finds it much too easy to deal with. Despite protestations to the contrary, he takes a decidedly moralistic attitude toward the photographer, as for instance when he arbitrarily resolves Antonioni's tentative questioning by deciding that the pictures of bums in the doss-house are "to be relished for their aesthetic value in a book for rich people." And the same heavy moralism is apparent in his judgment that the photographer should have been "sympathetic" and "cooperative" with the Vanessa Redgrave character. I don't find the photographer's behavior here admirable, but there is a lot to be said for his point of view. He takes pictures of a man and a woman innocuously romancing in a public park, whereupon the woman imperiously demands the film with sensitive upper-class remarks about his invasion of her "peace" and privacy—this is how the episode appears to him, which is to say that the woman appears to him to be an obvious phony and a snob. When, back at his studio, she explains that the publication of the pictures might bring her tangled personal life to the point of catastrophe, his advice is that catastro-

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phe helps you sort things out—debatable advice, but surely a serious and sincere statement of his own code of life. His code has elements of adolescent callowness, granted, but from his point of view her code is artificial and inauthentic, which is to say that her reasons for needing the pictures don't seem as important to him as his reasons for needing them. That Mr. Warshow should dismiss his reasons so easily seems to me another instance of the flat moralism that the movie tries to discourage.

But all of this, as I said in my review, depends on how you take the Vanessa Redgrave character, and I discussed my uncertainty about this in terms which still seem to me clear and relevant. I don't understand why Mr. Warshow is so puzzled by them. By "depth of feeling" I mean what everybody means by the common phrase, including the implication that there are such things as feelings that are highly visible but not deep, that some people are capable of deep feelings, others not, and that the former are more considerable than the latter. Which kind of person was the Vanessa Redgrave character?—that was my question. She does indeed register the feelings of anxiety, and desperation; so does—to offer what seems to me the right comparison—Anna, the girl who disappears, in *L'Avventura*. But in that movie the force and intensity of the actress's performance, and the way Antonioni timed and shaped the scenes, made one powerfully and painfully aware of and sympathetic with the depth of Anna's suffering. This is exactly what I was not aware of in Vanessa Redgrave's performance, and I remain uncertain as to whether Antonioni intended this negative effect. Mr. Warshow apparently disagrees with me about the quality of the performance, and he may well be right. But such disagreements are exceptionally difficult to argue out, and Mr. Warshow is mistaken if he believes he is really arguing with me when he says that "the Vanessa Redgrave character is obviously desperate to get hold of the pictures"; just as he would not really be arguing with me if, when I said that there was no depth of feeling in a 1938 MGM soap-opera, he countered by telling me that the Joan Crawford character loved her husband deeply and was in agony about his affair with his secretary.

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ISRAEL AND WORLD POLITICS

THEODORE DRAPER

A PECULIAR combination of internal and external forces was necessary to set off the third Arab-Israeli war in June 1967. A most unstable equilibrium had, of course, existed in the area since the second war in 1956. But for all their suspicions and grievances, the two main antagonists, Egypt and Israel, had not resorted to force against each other for ten years. That a full-scale war should have erupted this year suggests that a new element had to be injected into the Middle East to upset the status quo. And this new element could only come from the outside.

The antagonisms and rivalries which led to this war resemble roads that crisscross in all directions. Some were more important than others but no single one of them could have brought about the conflict. The Arab-Israeli conflict, deep as it was, had been held in leash for the most part since 1956 by other conflicting forces. Foremost among them were the conflicts among the Arab states themselves. They could not turn on Israel as long as they were spending so much substance and energy fighting among themselves. To the "revolutionary" Arab states, Egypt and Syria, victory over the "reactionary" Arab states, especially Jordan and Saudi Arabia, was a precondition for victory over Israel. Egyptian priorities seemed first to be Yemen, where its forces had been fighting for more than four years, and then Aden, which the British had promised to evacuate in 1968. On top of this, Egypt and Syria were busy competing for the leadership of the "revolutionary" Arab struggle. They were also divided on the strategy to be followed against Israel.

What we know as the Middle East, moreover, has more in it than Arabs and Jews. In addition to about two and a half million Jews and 60 million Arabs, it contains some 75 million non-Arab Moslems extending from Turkey to Iran. Until World War II, most of the area was essentially a British sphere of influence, with France entrenched in Syria and Lebanon only. France was eliminated by 1946. Britain quit Palestine in 1948, Iran in 1951, Sudan in 1953, Egypt in 1954-56, Jordan in 1957, and Iraq in 1958. As the British and French retreated, the United States and the Soviet Union moved in. The Truman Doctrine, for the containment of Communism, was promulgated in 1947 in response to Soviet pressure in three countries—two of them, Turkey and Iran, in the Middle East. The Truman administration unsuccessfully tried to organize a Middle East Defense Command, embracing the United States, United Kingdom, France, Turkey, and the Arab states, in 1951. Former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was more successful on a more limited scale by bringing together Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Great Britain in a defense arrangement known as the Baghdad Pact in 1955. The Soviet Union countered that same year with an arms deal with Egypt—the first great Soviet military and political breakthrough in the Arab world. By the end of the decade, the Chinese Communists had begun to assert themselves, especially in Iraq and Syria.

Thus there have been antagonisms and rivalries between Arabs and Israelis, Arabs and Arabs, Arab and non-Arab states, U.S. and USSR, Russian Communists and Chinese Communists. The battle of June 5 was not the result solely of differences between Arabs and Israelis, and it probably would not have broken out when it did if they had simply been left alone.

II

AS IN ALL such seemingly irreconcilable conflicts, the real *casus belli* is a struggle against history. And this history has been so encrusted with myths and legends that there can be little hope of progress toward reconciliation until some of them have been swept away.

One of the most potent legends is that Israel owes its very existence to "Western imperialism." It is well to determine how much truth there is in this story, not only for its own sake, but because it offers a good starting-point for considering the curious course of Soviet policy.

It is true, of course, that the British government's Balfour Declaration started Israel on the road to statehood in 1917. But a good many British governments and Foreign Secretaries came between that promissory note on the Promised Land, which cost Britain nothing, and the United

THEODORE DRAPER's latest book, *Abuse of Power*, has just been published by Viking. Mr. Draper has been appointed Visiting Professor in Political Science at Yale for next year.

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Nations General Assembly vote in favor of partitioning Palestine on November 29, 1947. Ernest Bevin, then British Foreign Secretary, was so little sympathetic to the Jewish cause that he opened himself up to the charge of anti-Semitism. Britain, in fact, abstained in the vote on the crucial resolution, and did little or nothing to implement it.

If Israel owed its existence to any powers besides itself, they were the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The favorable UN vote would not have been possible without the support of the Soviet Union, which could have vetoed the measure in the Security Council. In fact, the Soviet representative, Andrei A. Gromyko, then Deputy Foreign Minister, defended the partition of Palestine and the establishment of an independent Jewish state with all the arguments that the Arabs then and later have refused to accept. For example, he linked the birth of Israel with the Jewish past in Palestine and with the extermination of millions of Jews in Europe. In the session of November 26, 1947, he said:

> The representatives of the Arab States claim that the partition of Palestine would be an historic injustice. But this view of the case is unacceptable, if only because, after all, the Jewish people has been closely linked with Palestine for a considerable period in history. Apart from that, we must not overlook—and the USSR delegation drew attention to this circumstance originally at the special session of the General Assembly—we must not overlook the position in which the Jewish people found themselves as a result of the recent world war. I shall not repeat what the USSR delegation said on this point at the special session of the General Assembly. However, it may not be remiss to remind my listeners again that, as a result of the war which was unleashed by Hitlerite Germany, the Jews, as a people, have suffered more than any other people.

No one exceeded Gromyko, once the Soviet leaders had made up their minds that a binational, Arab-Jewish state in Palestine was impossible, in the ardor with which he praised the decision to set up a Jewish state:

> The solution of the Palestine problem based on a partition of Palestine into two separate states will be of profound historical significance, because this decision will meet the legitimate demands of the Jewish people, hundreds of thousands of whom, as you know, are still without a country, without homes, having found temporary shelter only in special camps in some western European countries.

Yet, in the same speech, Gromyko made a prophetic gesture to gain the favor of the Arab states:

> The USSR delegation is convinced that Arabs and Arab States will still, on more than one occasion, be looking towards Moscow and expecting the USSR to help them in the struggle for their lawful interests, in their efforts to cast off the last vestiges of foreign dependence.[1] *

The first country to recognize Israel, on May 14, 1948, eleven minutes after the new state's declaration of independence went into effect, was the United States. But the Soviet Union, the third, was not far behind four days later. The first diplomatic representatives to arrive in Tel Aviv one after the other in August 1948 were the American and the Soviet; they stayed at the same two-story hotel, which flew U.S. and USSR flags on its roof. The Israeli parliament on March 9, 1949 adopted a program of basic principles, one of which avowed "friendship with all freedom-loving states, in particular with the United States and the Soviet Union."[2] For a while, it seemed that, diplomatically, the Messiah had come to bring the two great powers together again in the Holy Land. If the existence of the state of Israel was the original sin, the Soviets were as implicated in it as anyone else.

A GLANCE AT the first Arab-Israeli war yields some useful historical perspective.

The Arab guerrilla war broke out as soon as the UN voted for the partition plan on November 29, 1947. Then the regular armies of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq invaded Palestine when the state of Israel was established on May 14, 1948. If arms were all that mattered, Israel should have been throttled at birth. Israel had only a small, underground defense force, the Haganah, with no artillery, tanks, or planes. The Arab armies were overwhelmingly stronger in numbers and equipment. At a particularly crucial moment, the Israelis managed to secure rifles, light machine-guns, and ammunition from Czechoslovakia.[3] Once war had broken out in earnest, the UN did not know what to do. The United States wavered and suddenly switched from supporting the partition of Palestine to putting all of it under a temporary "trusteeship." Ironically, the Soviet Union came out most firmly for going through with the original plan; Gromyko severely criticized the United States for holding back.[4]

As long as the Arab states thought they were winning, they ignored the UN, which vainly called on them to cease and desist. When the battle began to turn against them, they agreed to a one-month truce or cease-fire on June 11, 1948. But the pause gave the Syrians and Egyptians time to rest and regroup; they refused to renew the truce, took up arms again, and fought for another ten days—with the result that the Israelis captured almost half of Galilee in the north, which they would otherwise not have had. In mid-October, the Egyptians again broke the truce and renewed the fighting—with the result that the Israelis pushed them back and gained control of the Negev in the south, which they also might not

* All footnotes appear at the end of this article.

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have had. The fighting in the Sinai stopped on January 7, 1949, and armistice agreements were signed separately with Egypt on February 24, with Lebanon on March 23, with Jordan on April 3, and with Syria on July 20 of that year. Each of the Arab states tried to get the best bargain for itself, irrespective of the others. The procedure may be suggestive of the future.

In terms of the UN's position, there is no doubt who the "aggressor" was. The Arab states' resort to force was unmistakably a defiance of the UN resolution of November 29, 1947. Trygve Lie, then UN Secretary General, wrote in his memoirs: "The invasion of Palestine by the Arab States was the first armed aggression which the world had seen since the end of the War."[5] The "aggression" was halted by Israeli resistance, not by the UN, which stepped in only after the Arab states had lost their taste for fighting.

If the Arabs had accepted the UN plan of 1947, as the Jews did, Israel would have been a tiny, geographic monstrosity. The plan divided Palestine into seven parts, three Jewish and three Arab, each virtually disjointed, and a seventh, Jerusalem, which was to be "internationalized." The largest Jewish part consisted of the Negev, then a wasteland. But this also meant that Eilat, at the southern tip of the Negev desert and at the northern tip of the Gulf of Aqaba, was allotted to Israel to give it an outlet through the Straits of Tiran to the Red Sea and the East. Thus, when Israel captured the Negev in the late 1948 fighting, it was able to occupy Eilat, which the UN had allotted to it in theory only.

Once the Arab leaders became more interested in saving their shattered armies than in destroying Israel, they were delighted to go back to the 1947 UN partition plan which they had previously denounced. But it was too late. The armistice negotiations, which earned Dr. Ralph Bunche, the UN mediator, his Nobel Peace Prize, were advanced lessons in Oriental haggling. In the end, all parties remained pretty much where they had been when the fighting stopped. For example, the Egyptians remained in the Gaza Strip, which they still held but which had never been Egyptian soil. The Jordanians held on to the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Old City in Jerusalem, neither of which had ever been part of Jordan. Though the armistice agreement provided for "free access to the Holy Places and cultural institutions," such as the Wailing Wall and the Hebrew University on Mount Scopus, Jordan refused to live up to it—and nothing was done. As for Israel, the 1949 armistice agreements left it about one-third larger in territory than it would have been under the 1947 UN partition plan. Each war has ended with the Arabs more than willing to go back to the *status quo ante*.

The Soviet Union did not object to the outcome of the first Arab-Israeli war. It did not insist on a return to the 1947 boundaries. It did not assail the Israelis as aggressors because they had beaten back the armies of five Arab states and had forced them to accept armistice boundaries. It must be emphasized that none of these states had a "right" to Palestine territory which had never been theirs; the UN partition plan of 1947 had envisaged a new Arab state which never came into being. The main territorial effect of the 1949 armistice agreements was the enlargement of Israel, Jordan, and Egypt in that order.[6] In the present crisis, Arab leaders have talked much of going back to 1956, 1949, or 1947. Yet the differences between these three resulted from Arab-Israeli wars.

The UN's function was limited in the main to providing a skillful mediator for the 1949 armistice negotiations. Once the armistices were signed and the Arab leaders had recovered their nerve, UN resolutions were heeded as much as the famous resolution of November 29, 1947 had been heeded. In violation of the Constantinople Convention of 1888, Egypt has never permitted an Israeli ship to pass through the Suez Canal.[7] On September 1, 1951, and again on October 13, 1956, the Security Council called on Egypt to lift these restrictions. Neither resolution enabled a single Israeli ship to pass through the Canal. At the end of 1949, after the armistice agreement was signed, Egypt installed guns at Sharm el-Sheikh overlooking the Straits of Tiran to blockade the Israeli port of Eilat. To justify this hostile act, Egypt claimed that it was still in a state of "belligerency" with Israel, armistice or no armistice. By the time Israel attempted to take the issue to the Security Council in March 1954, the Soviets had adopted a new pro-Arab line, and a Soviet veto prevented the Council from doing anything about it.

I HAVE TOUCHED on some aspects of the crucial 1947-49 period because so much of the present Arab-Israeli conflict goes back to it. To both Arabs and Israelis, their third war was a continuation of the first and second. If the issue were merely the blockade of Eilat or the status of the Gaza Strip or the treatment of Arab refugees or the prevention of terrorist raids, it would probably not be beyond the wit of Arabs and Israelis to resolve. But the one, fundamental issue has always been the *existence* of the state of Israel. Once this is put in question, no lesser, immediate, practical problem can be settled in good faith or, more often, even brought up for settlement. As we shall see, the third Arab-Israeli war was fought in order to return, or to prevent a return, to the *status quo ante* of the second, and if the Arabs had been successful, they would not and could not have stopped short of going back to the *status quo ante* of the first. It is only by knowing something about the first two wars that the third can be understood.

And yet, if there is one subject that must be ruled out as off-limits, it is Israel's very existence.

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This is certainly true for all those powers which helped to bring Israel into existence or have recognized its right to exist. The contradiction in the Soviet position is that although it was most instrumental in bringing about the UN decision to partition Palestine in 1947-49 and cannot repudiate the right of Israel to live without repudiating its own past, it has nevertheless supported Arab states whose policies have been dedicated to just such a repudiation. There is a more fundamental reason, however, why nothing useful or hopeful can come out of questioning the very basis of Israel's national existence. If the Arabs have a "right" to destroy Israel by force, Israel cannot be denied the "right" to use force to prevent its destruction. It is too late to expect the Israelis to give up without a struggle what they have earned and won. As soon as the *casus belli* becomes the existence of Israel, there is no right and no wrong; there is only force to determine whether Israel is going to live or die. The relationship of Israel to the Arab world can be discussed more or less rationally; whether there should be an Israel cannot.

III

FROM THE SECOND Arab-Israeli war in 1956, it is possible to learn what conditions were necessary to bring on another conflict.

These conditions have, in the main, been five: (1) a rise in the level of Arab terrorist raids against Israel and Israeli military retaliation; (2) a significant imbalance in the level of arms available to both sides; (3) blockade of the Straits of Tiran to prevent shipping from the Israeli port of Eilat; (4) Arab military pacts and troop movements encircling Israel; and (5) a marked shift in the policies of the Communist and the Western powers *vis-à-vis* Israel and the Arab states. No one of these conditions may be determining, but when all come together, the danger of conflict clearly approaches the boiling point.

As early as 1951, it was clear that a cycle of Arab raids and Israeli reprisals had started. By 1955, both Egypt and Israel were officially committed to one or the other phase of the cycle. The question that concerns us here is not which side was guilty or innocent in individual incidents; the determination was generally too much even for the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, set up in 1948-49 to investigate breaches of the armistice agreements. We can only view this problem as a symptom of approaching war.

Until 1955, no Arab government accepted responsibility for the attacks on Israeli life and property by small groups of Arab "infiltrators." Israeli policy, on the other hand, made retaliatory or punitive actions a government decision and a military operation. This policy was based on the belief that these raids were a form of irregular warfare and that the Arab governments were responsible for their recurrence. Where, as in Lebanon, the government discouraged border incidents, they were few, and where, as in Egypt, Jordan, or Syria, the government encouraged or tolerated them, they were increasingly menacing. In any event, something changed in 1955. In August, it became known that Egypt was behind a campaign of sabotage and terrorism by groups known as *"fedayeen."*[8] As more and more *fedayeen* incidents piled up, Israeli reprisals intensified, until small-scale battles were being waged.

In September 1955, the first Soviet-Egyptian arms deal was consummated, though it was at first publicly attributed to Czechoslovakia. Until then, both Israel and the Arab states had been dependent on Western arms. But these were in relatively short supply owing to a Tripartite Declaration by Britain, France, and the United States on May 25, 1950, barring an arms race in the area. Suddenly, Egypt's new source of supply completely upset the existing balance. Egypt received tanks, artillery, fighter and bomber aircraft, and other weapons in such numbers that, materially, Israel was far outclassed.[9] In 1956 as in 1967, Egypt lost the war not because it did not have the equipment but because it did not properly use what it had. Though the Tripartite Declaration had recognized that both Israel and the Arab states needed to maintain "a certain level of armed forces" to assure their self-defense, the United States and Great Britain refused to balance the Soviet arms shipments to Egypt with sales to Israel. Only France agreed to provide Israel with new arms, especially planes. A shipment of 200 French trucks arrived two days before the outbreak in 1956 and, according to Major-General Moshe Dayan, then Israeli Chief of Staff, "saved the situation."[10]

Eilat, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the Straits of Tiran, of which we heard so much in the days before the third Arab-Israeli war, were also prime factors in setting off the second. The Israelis never reconciled themselves to the Egyptian blockade of Eilat. They were prepared to deal with the illegal Suez blockade diplomatically, but Eilat was always something else. Former Prime Minister David Ben Gurion made the freedom of passage from Eilat to Asia and Africa one of his main planks in the 1955 electoral campaign in Israel. Soon afterward, in September of that year, Egypt broadened the Eilat blockade to apply not only to Israeli ships but to ships of any other nation bound for Eilat, and even forced the Israeli commercial airplanes en route to South Africa to stop flying over the Straits of Tiran. From the fall of 1955, Ben Gurion made known publicly and privately that Israel could not tolerate the blockade of Eilat indefinitely. In November 1955, in a statement of policy of his new government, he warned: "This one-sided war will have to stop, for it cannot remain one-sided

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forever." As we now know, the two war aims which the Israeli government set for itself in 1956 were to break the blockade of Eilat and to eliminate the *fedayeen* bases in the Gaza Strip and the Sinai desert.[11]

T. E. Lawrence once said that "Arab unity is a madman's notion." If the Israelis could always count on this being true, they would have much less to worry about. Whenever the Arab countries show signs of uniting, the Israelis begin to worry because almost the only thing the Arabs can unite in favor of is against Israel. As someone has said, if Arab nationalists did not have Israel, they would have to invent it. When rivals, such as Syria and Egypt, and enemies, such as Jordan and Egypt, sign military pacts, they can mean only one thing—a two- or three-front war against Israel. An Egyptian-Syrian Mutual Defense Pact was signed on October 20, 1955, a similar Egyptian-Saudi Arabian military agreement seven days later, and Jordan adhered to them the following October.

Finally, the outcome of the war of 1956 was as much determined by shifts in the policies of the Communist and Western powers as by anything else. The Soviet-Egyptian arms deal the year before was undoubtedly the decisive move which emboldened Egypt to take steps more reckless than ever before and to drive Israel into a state of desperation. At the same time, for reasons of their own, Britain and France decided to settle accounts with Nasser's Egypt. In July 1956, when the United States unexpectedly withdrew its offer to assist Egypt to construct the Aswan High Dam and Nasser struck back by nationalizing the Suez Canal Company, the Anglo-French reaction was less tolerant than the American. For the British, it was an opportunity to get back into the Canal Zone, which they had just evacuated, and to reassert themselves in their old imperial domain. The French were as much interested in punishing Nasser for helping the Algerian rebels as in getting back control of the Canal. The Israelis considered the Anglo-French resentments a windfall, enabling them to overcome Egypt's advantage in Soviet arms. Dayan says that it is doubtful whether Israel would have moved against Egypt on October 29, 1956, if it had not known that the British and French were planning an operation of their own two days later.[12] The Russians had their hands full with their intervention in Hungary, which Soviet armed forces entered on November 1. The United States, having done more than its share to set all these moves going, surprised everyone by making common cause with the Soviets and by devoting itself more to getting Britain, France, and Israel out of Egypt than the Soviets out of Hungary.

For the Israelis, the "primary aim" of the campaign, according to Dayan, was the capture of the Egyptian fortress of Sharm el-Sheikh, commanding the Straits of Tiran and, therefore, the route to the Israeli port of Eilat. This was the last and hardest battle which the Israelis won on November 5. Dayan goes so far as to observe that the failure to take Sharm el-Sheikh would have meant, despite the other victories, loss of the entire campaign.[13] How much this position meant to them was also shown by how tenaciously they held on to it. When the British and French were forced by U.S.-Soviet pressure to give up their drive to Suez, the Israelis did not follow suit. Ben Gurion refused to get out of Sinai without guarantees that the blockade of Eilat and the terrorist raids from the Gaza Strip would come to an end. It took four months, during which the Israelis held out alone, for these demands to be met. Neither Egypt nor the Soviet Union was able to force the Israelis out of Sharm el-Sheikh. The power which had most to do with the Israeli evacuation was the United States. On February 11, 1957, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles presented to then Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban an *aide-mémoire* which stated:

> With respect to the Gulf of Aqaba and access thereto—the United States believes that the Gulf comprehends international waters and that no nation has the right to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf and through the Straits giving access thereto.

Another passage in this memorandum reads:

> In the absence of some overriding decision to the contrary, as by the International Court of Justice, the United States, on behalf of vessels of United States registry, is prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right.[14]

The Soviet spokesman in the UN interpreted this commitment to mean that the United States was threatening to use force, if necessary, to make the Gulf of Aqaba an international waterway,[15] and the U.S. representative, Henry Cabot Lodge, did not dispute him.

But Israel was in no mood to accept the strongest U.S. assurances. The Israelis demanded more than mere words and did not move until they received it. This took the form of a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) stationed at Sharm el-Sheikh, the Gaza Strip, and the Sinai boundary to prevent Egypt from closing the Straits of Tiran and to check terrorist raids from Egyptian-held territory. The Soviets fought bitterly against this solution of the problem.[16] But President Nasser finally agreed, and the Egyptian spokesman at the UN seemed to accept the arrangement with good grace.[17] Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir went along with it on March 1, and the following day President Eisenhower wrote to Premier Ben Gurion:

> I know that this decision was not an easy one. I believe, however, that *Israel will have no cause*

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to regret having thus conformed to the strong sentiment of the world community as expressed in the various United Nations resolutions relating to withdrawal.

It has always been the view of this Government that after the withdrawal there should be a united effort by all of the nations to bring about conditions in the area more stable, more tranquil and more conducive to the general welfare than those which existed heretofore. Already the United Nations General Assembly has adopted resolutions which presage such a better future. Hopes and expectations based thereon were voiced by your Foreign Minister and others. I believe that it is reasonable to entertain such hopes and expectations and *I want you to know that the United States,* as a friend of all the countries of the area and as a loyal member of the United Nations, *will seek that such hopes prove not to be vain* (my italics, T.D.).[18]

In diplomatic language, the United States seemed to be assuring Israel that it would not permit Eilat to be blockaded again or terrorist raids from Egyptian-held territory renewed. The combination of UNEF, U.S. assurances, and declarations by eleven other maritime nations, including Britain and France, upholding free passage of the Straits of Tiran, persuaded Israel to withdraw its forces from the Sinai peninsula and to give up the key position of Sharm el-Sheikh.[19]

In other respects, however, the second Arab-Israeli war ended indeterminately. By staying out, Egypt's allies, Syria and Jordan, left open the question of what might have happened if they had stepped in. By getting in, Israel's adventitious allies, Britain and France, left open the question of what might have happened if they had stayed out. Nasser was able to emerge from the conflict unscathed because the Anglo-French retreat left him in full possession of the Suez Canal, and he could claim that Israel would not have defeated him alone. He seemed for a time to have both the Soviet Union and the United States on his side, at least for the purpose of bringing the war to a close before he had suffered an irretrievable defeat. In these ways the second Arabi-Israeli war prepared the way for the third by giving the Arabs reason to believe, if they believed their own propaganda, that they could overwhelm Israel if they fought together and if Israel had to fight alone.

I have perhaps tried the patience of the reader anxious to get to 1967 by going over this apparently old ground. I have done so because I think that what happened in 1956 is most pertinent, even indispensable, for an understanding of 1967. The similarity of all the problems of 1956 and 1967 is, as we shall see, striking. When Americans and others learned that President Nasser had decided to get rid of UNEF and renew the blockade of Eilat, the nature and significance of these actions may not have been too clear. But the Israelis had been all through this before and had thought that they would never have to go through it again. It had meant war in 1956, and if Nasser wanted to do it again in 1967, it could only mean that he wanted to have another war.

IV

From 1955 to the present, the one new, disturbing element in the Arab world has been the Soviet Union. All the other elements were present before that time and have receded as the Soviets have advanced.

Before World War II, the Soviet Union did very little to exert a direct influence in the Arab countries. Traditionally, Russia was primarily interested in Turkey and Iran, its Moslem but non-Arab neighbors. In 1940, Stalin's Russia tried to establish a sphere of influence southward from Batum and Baku toward the Persian Gulf, a line of march which would have brought it next to two Arab countries, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. But this effort was made in collusion with Nazi Germany, not through the Arab countries themselves.[20] After the war, the most notable aspect of Soviet policy in the Arab area was, as we have seen, the backing of the UN's partition plan in Palestine in 1947-49, one consequence of which was support for some kind of Jewish state. In 1950, Prime Minister Ben Gurion proposed to the Soviet Ambassador that his country should try to initiate peace talks between Egypt and Israel. Moscow never replied.[21]

The first grave break between Israel and the Soviet Union took place in 1953. It came soon after the Stalin regime, in its last stages of psychopathology, had accused a group of Soviet doctors, most of them Jews, of plotting to kill a number of Soviet military leaders. This "Doctors' Plot" was linked, in *Pravda* of January 13, 1953, with a "Zionist espionage organization" and thereby given international connotations. Czechoslovakia had already staged the so-called Slansky trial, with strong anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist overtones, and a Czechoslovak communication of February 5, 1953 referred to "the effrontery and arrogance of the Israel Zionist agents in Czechoslovakia" and "the American warmongers and their Israeli and other stooges." On February 9, 1953, a small bomb exploded in the garden of the Soviet legation in Tel Aviv. The Soviet government immediately charged Israel with responsibility for the deed and broke off diplomatic relations. They were renewed the following July, four months after Stalin's death and after Israel had given assurances that it would not join any aggressive alliance against the Soviet Union. But the shift in Soviet policy soon proved to be more than a Stalinist aberration.

In Stalin's last years, Soviet policy was less pro-Arab than anti-Israel. Ever since he had burned his fingers with Chiang Kai-shek in the 1920's, Stalin had not taken kindly to "bourgeois nationalists," in which category the leaders of the Egyp-

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tian revolution were first pigeonholed. The Soviets did not greet with enthusiasm the overthrow of the Farouk regime in 1952 by the military junta headed by General Mohammed Naguib and Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, and they were still outwardly reserved when Nasser ousted the more conservative Naguib in 1954.

But Stalin's successors were increasingly more flexible in this sphere, as in others, and their own inclinations happened to coincide with changes in Syria and Iraq as well as in Egypt. In 1954, the Syrian military dictatorship of Colonel Adib Shishakli was overthrown. The rising Syrian power was represented by the newly-formed Arab Socialist Renaissance party, better known as the Ba'ath party from the first word of its Arabic name (*Ba'ath al-Arabi al-Ishtiraki*). No one, least of all its own leaders, has ever been able to explain what the Ba'ath meant by "socialism," but it was certainly second to none in its advocacy of Arab unity and nationalism. By 1957, the Ba'ath had gained the ascendancy over the Syrian military, and the Syrian Communists were considered the strongest single political force in the country. In 1958, the traditionalist regime of Nuri el-Said was overthrown in Iraq. The new military junta, headed by General Abdel Karim Kassim, also adopted a program based on Arab nationalism, Arab unity, and anti-Westernism. Like Egypt and Syria, Iraq turned to the Soviet Union for arms and economic aid. By the end of the decade, the Soviet investment and vested interest in these three countries had become a major factor in Middle Eastern diplomacy and strategy.

By turning the white man's burden red, the Soviets did not make it any lighter to bear. They were dealing with extremely insecure regimes and unstable societies. The propaganda of the new Egypt, the new Syria, and the new Iraq was almost identical in the rhetoric of Arab unity, but that was as far as they were united. The Ba'athists and Nasserites, Kassim and Nasser, wanted unity on their own terms—that is to say, an Egyptian- or a Syrian- or an Iraqi-dominated unity. They made and unmade deals with their local Communist parties which were hard put to know whether the Nassers and the Kassims were an open door or a barrier to ultimate Communism. The merger of Egypt and Syria in 1958, out of which came the United Arab Republic, has been attributed to Nasser's fear that the Syrian Communists were getting too strong. Both Egyptian and Syrian Communists were brutally repressed after the merger, and its breakup in 1961 was no cause for them to lament. Nasser managed to stay in power, but Kassim was overthrown in 1963, and Syria made a "Right" turn in 1961 and then, with the Ba'athist coup, a "Left" turn in 1963. After 1961, Nasser went to the "Left" in both domestic and foreign policy, in the first, through large-scale nationalization and in the second by declaring war on the Arab "reactionaries" in control of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and other areas. To follow all the twists and turns, ups and downs of the various Arab regimes in the past ten years would be dizzying. It is enough to say, for our purposes, that the wild new Arabian horses have not been easy or inexpensive for the Soviets to ride. They have been able to stay on them largely by outbidding the West, from paying for the Aswan High Dam to providing a steady stream of cheap arms, rather than by exhibiting any particular wisdom or cunning.

It is a mistake, then, to imagine that these Arab states have simply lent themselves to Soviet purposes. To the extent that they have done so, it is not the most important part of the story. Instead, the Soviets have curried favor with the Arabs mainly by giving them the arms to do what they wanted to do. Soviet arms have always talked far more loudly and persuasively in this region than Communist propaganda. It was no accident, as the Soviets like to say, that their first historic breakthrough in Egypt took the form of an arms deal. A pro-Arab policy of this kind could not fail to prepare the way for a third Arab-Israeli war. It was not necessary for the Soviets to proclaim this war as their own aim; it was merely necessary for them to arm those Arab states which were proclaiming it as *their* war aim.

On April 17, 1963, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq signed an agreement in principle to federate as a single state, with its capital in Cairo. The agreement, among other things, pledged the projected United Arab Republic to a crusade for "liberating the Arab Nation from the peril of Zionism." It was the first time, Prime Minister Ben Gurion noted in a parliamentary address in May, that the destruction of Israel had been set forth in a constitutional document providing for the unification of the three Arab states. The agreement proved not to be worth the paper it was written on because the Ba'athists in Syria and Iraq refused to accept Nasserite domination in the name of unity. Nevertheless, in one way or another, Arab unity efforts and anti-Israel war aims continued to feed each other.

In January 1964, Nasser convened the first Arab "summit conference" to deal with Syria's demand for immediate military action against Israel. The Syrians demanded war to punish Israel for having completed a pipeline to carry water inland from the Jordan river according to a plan worked out ten years earlier by Eric Johnston on behalf of the Eisenhower administration. At this conference, Nasser took the position that the Arab states were not prepared to fight Israel immediately and had to prepare for the day by setting up a United Arab Command and a fighting organization of Palestine Arab refugees. A unified Arab command was nominally set up, commanded by an Egyptian, General Abdel Hakim Amer, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), headed by a

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Syrian, Ahmad Shukeiry, was authorized at the second Arab summit conference in September of that year. The PLO was based in the Gaza Strip and depended largely on Egyptian backing. Toward the end of the year, another organization of even more extremist tendencies, El Fatah, started to operate out of Syria. It began to drag Jordan, which was not anxious to provoke Israel on behalf of Syria and Egypt, into the melee by striking most often across the much longer, less easily defended Israel-Jordan frontier. At the second summit conference, the Arab states also voted to raise $43 million a year to stock arms for Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan exclusively for use against Israel.

THUS, THE OLD cycle of raids and reprisals started again. This problem has always been most difficult for the Israelis to deal with. The Israelis could not ignore the terrorist tactics; yet they did not wish to emulate the Arabs and engage in transparently camouflaged terrorism of their own; instead, their reprisal policy was aimed at getting across the message that the Egyptian and Syrian governments were making undeclared and unofficial war on Israel through the PLO and El Fatah. Yet the Arab governments could refuse to accept responsibility for the terrorism, which their controlled press and radio acclaimed and encouraged, whereas Israel was unable, for reasons of policy, to disavow its reprisals. This disparity opened Israel to repeated censure in the UN, which took the position that Israel should rely on the UN's Truce Supervision observers and Mixed Armistice Commissions for protection against the terrorists. In August 1963, the Israelis agreed to put the UN case to the test. When two Israeli farmers were ambushed and killed near the Syrian border, Israel went to the Security Council for redress or at least condemnation of the deed. On the basis of reports from the UN's Truce Supervision Organization's Chief of Staff, Britain and the United States introduced a resolution condemning the ambush and implying that Syria had been remiss in permitting it to occur. On September 3, the resolution obtained eight votes, one short of passage. The Soviet Union cast the decisive veto. After another armed Syrian-Israeli incident in November 1964, Britain and the United States introduced a resolution in the Security Council calling for restraint and cooperation by both sides. On December 21, it again obtained eight votes but once more ran into a Soviet veto—on the ground that even this evenhanded appeal was unfair to Syria.

By 1965, then, the outlines of a third Arab-Israeli war were clearly taking shape. If it did not break out that year, the primary cause was Arab disagreement as to how and when it should be waged. Syria, under militant Ba'athist leadership, was the most impatient. But the Syrians knew they were too small and weak to take on Israel alone, and their strategy, therefore, consisted in goading Egypt to attack Israel. Jordan was most reluctant to get drawn into an open conflict, for one reason because the Egyptians and Syrians had been vowing for years to get rid of King Hussein's regime as well as Israel. The middle ground seemed occupied by Nasser's Egypt. At a Palestine National Conference in Cairo in May 1965, the Syrians complained bitterly that Egypt had not come to their aid when Israel had blown up some El Fatah bases. Nasser took the following line against his Arab critics:

> They say "Drive out UNEF." Suppose that we do, is it not essential that we have a plan? If Israeli aggression takes place against Syria, shall I attack Israel? Then Israel is the one which determines the battle for me. It hits a tractor or two to force me to move. Is this a wise way? We have to determine the battle.[22]

This was the ambidextrous, double-edged Nasserite policy that divided or confused both Arabs and Israelis. In principle he seemed to agree with the Arab extremists with whom his differences, on the surface, were limited to timing and tactics. Nevertheless, timing and tactics were most important to them, and on these he drew back from an immediate confrontation. Meanwhile, his relations with Israel appeared to be relatively tranquil, while the Syrian-Israeli border was exploding with violence. One school of Israeli thought argued that Nasser was merely biding his time; he was as dangerous and untrustworthy as any other Arab extremist. Another Israeli school considered that his actions were more important than his words; it believed that it might be possible, eventually, to come to terms with him.

In 1966, however, events in Syria, always the tinderbox, made Nasser's balancing act more difficult. On February 23, the inevitable army coup ousted the more moderate wing of the Ba'athist party and put little-known Ba'athist extremists in power. The new government, headed by President Nureddin el-Attassi and Prime Minister Yusif Zuayin, issued a statement calling on all Arab revolutionary organizations "to face Zionism and imperialism and to liberate usurped parts of Palestine." By "usurped," Syrian nationalists meant that Palestine actually belonged to Syria, not to any other Arab nation in particular or to an Arab state in general.[23] The new cabinet, for the first time in Syrian history, included two Communists, Samih Ateyyeh, as Minister of Communications, and Dr. Ahmed Murad, as Minister of Economy. In a speech to a Ba'ath party congress on March 10, Dr. el-Attassi designated "the liberation of Palestine" as the keystone of the revolution. He indicated that the new Syrian regime was not satisfied with waiting for the right time to attack Israel:

> We believe that postponement of the liberation battle will increase the enemy's chances of survival. Through its call for the liberation war,

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the revolution believes that the chances of [Arab] unity will increase. Unity will be forged in the flames of the liberation war, which will be a decisive factor in providing the psychological, political and military atmosphere.

The new Syrian regime also introduced a Chinese Communist inflection in its war propaganda. On May 23, Dr. el-Attassi scoffed at waging a conventional war against Israel and urged what he called a "people's war of liberation," Chinese Communist-style. In a speech to army units on Syria's southwestern frontier with Israel, he declared:

> We want a full-scale, popular war of liberation, not only to destroy the Zionist base in Palestine but also to destroy oil monopolies and imperialist and reactionary interests. We want a policy of scorched earth, and it is only through this policy that we can hope to build a new life for the Arab masses.

In addition to Israel, he attacked the "reactionary" Arab states, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. He told the soldiers:

> You have grown tired of piling up arms. I realize how eager you are that we should start the battle. The time has come to use these arms for the purpose for which they were created.[24]

The Syrians were as good as their word. The year 1966 was the worst since 1956 for Arab terrorist raids and Israeli military reprisals. The UN Security Council spent a major part of its time that year on Syria-Israel and Jordan-Israel border incidents. One wrangle was especially revealing. Before midnight on October 7, demolition charges exploded underneath two buildings in the Romema quarter of Jerusalem, causing much damage and injuring four civilians. On October 8, a mine blew up an Israeli police car, killing four and wounding two. Radio Damascus broadcast "Communique No. 53 of the General Staff of the *El Assefa*," the military branch of El Fatah, which read: "A force from Group 105 penetrated on October 8 into occupied Jerusalem and bombed two buildings. Two demolition charges exploded at 2345 hours and two others at 2400 hours," an accurate description of the Romema incident. When Foreign Minister Eban, who was in New York at the time, complained on October 9 to Secretary General U Thant, Syrian Prime Minister Zuayin decided to hold a press conference in Damascus. On October 10, he served notice that Syria would never take measures to curb the new *fedayeen*. "We are not," he said, "sentinels over Israel's security and are not the leash that restrains the revolution of the displaced and persecuted Arab Palestinian people." And he promised that Syria would "never retreat from the popular liberation war to recover Palestine."[25] Israel thereupon decided to take the cases to the Security Council.

The discussion at the UN was almost an exact replica of the one which took place seven months later on the eve of the third Arab-Israeli war. The most remarkable similarities were provided on October 14 by the Soviet Ambassador, Nikolai Federenko. One part of his speech was especially noteworthy:

> Since the time when the Syrian people started to consolidate its independence and ensure its social progress, military tension has begun to build up on the borders of Syria, and we know that, of late, Israel has been concentrating large military forces on the Syrian border. In areas adjacent to Syria, military maneuvers are being staged. A large number of landing troops, equipped with artillery and mine-sweepers, have been thrown in. There has been a partial mobilization of reserves in Israel. In addition, there is information showing that an air attack is being prepared in Israel against neighboring Syrian territory in preparation for the intrusion of Israel forces deep in Syrian territory.[26]

The scare was so great that Secretary General Thant asked Lt. Gen. Odd Bull, Chief of Staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organization, to investigate. His report failed to bear out any of Federenko's charges of Israeli plans and preparations to invade Syria. A mildly worded resolution was submitted by Argentina, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Uganda, and Nigeria which, among other things, called on Syria to take stronger measures to prevent further border incidents. It received ten votes in the Council. But it was killed by a Soviet veto, the first in two years and the first ever cast by the Soviets against a resolution proposed by African countries.

All through 1966, both the Soviet Union and Egypt drew closer to the Arab extremists, represented most uncompromisingly by the new Syrian regime. In April, Prime Minister Zuayin and a large Syrian delegation made a pilgrimage to Moscow and came back reporting a Soviet contribution of about $150,000,000 to finance a Euphrates River dam and power station.[27] On July 8, Egypt and Syria signed a trade pact, the first agreement of this sort between them since the 1961 break. Late in July, an Iraqi delegation went to Moscow and returned boasting of a pledge of Soviet arms. And on November 4, Egypt and Syria signed a mutual defense agreement providing for a joint military command.

V

As late as November 24, 1966, almost three weeks after he had signed the Egypt-Syria military pact, President Gamal Abdel Nasser still said publicly that "the way back to Palestine is hard and long."[28] Only six months later, he seemed to think that it had become much easier and shorter.

Why? The answer holds the key to the third Arab-Israeli war.

The trouble, as usual, started on the Syria-Israel

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frontier. Here is a record of the violence that flared up in the first eleven days of January 1967, as recorded in an Arab factual source:

January 1: An Israeli spokesman in Tel Aviv said that three Israeli tractors near Haon village on the southeastern shore of the Sea of Galilee came under fire from a Syrian post. The fire was returned.

January 2: A military spokesman in Damascus claimed that Syrian armed forces had destroyed three Israeli outposts to the north of the Sea of Galilee.

January 4: An Israeli spokesman said that two armed Syrians had fired several shots at Israeli farmers southeast of Ein Gev on the eastern shore of Galilee. Nobody was hurt in this exchange.

January 6: A Syrian army spokesman said that Syrian arms fire had destroyed an Israeli tractor north of the Sea of Galilee. At least one Israeli was killed or wounded as he was seen being removed from the tractor.

A later statement issued by the same spokesman said that Syrian armed forces had destroyed two Israeli outposts in a clash between both sides. The clash began, he said, when Israeli outposts shelled Arab farmers.

January 8: Syria claimed that its forces had demolished a number of Israeli military targets including an ammunition dump, after Israeli troops had opened fire on its hillside positions. A spokesman in Tel Aviv alleged that Syria had started the firing which continued for over three hours.

January 9: Firing broke out all along the frontier and lasted for about two hours. Syria admitted losing one machine gun and claimed to have destroyed one Israeli tank. The Israeli countercharge said two Syrian tanks were destroyed and another hit after Syrian positions had opened fire on a tractor.

January 10: An Israeli spokesman said that tanks and heavy mortars were used in a Syrian attack. He listed seven separate incidents of firing into Israel from the Syrian side of the border.

January 11: According to the Syrian spokesman, heavy tanks, weapons, tanks, and aircraft were used. The spokesman said: "Enemy gun batteries and tanks were silenced for good, an anti-tank gun was destroyed and a fuel dump burned out." Israeli aircraft appeared but were forced back to base by Syrian jets, the spokesman said.[29]

There is, of course, no point in trying to assess the blame for these incidents. What is clear from both Syrian and Israeli versions is that a small-scale border war broke out early this year. There could be no doubt, by this time, that these attacks and counterattacks were deliberate, organized, and increasingly costly. On January 14, an explosion took place in a pump-house, damaging a wall in Dishon, a village in northern Israel. A few hours later, an anti-personnel mine went off at a football game in Dishon. A player set it off; one spectator was killed and two were wounded. Israeli army sources reported that both the explosives and the mine were East-European in origin, of the type used by the Syrian army.[30]

January was another month of futile Israeli-Syrian exchanges at the United Nations. To the Israeli demand that Syria should take steps to prevent these incursions, the Syrian Head of State, Dr. Nureddin el-Attassi, replied with the utmost candor. On February 8, he declared publicly that "we shall not act as protectors of Israel against Palestine commandos defending their homeland." On February 22, he said: "It is the duty of all of us now, to move from defensive positions to offensive positions and enter the battle to liberate the usurped land. There is absolutely no scope for hesitation from now on and everyone must face the test and enter the battle to the end." On March 8, he made a speech which was reported by an Arab news source as follows: "Dr. Attassi called on Palestine Arabs to follow the example of the Algerians in their fight against the French and model their methods on the North Vietnamese fighting the Americans. Palestine will not be returned to its people except by 'an all-out war of liberation,' he said. He praised the bravery of Palestine Arab commandos inside occupied Palestine (Israel). 'Commando action in the occupied land will not cease,' he said. The Syrian army, he said, 'is ready to fight the decisive battle with Israel.' "[31]

FOR THE Syrian government, then, the war against Israel had already started. It was being waged in the manner that Syria considered most advantageous. The old *fedayeen* tactics had been renamed the "people's war of liberation" and had been given new dimensions as well as new significance. The new *fedayeen* were trained and equipped by the Syrian army, which was itself being trained and equipped by the Soviet Union. Though these actions started as "commando" raids, the main Syrian military forces were inevitably drawn into the fighting by Israeli retaliatory measures. Battles with tanks, anti-tank guns, and planes early in January could hardly be dismissed any longer as minor border "incidents." The official Syrian radio broadcast the El Fatah communiqués as war bulletins.

Nevertheless, the Syrians were still far out. From their point of view, Egypt and especially Jordan were holding back. Nasser had always taken the position that the United Arab Command could not act unless the forces of one Arab country could pass through and fight in the territory of another. This was precisely what King Hussein of Jordan feared the most because the Egyptians and Syrians had been vowing for years to overthrow his "reactionary" regime. In January 1967, renewed pressure was brought on Hussein to permit other Arab military forces to move into Jordan. When he refused, Nasser assailed

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him mercilessly on February 22 as an American puppet, and Hussein retaliated by withdrawing his ambassador from Cairo. When the Arab Joint Defense Council met in Cairo on March 11, Jordan as well as Tunisia and Saudi Arabia refused to attend. As long as Hussein was actually more afraid of Egypt and of Syria than of Israel, the united Arab front which Nasser demanded as a precondition for an all-out war against Israel could not be realized. As late as March 1966, Nasser took the position that an attack on Israel from the south was not militarily possible; the Arab attack had to come from Syria and Jordan.[32]

To fight fire with fire, Hussein's government began to twit Nasser about the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) which the Arab militants had always regarded as an Egyptian alibi to refrain from attacking Israel. Prime Minister Wasfi Tell of Jordan even accused Nasser of having in 1957 entered into a "gentlemen's agreement" with Ben Gurion to set up a buffer between Israel and Egypt. An American correspondent reported:

> The whole question of UNEF has been brought up by Jordan in Arab defense councils, where Jordan has been under heavy pressure to admit foreign troops to defend the country against Israeli attacks.
>
> Jordan responded by insisting that other Arab states also go on a war footing for the battle with Israel, and specifically asked Egypt to get rid of UNEF so that the Egyptian army—the biggest in the Arab world—can take part in the battle.
>
> The Egyptian response has been that the UN force was symbolic (it numbers about 3000 men) and would have no effect whatsoever if it tried to stop Egyptian army movements.[33]

Hussein and his advisers undoubtedly considered this riposte a clever way of embarrassing the Egyptians. In the circumstances of early 1967, however, it rather played into the hands of the Syrians, his most intransigent Arab enemies, who were telling Nasser exactly the same thing, though their motives were undoubtedly different. Thus, from the Arab "Left" and "Right," pressure was building up for Nasser to "go on a war footing for the battle with Israel."

But again, the Soviets saw fit to contribute a major war scare to the sufficiently tense situation on the Syria-Israel frontier. The Soviet press, of course, wholly blamed Israel for the incidents. But it went further and, as in the previous October, invented a virtual Israeli mobilization to invade Syria. A report in *Izvestia*, the Soviet government organ, of February 3, 1967, ran: "War psychosis is mounting in the state of Israel. The country's armed forces are being alerted. All leave has been cancelled and more reservists have been called up. Large armed forces have been concentrated on the northern border. The incidents on the Syrian-Israel frontier which began on the eve of the New Year, continue unabated." Thus for the second time in less than four months, the Soviets were responsible for spreading an unfounded rumor, no doubt in the guise of intelligence reports, that could only serve to incite the Syrians and neighboring Arabs to stage a counter-mobilization and prepare for imminent war.

If internal Arab pressure was one factor in Nasser's decision, the other was external pressure on his policy.

Ever since 1955, Egypt had become increasingly dependent on Soviet military and economic largesse. The Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe had provided Nasser with at least $1.5 billion in economic aid, and probably more than that in military assistance. In 1965, according to Nasser himself, the Soviets had saved Egypt from "inevitable famine" by diverting 300,000 tons of wheat to Alexandria. By the beginning of 1967, Nasser was desperately in need of food again. He could not get it from the United States, which for a year had been holding up an Egyptian request for $150 million of surplus food after Nasser had made a number of insulting anti-U.S. speeches. In January 1967, the Soviets again agreed to tide him over with 250,000 tons of wheat in the next three months. On February 22, Nasser made another inflammatory oratorical attack on the United States in which he threatened not to pay Egypt's debts which amounted to over $1 billion of which almost half a billion belonged to the United States. In February, too, Egypt failed for the third successive month to make any payment to the International Monetary Fund to which it owed some $105 million lent in the past four years.

In these circumstances, the Soviet factor could not have failed to weigh heavily in Nasser's calculations. On March 29, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko suddenly arrived in Cairo for a three-day visit. Very little is known about it except that it was arranged hurriedly. Whatever it signified, it came on the eve of the final crisis before the third Arab-Israeli war.

VI

On April 7, the biggest Arab-Israeli battle since 1956 was fought over Syria. It precipitated all the events which led to the larger war almost exactly two months later.

The escalation of the fighting that day was typical; only the magnitude of the forces and the losses suffered were not. According to both Israeli and Syrian versions, Syrian guns emplaced in the hills overlooking the Israeli frontier settlements opened fire on an Israeli tractor plowing in the "demilitarized zone" that morning.[34] Soon tanks and mortars went into action. By the end of the day, Israel reported shooting down six MIG-21's of the Syrian air force with no losses of its own; Syria claimed that five Israeli Mirage jets and

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four Syrian MIGs had been shot down. Unfortunately for the Syrians, three of their planes crashed in Jordan, as a result of which these losses could be confirmed. The Jordanians were so unkind that they issued a report that the Syrian planes had been armed with dummy wooden rockets. The Damascus radio struck back: "The days of the treasonable regime in Jordan are numbered."[35]

For the Syrians, the April 7 battle was no setback. It was a welcome occasion for heating up the "popular liberation war" against Israel. On April 8, the Syrian Minister of Information, Mahmoud Al-Zu'bi, declared that the clash "will be followed by more severe battles until Palestine is liberated and the Zionist presence ended." The fighting, he said, "is not the first battle nor will it be the last." He told reporters that there could be no permanent calm in the Arab areas adjacent to Israel "as long as there is Zionist occupation of Palestine." The battle, he boasted, proved Syria's superiority in land fighting, if not in the air, "since Israeli military outposts were destroyed and serious damage caused to four settlements."[36] On April 17, the Syrian Head of State, Dr. el-Attassi, celebrated the same battle as having been "very useful to us." Syria, he said, "cannot but support Arab commandos" and "is prepared to wage the battle with all its resources, whatever the cost or sacrifices." He inveighed against Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Morocco because they were not revolutionary enough.[37]

For Nasser, April 7 was a dividing line. It forced him to face as never before the problem of implementing the Egypt-Syria mutual defense pact of the previous November. Syria, after all, claimed to have been attacked by Israel, and whether its losses were four or six planes, they were evidence of the seriousness of the struggle. This meant that he was obliged to come to the defense of Syria, wherever that might lead. The Jordanians, enjoying his dilemma, could not resist needling him. The leading Jordanian newspaper of April 8 demanded: "What has Cairo done in face of this flagrant air aggression on Damascus?"[38] On April 10, Cairo sent its air commander, General Mohammed Sidky Mahmoud, to Damascus to confer for twelve days. On April 17, Egypt's Prime Minister, Mohammed Sidky Soliman, came to Damascus for five days, the highest-ranking Egyptian official to visit Syria since the 1961 break. A communiqué on April 22 pledged both sides "to carry out joint plans under the joint defense agreement between them," and to consider the "battle for the liberation of Palestine" the main cause around which the Arab masses should rally.[39] On May 2, President Nasser felt it necessary to explain why Egyptian planes had not come to the rescue of the Syrians as a result of the April 7 clash. He attributed the failure to act to the limited range of Egypt's fighter planes, a restriction which he said had been pointed out to the Syrians, who had assured him that they had enough fighters of their own.[40]

As for the Soviets, the onesided defeat of their MIG's by French Mirages, which was generally credited, gave them a direct stake in the outcome of the April 7 battle. Every move that Syria and Egypt might subsequently make had to be paid for largely by the Soviets, and without Soviet materiel, the two Arab states could not contemplate making war. The Soviets had invested so heavily in Syria and Egypt, as well as in Iraq, that they could not stay out of this runaway crisis even if they had wanted to do so. And far from wanting to stay out, they clearly tried to get more and more deeply embroiled in it.

THE NEXT ROUND of "commando" violence showed how far the Soviet leaders intended to go. On May 5, Israeli territory was shelled from Lebanon, and on May 8, a military vehicle was blown up five miles inside Israeli territory. These exploits by El Fatah demonstrated such technical proficiency that the Israeli government decided to issue a stern warning.

This appraisal was fully backed up by the UN truce observers whose reports led Secretary General Thant to declare on May 11:

> I must say, that in the last few days, the El Fatah type of incidents have increased, unfortunately. Those incidents have occurred in the vicinity of the Lebanese and Syrian lines and are very deplorable, especially because, by their very nature, they seem to indicate that the individuals who committed them have had more specialized training than has usually been evidenced in El Fatah incidents in the past. That type of activity is insidious, is contrary to the letter and spirit of the Armistice Agreements and menaces the peace of the area. All governments concerned have an obligation under the General Armistice Agreements, as well as under the Charter of the United Nations and in the interest of peace, to take every measure within their means to put an end to such activities.[41]

Apparently the full import of the crisis that gathered in May caught the Israeli government by surprise. In an interview in *U. S. News & World Report* of April 17, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol had been asked whether he expected a full-scale war with Egypt, Syria, or Jordan. He incautiously replied that"I don't think there will be full-scale war in the next few years—although we are, of course, preparing for such a possibility, and I say that openly to the world."[42] But on May 12, Eshkol spoke with less confidence in the future. Of attempts to commit sabotage on Israeli soil, he said: "There will be no immunity for any State which aids and abets such acts." He noted that Syria seemed to have taken on itself to assume the leadership in the Arab struggle against Israel. But, he added, Syria's forces were not great, and "not without reason is she looking for protection among larger countries." Although this need not

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cause any alarm, he cautioned, "we shall go on manning our posts, ready for any possible deployment." The following day, he again spoke on the same theme without appearing to think that a showdown was imminent:

> The firm and persistent stand we have taken on behalf of our rights has strengthened the awareness among our neighbors that they will not be able to prevail against us in open combat. They recoil today from any frontal clash with Israel, and they postpone the date of such a confrontation to the remote future. Among the Arab rulers and their saboteur-minions, there are some who nowadays attempt to manifest their hostility to Israel in deeds, diligently in search of ways of attrition, subversion, and aggression against human lives. We have furnished proof that we shall not permit our borders to be opened to attack. We have proved that to their attempts to pick easy and exposed targets, we were able to respond at a place, time, and by a method of our own choosing. Thus, the saboteurs and their employers found out that they would not accomplish their aims this way. We do not recognize the limitations they endeavor to impose upon our acts of response. The Arab States and the nations of the world ought to know that any border which is tranquil from their side will also be quiet from our side. If they try to sow unrest on our border—unrest will come to theirs.[43]

I have cited the relevant portions of these two statements by Eshkol at some length because they —and particularly the first one of May 12—were later used by Nasser to justify his decision to move troops to the Israeli border and to renew the blockade of Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba. In a long and most revealing press conference in Cairo on May 28, Nasser said:

> In its threats in the past few years, Israel has gone beyond every limit. The most recent thing was the Israeli Prime Minister's threat to attack Syria and his war threats. Israel has been continuously threatening war. On May 12, this threat reached an extent that no one would accept. It was the duty of every Arab to respond to this threat. Therefore, I said that if Israel wanted to threaten war—which it actually did—then Israel is welcome.[44]

Soviet Premier Kosygin also referred in his UN speech of June 19 to Prime Minister Eshkol's alleged threats:

> The Premier of Israel made it clear that the armed attack on Syria in April was not the last step, and that Israel was itself going to choose the method and time for new actions of this kind.

THE READER may judge for himself whether Eshkol was guilty of threatening to attack Syria or of threatening war in Nasser's or Kosygin's sense. Ironically, the Israeli Prime Minister had opened himself to some criticism for refusing to believe that a full-scale war was so imminent. If we recall the kind of threats against Israel made for months and even years by the highest Arab leaders, this purported Israeli threat against Syria hardly seems to be sufficient cause for setting off a third Arab-Israel war. In any event, one of the alleged motivations for the Egyptian actions was the Eshkol statement of May 12.

The other motivation directly implicated the Soviet Union. An Egyptian parliamentary delegation went to Moscow for the May Day celebration and stayed until May 14. In his speech of resignation on June 9, later withdrawn, Nasser claimed that Egypt and Syria had been persuaded that Israel planned to invade Syria. But, as if he felt these Arab sources might not be sufficiently convincing, he added:

> Even our friends in the Soviet Union told the parliamentary delegation which was visiting Moscow early last month that there was a calculated intention [to invade Syria].[45]

An official Soviet version was given by Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin to the UN on June 19:

> In those days, the Soviet Government, and I believe others too, began receiving information to the effect that the Israeli government had timed for the end of May a swift strike at Syria in order to crush it and then carry the fighting over into the territory of the United Arab Republic [Egypt].

These statements raise a fascinating question about the Soviets' role in stirring up this conflict. In October 1966, as we have seen, Soviet Ambassador Federenko had rehearsed this very bit of intelligence and it had again made its appearance in the Soviet press in February 1967. Federenko had solemnly assured the UN that Israel had been "concentrating large military forces on the Syrian border," that it had been staging military maneuvers in areas adjacent to Syria, that it had partially mobilized reserves, and that it was preparing "for the intrusion of Israeli forces deep into Syrian territory." In an area as small as the Syrian-Israeli border, such activities could not have been concealed from the UN truce observers who reported no such things taking place. Now, seven months later, the Soviets were assuring their Egyptian friends of another Israeli plan to invade Syria.

This peculiar Soviet effort to inflame the Arabs had a peculiar background. After the battle of April 7, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Yakob Malik had called in the Israeli ambassador in Moscow, Katriel Katz, to accuse Israel of "aggression" and to threaten reprisals. On May 12, the Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Arye Levavi, had invited the Soviet ambassador, Dimitri Chuvakhin, who had accused Israel of concentrating forces on the Syrian border, to visit the area to see for himself. Chuvakhin had refused the offer with the curt reply that his government's information was good enough for him. Again on May 19, Eban tried to convince Chuva-

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khin. "I can state to you," Eban said, "that there are no concentrations on the Syrian frontier, and the Egyptians should know this." "On one occasion [May 29]," Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban told the UN on June 19, "the Soviet ambassador complained to my Prime Minister of heavy troop concentrations in the north of Israel. But when invited to join the Prime Minister that very moment in a visit to any part of Israel which he liked, the distinguished envoy brusquely refused."

But the damage had already been done. Nasser has said that he received information on May 13 that "Israel was concentrating on the Syrian border huge armed forces of about eleven to thirteen armed brigades," south and north of Lake Tiberias.[46] For this reason, he claimed, the first Egyptian troops were sent to the Sinai border with Israel on the night of May 14. Six days later, Secretary General Thant reported:

> There have been in the past few days persistent reports about troop movements and concentrations, particularly on the Israel side of the Syrian border. These have caused anxiety and at times excitement. The Government of Israel very recently has assured me that there are no unusual Israel troop concentrations or movements along the Syrian line, that there will be none and that no military action will be initiated by the armed forces of Israel unless action is first taken by the other side. *Reports from UNTSO Observers have confirmed the absence of troop concentrations and significant troop movements on both sides of the line* (my italics, T.D.).[47]

Israeli mobilizations, troop concentrations, and troop movements happen to be notoriously hard to conceal. A glance at the Syria-Israel border shows how short it is, barely fifty miles altogether. That UN truce observers should not have been able to see what the Soviets were telling the Egyptians and no doubt the Syrians about Israeli troops poised to invade Syria is one of the more seductive mysteries of the prewar buildup. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it was, unfortunately, not the only one.

VII

We have now come to the final or what may be called the Sharm el-Sheikh phase of the buildup.

As Secretary General Thant later told the story, the Commander of UNEF, Major General Rikhye, received a message from the Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces, General Mahmud Fawzi, at 10 P.M. (Gaza time) on May 16. It requested the immediate withdrawal of all UN troops from two places, El Sabha, a strategic point in Sinai at the northern end of the Egypt-Israel border, and Sharm el-Sheikh, the fortress controlling entrance into the Gulf of Aqaba. General Rikhye replied that he did not have the authority to order the withdrawal and was told that there might be clashes between Egyptian and UN troops that very night. While Secretary General Thant requested a clarification of the Egyptian request, Egyptian forces began on May 18 to take matters into their own hands. The observation posts at El Sabha and other points were occupied by Egyptian troops and two Egyptian artillery shells burst between two UN posts, one of them El Sabha. At noon (New York time) on May 18, the Secretary General received the official Egyptian request to withdraw all UN forces "as soon as possible" from Egyptian territory and the Gaza Strip. Mr. Thant expressed the intention of appealing to President Nasser for a reconsideration but was told not to do so or he would be sternly rebuffed. Two governments, undoubtedly India and Yugoslavia, which provided about half the troops for UNEF, took the position that they would comply with Egypt's request and withdraw their troops whatever the UN decided to do. On the night of May 18, Secretary General Thant ordered the total withdrawal of UNEF as requested by Egypt.[48] While U Thant was on his way to Egypt on May 22, Nasser, without waiting to see him, officially announced the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israel and the consequent blockade of the port of Eilat.

Most of the controversy raised by these actions has concentrated on two questions. Was the Secretary General right or adroit in withdrawing UNEF so quickly? Was Egypt legally justified in closing the Straits of Tiran to Israel and blockading Eilat? For the time being, only the second concerns us.

I do not wish to enter into the legality of the move because it seems to me largely beside the point. If nothing else were at stake but the blockade of Eilat, it would still have been a serious blow to Israel, for Eilat in 1967 was not what it had been in 1956. Israel had put a decade of stupendous effort into building up the port, its only outlet to the south. A pipeline had been built to carry the oil of Iran from Eilat to Beersheba and then by truck to a refinery in Haifa. A large proportion of the mineral exports from the Dead Sea and the growing copper production of Timna went out from Eilat. The ambitious development plans for the Negev largely depended on using the port of Eilat. Israel might well have fought for Eilat but the point is that, after May 18, Eilat was merely a symptom that Israel had to fight for itself.

On May 18, Syria's Foreign Minister, Dr. Ibrahim Makhous, gave the following interpretation of UNEF's withdrawal to the Syrian news agency: "The withdrawal of the UN forces in this manner, which means 'make way, our forces are on their way to the battle,' proves that there is nothing that can stand in the way of the Arab revolution and that reaction's attempt to raise

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doubts regarding the presence of these forces had boomeranged."[49]

On May 20, Syria's Defense Minister, General Hafiz el-Assad, told a Syrian newspaper that the Syrian air force had violated Israeli territory "dozens of times" in the past year. "The army, which has long been preparing itself for the battle and has its finger on the trigger, demands in one voice that the battle be expedited," he said. "At present we are awaiting the signal from the political leadership. As a military man I feel that the time has come to wage the liberation battle. In my opinion it is necessary to adopt at least the minimum measures required to deal a disciplinary blow to Israel, which should restore its senses and bring it to its knees, humiliated and terrified to live in an atmosphere of awe and fear which will prevent it from contemplating another aggression."[50]

On May 22, President Nasser delivered a radio address announcing the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba. In it he revealed for the first time what he had had in mind. First, he seemed preoccupied with explaining away the Egyptian defeat in 1956. He blamed it on the Anglo-French invasion which, he claimed, had prevented Egypt from fighting Israel. Then he boasted of his new Soviet planes: "At that time we had a few Ilyushin bombers. We had just acquired them to arm ourselves. Today we have many Ilyushins and others. There is a great difference between yesterday and today, between 1956 and 1967." And so the time had come to demonstrate what Egypt, if it did not have to worry about Britain and France, could do to Israel. "Today we have a chance to prove the fact. We have, indeed, a chance to make the world see matters in their true perspective. We are now face to face with Israel." Referring to Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol's statement of May 12, he took up the alleged challenge: "The Jews threatened war. We tell them: You are welcome, we are ready for war."[51] On that same day, Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol called for mutual withdrawal of Egyptian and Israeli troops from the border.

Thant reached Cairo on May 23 and stayed two days. As he has reported his conversations with the Egyptian President and Foreign Minister, the most important point made to him was a statement of their "general aim" in closing the Straits of Tiran to Israel. It had been done, they said, "for a return to the conditions prevailing prior to 1956."[52] As we shall see, this was not the only aim or purpose given by Nasser to explain why he had decided to take over Sharm el-Sheikh; it may be considered the minimum aim which could be stated to someone like the Secretary General.

THE FIRST PUBLIC Soviet and American reactions came on May 23. The Soviet statement did not refer to Sharm el-Sheikh and the renewed blockade of Eilat at all. It merely reiterated the charge that Israeli statesmen had threatened to attack Syria and, therefore, the Arab states had acted to repel the expected "aggression." It broadened the scope and implications of the crisis by contending that Israel's actions had been directly and indirectly encouraged by "certain imperialist circles which seek to bring back colonial oppression to Arab lands." In effect, it avoided all the concrete issues by giving general backing to the Arabs and making a general indictment of Israel.[53] President Johnson's statement of May 23 made two main points. The United States, he said, was "dismayed at the hurried withdrawal" of UNEF, an implied criticism of the Secretary General's decision. The other recommitted the United States, at least formally, to the 1957 understanding opening the Straits of Tiran to Israel:

> The United States considers the gulf [of Aqaba] to be an international waterway and feels that a blockade of Israeli shipping is illegal and potentially disastrous to the cause of peace. The right of free, innocent passage of the international waterway is a vital interest of the international community.[54]

However, all this was not really pertinent to what Nasser thought he was doing. On May 26, he made a speech to the Central Council of the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions. In it he said many things that would not have been fitting in conversations with the United Nations Secretary General. Most of this speech was devoted to explaining why he had waited so long to seek a showdown with Israel. Nasser explained:

> We awaited the proper day when we would be fully prepared and confident that we would adopt strong measures if we were to enter the battle with Israel. I say nothing aimlessly. One day two years ago, I stood up to say that we have no plan to liberate Palestine and that revolutionary action is our only course to liberate Palestine. I spoke at the Arab summit conferences. The summit conferences were meant to prepare the Arab states to defend themselves. Recently we have felt strong enough that if we were to enter a battle with Israel, with God's help we could triumph. On this basis, we decided to take actual steps.

Then he went on to explain why he had waited so long to get rid of UNEF:

> A great deal has been said in the past about the UN Emergency Force. Many people blamed us for UNEF's presence. We were not strong enough. Should we have listened to them or built and trained our army instead while UNEF still existed? I said once that we could tell UNEF to leave within half an hour. Once we were fully prepared we could ask UNEF to leave. And this is what has actually happened.

After this came the explanation for Sharm el-Sheikh:

> The same thing happened with regard to

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Sharm el-Sheikh. We were also attacked on this score by some Arabs. Taking over Sharm el-Sheikh meant confrontation with Israel. *Taking such action also meant that we were ready to enter war with Israel. It was not a separate operation.* Therefore, we had to take this fact into consideration when moving to Sharm el-Sheikh. The present operation was mounted on this basis (my italics, T.D.).

And if it came to war, what was the final aim? Nasser answered:

> The battle will be a general one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel. I probably could not have said such things five or even three years ago. If I had said such things and had been unable to carry them out my words would have been empty and valueless. Today, some eleven years after 1956, I say such things because I am confident. I know what we have here in Egypt and what Syria has. I also know that other states—Iraq, for instance, has sent its troops to Syria; Algeria will send troops; Kuwait will also send troops. They will send armored infantry units. This is Arab power.[55]

At a press conference in Cairo on May 28, Nasser reiterated for a non-Arab audience what the problem was not:

> The problem all of us are experiencing now and are concerned about—all of us, statesmen, journalists, and the multitudes of peoples—is neither the problem of the Tiran Straits nor the withdrawal of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF). All those are side issues of a bigger and more serious problem—the problem of the aggression which has taken place and continues to take place on the Arab homeland of Palestine and the continuous threat posed by that aggression against all Arab countries. This is the original problem.

For the nature of this threat, Nasser again referred to Prime Minister Eshkol's statement of May 12:

> Israel has been continuously threatening war. On May 12 this threat reached an extent that no one would accept. It was the duty of every Arab to respond to this threat. Therefore I said that if Israel wanted to threaten war—which it actually did—then Israel is welcome.

Once more Nasser explained that his actions the week before had "restored the situation to what it was in 1956." They were, he made clear, a challenge to Israel to capitulate or fight:

> We have taken these measures to restore things to what they were before. Now we are waiting to see what Israel will do next. Should Israel provoke us or any other Arab country, such as Syria, we are all prepared to face it. If Israel chooses war, then, as I have said, it is welcome to it. . . .

Toward the end of the conference, Nasser gave a peculiar definition of Israeli "aggression":

> As I have said, Israel's existence in itself is an aggression.[56]

Finally, on May 29, the same question of what the crisis was all about came up in a speech which Nasser made to members of the National Assembly who visited him:

> The issue now at hand is not the Gulf of Aqaba, the Straits of Tiran or the withdrawal of UNEF, but the rights of the Palestinian people. It is the aggression which took place in Palestine in 1948 with the collaboration of Britain and the United States.

He went on:

> The issue today is far more serious than they say. They want to confine the issue to the Straits of Tiran and the right of passage. We say: We demand the full rights of the Palestinian people. We say this out of our belief that Arab rights cannot be squandered because the Arabs throughout the world are demanding these Arab rights.[57]

In effect, Nasser had set up a situation in which, from his point of view, he could not lose. If the Israelis decided to capitulate to the new blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, it would set them back to the pre-1956 situation. They would be put in the position of acknowledging that they had fought the second Arab-Israeli war of 1956 in vain. They would surrender a decade of effort and treasure poured into the port of Eilat and the economic interests dependent on it. They would be forced to admit such military inferiority to the Arab states that they could only look forward to a future of waiting helplessly for the Arabs to make further demands. Nasser's minimum aim, therefore, amounted to winning the prize of a war without firing a shot.

But Nasser did not really expect the Israelis to capitulate. He recognized, as he stated openly on March 26, that his move at Sharm el-Sheikh was "not a separate operation" but was more likely to bring about "a general war with Israel." Throughout May, the Egyptian and Syrian leaders gave every indication of deliberately trying to provoke Israel into a general war. As Nasser put it on May 28, "Now we are waiting to see what Israel will do next," and "if Israel chooses war, then, as I have said, it is welcome to it." And if Israel chose war, he was confident that the Arabs would accomplish their maximum aim—to set Israel back to the pre-1948 situation, that is, before there was a state of Israel.

In view of the outcome of the war, it may be hard for some to imagine that Nasser deliberately set up a situation in which he considered the Israelis practically forced to attack. It may be difficult to believe that he could have so fantastically miscalculated the balance of power on both sides. But if politicians and generals did not make mistakes, there would never be any losers in wars. The evidence is overwhelming that Israel acted

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exactly as Nasser expected and wanted it to act. The only question is why he expected and wanted it.

Part of the answer lies in what the Arabs, especially the Egyptians, thought they had learned from the wars of 1948 and 1956. In the first, a number of Arab states had started out fighting together, but the Egyptians had borne the brunt of the final phase and considered themselves betrayed by the others. The lesson seemed to be that Egypt had to reform itself and depend on its own resources. In the second, Egypt had fought alone, despite pacts with Syria and Saudi Arabia which it had never put into effect. The lesson seemed to be that Arab unity was necessary to defeat Israel. Beyond this, the Egyptians also convinced themselves that they could have handled Israel alone if they had not been forced to use their best forces against Britain and France. Thus Arab unity plus an isolated Israel came to be the foolproof formula for victory in the third war.

Of the several prewar studies made of Arab-Israeli military capabilities, one is especially noteworthy because it comes from an Arab source. Some of the author's conclusions undoubtedly help us to get an insight into the thinking that led to Egypt's prewar policy. After examining the advantages and disadvantages offered by Israel's geographical position, the author observes: "Above all, the advantages accruing from Israel's compactness apply only when she is fighting on a single front at any one time—which she managed to do even in 1948 when engaging four Arab armies. The geographic fact that the Arabs surround Israel on three sides would be turned into a crushing military advantage once Arab military operations against Israel are conducted according to a single, coordinated plan." Then the study makes a very significant connection between Israel's manpower problem and the length of the war. The 250,000 men and women whom Israel could probably mobilize, it notes, would immobilize the entire economy, for which approximately half that number is needed, if the war went on for even a few days. His verdict is that "any war with Israel that lasts for over a week and which calls for more than 100,000 Israelis being mobilized would, by that fact and apart from the military outcome, do very extensive if not permanent damage to the economic life of Israel." In the air, this writer thought that Egypt had all the advantage. He was especially impressed by the heavy TU-16 bombers and medium IL-28 bombers which the Soviets had given Egypt. "Israel suffers from lack of territory which means that an Egyptian bomber based in Sinai would be over Israel within minutes of taking-off," he pointed out. "The opposite case does not apply to Egypt and Israeli bombers since these planes would have to cross the whole of Sinai and/or the Delta area before being within striking distance of Egypt's industrial centers." After making a survey of each of six Arab states which might possibly be involved in such a war, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, the study came to this final conclusion: "The only chance that the Arabs have of beating Israel in the field is through a properly unified and coordinated military action in which narrow nationalistic interests must give way to a sincere feeling of unity."[58]

The emphasis in this analysis was, then, on Arab unity, Israeli isolation, and the inability of Israel to fight a "long" war (more than a week!). If the first two conditions could be achieved, the outlook for the Arabs seemed most promising. For the Israelis, the same factors operated; Arab unification and their own isolation meant the approach of war, and to save themselves they had to fight at all costs the shortest possible war (less than a week!).

BY THE END of May, Arab unity seemed to be an accomplished fact. On May 24, Iraq decided to send land and sea forces to Syria and Egypt. To get to Egypt, however, Iraqi troops had to go through Jordan. That same day, King Hussein of Jordan decided to cast in his lot with what seemed to be an irresistible movement. He announced that he had granted Iraqi and Saudi Arabian forces permission to enter Jordan and that he had sent a representative to Cairo. On May 25, Dr. el-Attassi, the fire-eating Syrian head of state, told members of the Central Council of the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions: "Today we are living in a prelude to war." He added: "The time of the battle you have long awaited has come."[59] On May 30, King Hussein and President Nasser signed a Jordan-Egypt mutual defense pact which completed the Arab encirclement of Israel. Hussein, no doubt, was under pressure to join the Arab coalition or see his country invaded by Iraqi and other Arab forces anyway, an eventuality which would have doomed his regime one way or the other. Jordan, which had ordered the Syrian ambassador out of the country on May 23 as a result of a border incident, resumed full diplomatic relations with Syria on June 1. Iraqi and Kuwaiti troops arrived in Egypt on May 31. Iraqi President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Lt. Gen. Abderrahman Arif, told air force officers on June 1: "Brethren and sons, this is the day of the battle to avenge your martyred brethren who fell in 1948. It is the day to wash away the stigma. We shall, God willing, meet in Tel Aviv and Haifa."[60] On the same day, Ahmed Shukeiry, the chieftain of the Palestine Liberation Organization, gave an interview in the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem. Asked whether the PLO or the Jordanian army would fire the first shot against Israel, he replied:

> Why not? This is likely. It is most likely and possible that the Jordanian army will begin the battle and march to liberate the country—our country.

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Asked what would happen to native-born Israelis if the Arab attack succeeded, he answered:

> Those who survive will remain in Palestine. I estimate that none of them will survive.[61]

There was hardly ever a war in which it was more inconsequential which side struck the first blow. By the end of May, both sides were fully mobilized. Nasser had sent the bulk of his forces to the Sinai border with Israel, an effort so arduous and costly that it would have been well-nigh ruinous to both morale and equipment if he did not use them. The Israelis could not maintain a full-scale mobilization without straining themselves to the breaking point, war or no war. One rumor had it that the Israelis were going to attack Syria on May 15. Another rumor had reached the Israelis that the Egyptians were going to attack them on May 25. From this point on, the slightest incident could have triggered the war because each side knew the other was ready to go into full battle, and the Israelis, from the point of view of both geography and manpower, were in the worst position of all to wait to see whether it was just another incident or the opening shot of the expected war.

Nevertheless, while the Arabs could do something about their own unity, they could not by themselves do much about isolating Israel, the second key condition for victory in their war planning. To make sure that the lesson which they thought they had learned from 1956 would be carried out, they had to count on the Soviet Union. The Arabs were too sure and too proud of themselves to demand Soviet assistance in the form of Soviet armed forces in the coming war. It was enough that the Soviets had provided them with what seemed overwhelming superiority in military equipment for their numerically superior manpower. But the Soviets had to perform one more indispensable service for them—to give them a guarantee against any Western intervention on the side of Israel, as had happened in 1956.

This additional assistance to the Arab cause the Soviets were able and willing to contribute. The first indication of what the Arabs expected from the Soviets in this respect came in a press conference on May 21 in Cairo held by the uninhibited Shukeiry of the PLO. The question and answer went as follows:

> Q. Do you think that the Soviet Union will intervene to stop the fighting or do you think it might take either side?
>
> A. I think it will not take part in the fighting in terms of supporting the Arab forces, but in terms of supporting the Arab position like trying by all means to avoid any U.S. military intervention. This by itself is a great service to the cause of peace. I believe the efforts of the Soviet Union will be directed in one direction—that is, the localization of the war in the Middle East and to prevent the United States from any military involvement.[62]

Four days later, President Nasser decided to make sure. On May 25, he sent his War Minister, Shamseddin Badran, to Moscow. Badran returned on May 28, and the following day Nasser told publicly what he had accomplished.

> Badran relayed to me a message from Premier Kosygin saying that the Soviet Union stands with us in this battle and will not allow any country to intervene, so that the state of affairs prevailing before 1956 may be restored.[63]

Later, in his resignation speech of June 9, Nasser added one more detail relating to the Soviets' role in the pre-war crisis. On May 25, the Israeli government received information that Nasser was about to order a surprise attack on Israel.[64] This news was taken so seriously that Foreign Minister Eban, who had just arrived in Washington, urgently asked President Johnson to advance their scheduled meeting later that day by two hours. Evidently the Soviets had received the same information concerning Nasser's intentions.[65] For Nasser revealed that a message was handed on May 26 from President Johnson to the Egyptian ambassador in Washington "asking us for restraint and not to be the first to open fire. Otherwise we would face serious consequences." And a few hours later, at 3:30 a.m., the Soviet ambassador in Cairo came to see Nasser and "told me that the Soviet Government strongly requested we should not be the first to open fire."[66] We have so far only Nasser's version of these events. Nasser implied that the only reason he did not fire the first shot was that the U.S. and the USSR had asked him not to do so. In any case, the Soviet commitment did not depend on who fired the first shot; the Egyptians and Israelis were fully mobilized and presumably prepared for any eventuality; Nasser continued as if it did not matter who struck the first blow, and he fully expected Israel to be provoked into it; the fatal mistake was not in waiting, if Egypt did wait, but in failing to be on the alert, especially in its military airfields, at a time when the slightest incident could have touched off the "general war with Israel."

FROM THIS it may be gathered that Kosygin had committed the Soviet Union two things: Soviet intervention on the side of the Arabs *if* any other power intervened on the side of Israel, and a restoration of the pre-1956 rather than the pre-1948 situation.[67] There is no reason to believe that the Soviets committed themselves to intervene unilaterally or that the Arabs asked them to do so. The Arabs were too confident of winning without direct Soviet intervention as long as the Soviets could give them a guarantee against intervention by the United States or any other Western power. This does not mean that the Arabs set themselves merely the restoration of the 1956 situation. In his speech on May 29, Nasser said:

> Now, eleven years after 1956, we are restoring

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things to what they were in 1956. This is from the material aspect. In my opinion this material aspect is but a small part, whereas the spiritual aspect is the great side of the issue. The spiritual aspect involves the renaissance of the Arab nation, the revival of the Palestine question, and the restoration of confidence to every Arab and to every Palestinian. This is on the basis that if we were able to restore conditions to what they were in 1956, God will surely help and urge us to restore the situation to what it was in 1948.[68]

At this stage, during the ten days before the outbreak, Nasser had reason to worry about what might happen in the United Nations, just as Israel had reason to worry after its victory. On the evening of May 23, Canada and Denmark requested an immediate meeting of the Security Council to deal with the Middle Eastern crisis. After the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba, the full dimensions of the emergency were clearly visible. Indeed, four days earlier, on May 19, Secretary General U Thant had already advised the Council that "the current situation in the Near East is more disturbing, indeed, I say more menacing, than at any time since the fall of 1956."[69] The Canadian-Danish request was supported by U.S. Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg who offered to join with the Soviet Union, Britain, and France "in a common effort to restore and maintain peace in the Middle East."[70]

But the Soviet Union was already running interference for the Arab states, and Egypt in particular, to prevent any "intervention" by outside powers in the consummation of the Arab plan. Therefore, Soviet Ambassador Federenko barred the way on May 24 to permit the Security Council even to take up the subject. The reason he gave shows to what extreme lengths the Soviet leaders were willing to go to give the Arabs a free hand. "Having heard the statements of representatives of the Western powers," Federenko said loftily, "we are even more convinced that certain forces are *artificially heating up the climate* for reasons that have nothing to do with a true concern for peace and security in the Near East" (my italics, T.D.). He brusquely rejected the proposal that the Soviet Union should take part in consultations.[71]

The Security Council met again on May 29 to discuss the by now inescapable Middle East crisis. On this occasion, the Egyptian spokesman, Ambassador Mohammed Awad el-Kony, explained in brutally frank terms why Egypt had been justified in closing the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel:

> The continued violations and the numerous premeditated acts of aggression in all dimensions against the Arabs, which culminated in the cowardly attack on Sinai in 1956, clearly means that *a state of overt war has been existing.* Hence my Government has the legitimate right, in accordance with international law, to impose restrictions on navigation in the Straits of Tiran with respect to shipping to the enemy (my italics, T.D.).[72]

This candid rationale for Egypt's actions meant, if it meant anything, that *overt* war had already broken out in the Middle East and, indeed, had been going on ever since 1956. But if Ambassador el-Kony was right—and he was merely repeating assertions that had been made for years in Cairo and Damascus—anything the Israelis did after May 29 was also justified. If the Egyptians and the Israelis were already in a state of "overt war" on that date, it is hard to see how the Israelis could be charged with an "aggression" which started the war a week later. The logic used by the Egyptians for closing the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel contained a built-in justification for any military action that the Israelis might take in retaliation. Yet the Egyptian case against Israel seemed to be based on the flagrant contradiction that Egypt could close the Gulf of Aqaba because it was in a state of war with Israel but Israel could not strike back because it was not in a state of war with Egypt. One never ceases to wonder at the human predilection for having one's cake and eating it too.

As LATE AS May 29, however, Ambassador Federenko still accused Ambassador Goldberg of attempting "to dramatize the situation," as if anything could have been more dramatic than the Egyptian declaration, made only a few hours earlier, that "a state of overt war" existed in the Middle East. Federenko, however, was not above dramatizing the situation in his own way. A "dangerous aggravation of tensions" existed in that part of the world, he declared, but there was only one "real culprit"—Israel. His solution was extraordinarily uncomplicated. All that was necessary was for the Western powers, who were allegedly using Israel to restore their former colonial rule, should "simply call to order" their Israeli "friends and allies."[73]

On May 31, Ambassador Federenko took a different tack. He defended the Arab cause mainly by attacking a mythical U.S. "naval blockade" of Cuba, which he seemed to equate with the Egyptian blockade of Israel.[74] And on June 3, at the last meeting of the Security Council before the outbreak of hostilities, he contented himself for the most part with again complaining about Cuba and by attacking U.S. policy in Vietnam.[75] Thus Soviet strategy in the UN consisted of preventing serious discussion of the issue first by belittling its gravity and then by talking of other things.

When the UN might have done something about preventing the war, the Soviets did everything in their power to reduce the organization to impotence and bring it into disrepute. When the lightning Israeli victory proved that the Soviets had not done enough for the Arabs merely by forcing Israel to fight alone, they attempted to turn the UN into an anti-Israeli coalition to restore the very *status quo ante* for which the Arab

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states had waged the war. It is questionable which Soviet tactic has done the UN more lasting damage.

VIII

None of the great, not-so-great, and no-longer-so-great powers distinguished itself in this war crisis.

For the United States, the third Arab-Israeli war was the final stage of bankruptcy of a Middle Eastern policy that went back to the Baghdad Pact of 1955. This association of Britain, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan, which the United States did not join but with which it maintained an intimate liaison, was undoubtedly the most dubious and rickety of John Foster Dulles's diplomatic brain children. Each of its members was less interested in any of the others than in pleasing the United States in order to get on the high priority list for American arms. The only Arab member was Iraq which was then challenging Egypt for leadership in the Arab world. As a result, Egypt under Nasser took umbrage and considered the pact a threat to its own pretensions and ambitions. For once, Egypt and Israel agreed on something—neither had any use for the pact. When Britain tried to get Jordan into it, the opposition was so great that two Jordanian governments fell in one week and King Hussein had to get rid of Sir John B. Glubb (better known as Glubb Pasha, Chief of the Jordanian General Staff), terminate the Anglo-Jordanian treaty, and cancel British rights to bases in Jordan. When the Iraqi strong man, Nuri el-Said, was assassinated in 1958, Iraq was quickly knocked out of the pact which had to be reorganized the following year as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) without any Arab membership at all. As John C. Campbell dryly noted, CENTO remained "a rather artificial combination of three Middle Eastern states which have few natural ties with each other,"[76] a condition which surely made this alliance one of the most unnatural on record. In addition, it might be added, it contained the one Western power that had been the most longstanding *bête noire* of Arab nationalism. Of the three remaining Middle Eastern states, over $4 billion of U.S. aid did not prevent Pakistan from turning to the Soviet Union in 1965, and a somewhat less astronomical handout did not prevent Iran from accepting $286 million of economic aid from the USSR in 1966 and signing a $100 million military aid agreement with the USSR in January 1967.

As ironies of history go, one of the most delectable is the fact that John Foster Dulles found some of his most successful, if unauthorized, disciples—in Moscow. Once the Soviets decided to compete actively with the United States for influence in the so-called underdeveloped or developing countries, they did not have to exhibit any marked originality; it largely sufficed for them to take over and adapt for their own uses the instrumentalities of foreign policy which Dulles did not invent but which he elevated in importance to a degree that only the United States could afford—economic aid and military assistance. The United States could hardly complain if the Soviet Union, using the former's own methods, outbid it in selected countries. The Soviet footholds in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq were not for the most part gained by using the local Communist parties (the Syrian party became an important factor only in 1966), but by making direct state-to-state economic and military deals with whichever amenable government happened to be in power. In making these deals, however, the Soviets did have one advantage. The United States could not or would not adopt a hard, gross anti-Israeli line to please the Arabs; all it could do was try to maintain friendly relations with both sides. The closer the Soviets got to the Arabs, the more virulently anti-Israel they became. To listen to Soviet spokesmen in the United Nations, the Arabs could do no wrong and the Israelis no right; there has never been a Soviet word of protest against the *fedayeen*, the Palestine Liberation Organization, or El Fatah raids on Israeli territory; there has never been anything for the Soviets but Israeli "aggression" and "provocation."

The United States has given over $1 billion to Egypt and over one-half billion dollars to Jordan in aid in the past two decades. Jordan, in addition, has been fully armed by the United States; it possessed twice as many U.S. tanks as Israel had in the recent war.[77] Egypt has been a lost cause for years and hopelessly lost since 1965. But the case of Jordan demonstrates far more flagrantly the failure of U.S. policy in this area. Jordan was armed supposedly to make it capable of resisting the inroads of its Arab antagonists, Egypt and Syria. It cannot be said that this calculation was altogether wrongheaded. But in the payoff, the arms given to Jordan might just as well have been added to the Soviet arms given to Egypt and Syria. The policy failed when it was needed the most.

In the days immediately before the outbreak of the third Arab-Israeli war, the United States was, therefore, caught with almost no leverage on the Arab side. The confusion and indecision in Washington were immense, even if some of the difficulties were understandable. One obstacle was that U.S. officials were at first not quite sure what the U.S. commitment to Israel was. I was authoritatively told in Washington that former President Eisenhower was called, after Nasser officially closed the Straits of Tiran to Israel on May 22, and asked just what the U.S. commitment made by him in 1957 was. He answered forthrightly that he considered it a "commitment of honor" for the United States to live up to his assurance to former Prime Minister Ben Gurion that the Straits would be kept open. As a result, President Johnson is-

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sued his statement of principle the following day affirming that the United States judged the blockade of Israeli shipping to be "illegal and potentially disastrous to the cause of peace." But how to break through the blockade was something else.

The first modality was another piece of paper—a declaration signed by as many maritime powers as possible along the lines of President Johnson's statement but containing an implicit warning that the signatories were prepared to exercise the rights of "free and innocent passage." At the same time, but far more mutedly, plans were gingerly being worked out for a collective maritime flotilla —soon dubbed the "Red Sea Regatta"—to provide a naval escort for ships through the Straits of Tiran, if Egypt did not heed the declaration. This contingency planning, in the Pentagon, was British and American, without any great enthusiasm on either side.[78] The United States had the 50-ship Sixth Fleet with its two aircraft carriers, *America* and *Saratoga,* and a third carrier, *Intrepid,* and the British had about half a dozen ships in the area, but two British aircraft carriers, *Victorious* and *Hermes,* were about 1000 miles away in the vicinity of Aden. First, however, President Johnson and the State Department worked on the maritime declaration which was relatively cheap since it needed words rather than action. When Israeli Foreign Minister Eban came to Washington on May 25, he was urged to prevail on the Israeli government to trust in the proposed action of the "maritime powers" and meanwhile to use the utmost restraint. "We were at first asked to wait two days," Prime Minister Eshkol later recalled. "Then we sent Abba Eban to the United States—and were asked to wait a further fortnight. They told us that forty to fifty maritime powers would sign a guarantee for free passage through the Tiran Strait."[79] Actually, no more than fifteen to twenty powers ever indicated that they might sign the declaration in principle, and only the Netherlands and Australia seemed prepared to back the United States and Great Britain in any possible implementation.

In Cairo, meanwhile, the U.S. embassy was a diplomatic shambles. For three months before the May crisis, the ambassadorial post in the Egyptian capital had been vacant. No U.S. official in all that time had talked to President Nasser. The new U.S. ambassador, Richard H. Nolte, a respected student of Islamic jurisprudence and culture but without diplomatic experience and with an excessive deference for Arab sensibilities, did not arrive at his post until May 21, on the eve of Nasser's closure of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel. When Nolte was asked at the airport what he thought of the approaching crisis, he replied, according to one version, "What crisis?", and according to another: "There is no crisis in the Middle East. This thing will not amount to much."[80] This was too much for David G. Nes, who had been Deputy Chief of Mission in Cairo in the absence of an ambassador. Nes later took the extraordinary step for a career diplomat of making public his alarm and dismay at the way the Egyptian buildup had been handled. Nes revealed that he had been convinced as far back as January 1967 that Nasser had been planning a major confrontation with Israel and the West. Apparently unable to get through to his superiors in Washington, Nes wrote a letter in the first week of January to Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, urging that a top professional diplomat or a well-known business executive close to President Johnson be appointed as ambassador in Cairo inasmuch as the incumbent, Lucius Battle, was scheduled to leave the post in March. When Mr. Nes protested to Mr. Nolte that his remarks at the airport had greatly underestimated the seriousness of the situation, the latter reportedly replied that Washington thought Mr. Nes was being an alarmist.[81] The imbroglio in the embassy was so demoralizing that the State Department sent its adviser on the Middle East, Charles W. Yost, to Cairo to calm the troubled diplomatic waters. President Johnson chose the former Secretary of the Navy in the Eisenhower administration, Robert B. Anderson, as his personal envoy to Nasser.

In the UN, Ambassador Goldberg tried to spell out a key phrase in Secretary General Thant's report of May 27. Thant had urged "all the parties concerned to exercise special restraint, to forgo belligerence and to avoid all other actions which could increase tension, to allow the Council to deal with the underlying causes of the present crisis and to seek solutions." In his statement on May 29, Mr. Goldberg paid special attention to the words, "forgo belligerence." He said: "We believe, from the context of the situation, that with respect to the particularly sensitive area of Aqaba, forgoing belligerence must mean forgoing any blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba during the breathing-spell requested by the Secretary General, and permitting free and innocent passage of all nations and all flags through the Straits of Tiran to continue as it has during the last ten years."[82] It was a good try, but the Egyptian spokesman, Ambassador el-Kony, made short work of it by arguing, among other things, that the three Arab states bordering the Gulf—Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt—were already "in a state of war with Israel" and, therefore, had the right "to ban the vessels of an enemy."[83] The double standard operated throughout: Egypt was at war with Israel but Israel had no right to be at war with Egypt.

In any event, the negotiations for the maritime powers' declaration dragged on, and the planning for a flotilla to escort ships through the Straits in some indeterminate contingency became more and more remote. President Johnson maintained the position that somehow or other the Israelis were

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going to get through the Straits, if they waited long enough. But there was a marked difference between what correspondents heard at the White House and the State Department, and at the Pentagon. The men at the first two were preoccupied with the problem of playing for time, but if diplomatic time ran out, the men at the third were in no mood to force a military showdown. The latter were haunted by the prospect of a "second Vietnam" in the Middle East for which they were totally unprepared. Moreover, the administration was making no effort to prepare American public opinion for such a dire eventuality. Even at the White House and the State Department, those who supported Israel's right to freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran in principle could hardly bring themselves to contemplate what might be necessary to enforce this right in practice.[84] A high State Department official threw up his hands in despair at what might have happened if the *Intrepid* had been sent, as someone once suggested, through the Straits.

President Johnson's resort was to keep both sides talking as long as possible in search of a "compromise" solution. For this purpose, it was announced on June 4, the day before the outbreak, that he had invited President Nasser to send Vice President Zakaria Mohieddin to Washington, and had arranged to send Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey to Cairo. Nasser agreed for reasons of his own. Despite his more belligerent utterances, he was not altogether averse to having his way in the Gulf of Aqaba without firing a shot, thereby enabling him to claim in the Arab world that he had taken from the Israelis the equivalent of what the latter had had to gain by fighting a war. Nasser was not unwilling to permit the great powers to "prevent war," in his sense, as long as he did not permit the Israelis to get back into the Gulf of Aqaba. For this reason, as he agreed to send Mohieddin to Washington, on June 4 he also told the so-called maritime powers what price they would have to pay for doing business with him: "We shall consider any declaration by them as a transgression of our sovereignty. It would be considered a preliminary to an act of war."[85]

THE TROUBLE with all this diplomatic byplay from the Israeli point of view was that it had become largely irrelevant. For Israel was faced with two problems, and Washington wished to concern itself with only one. The two were the blockade of Eilat and the Egyptian military buildup on the Sinai border. By the beginning of June, the buildup was so great, and the Israeli strain of countermobilization so intense, that the question of the Gulf of Aqaba had taken second place in the Israelis' calculation of the danger before them. There was no telling when the proposed maritime powers' declaration might be signed, now that President Johnson had decided to bargain with Egyptian Vice President Mohieddin, and at best it would be a piece of paper. The possibility that any action might follow from it had become dimmer and dimmer. The one thing that no one was talking or thinking of doing anything about was the overwhelming military pressure that the Arab states had developed on the Israeli borders. On June 4, Iraq officially joined the Egypt-Syria-Jordan military pact. From near and far, Arab military units were hastening toward the Israeli frontiers. As the acute Washington correspondent of the London *Times* had already observed: "At the State Department it was emphasized that the naval planning was concerned only with securing passage for international shipping through the Strait of Tiran to the Gulf of Aqaba. There was no question of intervention in a possible land war."[86] By the first days of June, the land war and not the Gulf of Aqaba was preeminent in Israeli worrying and decision-making.

When the war did break out on June 5, the worst Israeli apprehensions of U.S. immobility seemed justified by the statement later that same day by the State Department's press officer, Robert McCloskey, that "our position is neutral in thought, word, and deed." I have been assured, on the highest authority, that this remark was an inadvertence never intended to represent U.S. policy.[87] The White House press secretary, George Christian, soon made known that McCloskey's *faux pas* had not been cleared with the White House. Secretary of State Rusk tried to "clarify" the matter by saying that the United States was "non-belligerent" but hardly "indifferent," which hardly needed saying. Whatever the circumstances of Mr. McCloskey's indiscretion, the United States could simultaneously be "neutral in thought, word, and deed," "non-belligerent," and not "indifferent." In any case, the handling of this incident was scarcely reassuring to the embattled Israelis.

The worst victim of one's propaganda is often oneself. For months, Nasser had been telling his own people and the Arab world that Israel was merely a creation and a puppet of "Western imperialism." On May 26, Nasser said: "What is Israel? Israel today is the United States. The United States is the chief defender of Israel. As for Britain, I consider it America's lackey."[88] On May 29, he declared: "We are not facing Israel, but those behind it. We are facing the West, which created Israel."[89] If Nasser actually believed this, it led him to think that he was safe so long as he did not have to worry about the United States or the West, thanks to the Soviet Union's good offices, or that the Israelis could not move without U.S. permission.[90] In fact, the Israelis knew that they had to fight alone and that there was very little the United States would or possibly could do to help them. The last thing the Israelis wanted was to have the United States intervene à la Vietnam and make Israel into a "second Vietnam."

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THIS BRINGS US to the relationship between the third Arab-Israeli war and the Vietnam war, a subject on which there has been more than the usual quota of misunderstanding and nonsense by some who should know better. A statement, which appeared as an advertisement in the New York *Times* of June 7, 1967, called on President Johnson "to act now with courage and conviction, with nerve and firmness of intent, to maintain free passage in those waters [of the Gulf of Aqaba]—and so to safeguard the integrity, security, and survival of Israel and its people, and to uphold our own honor."[91] There was nothing in this statement to which the Johnson administration had not already pledged itself. It did not mention the Vietnam or any war. Some who signed it were critics of U.S. policy on Vietnam, some were not. But it moved Professor John P. Roche, a Special Consultant in the White House, to play the role of court jester and suggest that the statement should have been signed "Doves for war," a much-quoted phrase by which he evidently meant "Vietnam doves for Israeli war." William F. Buckley, Jr. wrote a column on the statement which he also tied up with the Vietnam war and which so bemused him that he gave it credit for putting "most of the critics of our policy in Vietnam on the run."

The issue this raises far transcends the statement which occasioned it. The implication of the Roche-Buckley line is that Vietnam "doves" must be dovish everywhere or, conversely, Israeli "hawks" must be hawkish everywhere. Indeed, one does not have to do very much thinking any more. One merely has to take a position on Vietnam, dovish or hawkish, and every problem in every country in every region of the world automatically falls into place. On principle, one must be all hawk or all dove in U.S. foreign policy, and there is only one touchstone to determine which one it is—Vietnam. This principle is obviously inherent in the Roche-Buckley tie-up of Vietnam and Israel, and the only thing that could conceivably make it possible for a position on one to determine a position on the other.

I cannot imagine a more dangerous and pernicious doctrine. This is not evidence of contradiction on the part of critics of the Vietnam war; it is rather evidence of obsession on the part of its proponents. The cost of the Vietnam war has been high enough, but if it is to become the one, determining factor in U.S. foreign policy halfway across the globe, in totally different circumstances, the result must be war everywhere or paralysis everywhere. There is no inherent reason why one cannot criticize the abuse of power in Vietnam and the abdication of power elsewhere. Indeed, the real problem is on the other foot: our overinvestment and overindulgence of power in Vietnam has made it in short supply for use elsewhere. As the Vietnam war drags on, a "second Vietnam" has become the nightmare of U.S. policy makers and military planners. There is, then, reason to be concerned that abuse of power in one place may well lead to abdication of power in another, more important place. Soviet policy may be taking this into account, even if we cannot yet face it.

In any case, even if the Roche-Buckley principle is accepted, the Vietnam "hawks" cannot have it both ways. After all, they happen to be in control of our government, and nothing could be more ironic than the fact that they had to be urged on by Vietnam doves to be hawkish in Israel. Some hawks were, no doubt, hawkish on both issues, but the outstanding phenomenon in Washington was the dovishness on Israel by the Vietnam hawks, especially in the hawk headquarters, the Pentagon. If consistency were all that mattered, one would imagine that it was more important for those in power than for those not in power to be consistent. Yet, curiously, the grim joke was "doves for war," not "hawks for peace."

Actually, U.S. intervention on the Vietnam model in the Arab-Israeli struggle was never a realistic alternative, if only because Israel would not have permitted itself to become another South Vietnam. The defense of South Vietnam has caused such havoc in South Vietnam that the example has frightened our potential allies at least as much as it has deterred any present enemies. The crisis in the Middle East should again have shown how limited the application of Vietnam tactics may be in the rest of the world; it reinforces one of the main criticisms of our Vietnam policy—that it has claimed to influence events elsewhere far more than it can ever do. Yet, President Eisenhower undeniably assumed an obligation to Israel when his administration persuaded Israel to withdraw from Sharm el-Sheikh in 1957 in return for an explicit U.S. assurance that Israel would "have no cause to regret" giving up this hard-won vantage point. Subsequently, according to Prime Minister Eshkol, U.S. officials told Israel it did not need U.S. arms because it could rely on the U.S. Sixth Fleet.[92] Fortunately for both Israel and the United States, the Israelis never took these assurances too seriously and always counted on having to do their own fighting. Nevertheless, there was a problem of unmistakable U.S. commitments. I have been one of those who have criticized the Johnson administration for distorting and exaggerating our past commitments to South Vietnam. But this does not mean that we do not have any real commitments anywhere; here again the worst thing that can possibly happen to our foreign policy is to shape it, commitments and all, completely in the image of our Vietnam policy. The problem of living up to our commitments to Israel was primarily one for the Johnson administration, not for the critics of its Vietnam policy. It is a measure of the difficulty of that problem that neither the administration nor its critics created it and neither would have found an easy solution for it. But some of the men around

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the President would have been better advised to resist the cheap temptation to use the Israeli crisis to discredit their Vietnam critics; it would have been healthier for all concerned to stand together where possible and not let their other disagreements always come between them. Since Vietnam, our far-flung commitments have become an extremely difficult and embarrassing question; a review of those commitments has been long overdue; it will never be faced if all that matters, everywhere, is what one thinks about our policy in Vietnam.

The real problem of U.S.-Israeli relations is not what the United States could have done once the war started, but what the United States should have done before the war and what it should do afterward. U.S. military equipment made up a very minor part of Israeli arms in the recent war because the United States had pursued a policy of restricting arms sales to Israel. The Israelis did not have a single U.S. bomber or fighter; the delivery of U.S. Skyhawk fighter planes, to balance Lockheed F-104's previously made available to Jordan, was not expected until next year. The Israeli air force was French, most of its tanks were British, and its small arms were produced at home. It was the influx of Soviet arms on the Arab side and the increasing difficulty with which Israel could match it in the West that encouraged Nasser and contributed to this war. If quantity of arms had been the decisive factor, the Israelis would have been in grave trouble.[93] The problem has arisen again with the renewed influx of Soviet arms to Egypt and Syria. In view of the Arab propaganda about Jewish influence in the United States, one wonders whether any non-Jewish state in Israel's position, faced with enemies armed by the Soviet Union and enjoying the full support of Soviet propaganda and diplomacy, would have found it so difficult to *buy* arms in this country. This is the real problem of the past and future, not "doves for war" by the United States on behalf of Israel.

IX

ONE ISSUE was, in my view, blown up by Israel and to a lesser extent by the United States and other countries far beyond what it merited. It concerned the removal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) from Sharm el-Sheikh and the Egypt-Israel border.

The main charges against Secretary General U Thant's order on the night of May 18 for the withdrawal of UNEF in response to the official Egyptian request a few hours earlier were made by Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban at the UN General Assembly on June 19. He complained that U Thant's action had been "disastrously swift" and that the Secretary General should have made a greater effort to play for time. "What is the use of a fire brigade," Eban asked dramatically, "which vanishes from the scene as soon as the first smoke and flames appear?"

This controversy will undoubtedly provide international legal authorities with seminar material for years to come. Ordinary mortals may enter this arena only at their own peril. The problem, nevertheless, cannot be entirely avoided because it raises the question of how the war came about and because the answer may help to determine the future usefulness of the UN.

Some things seem reasonably clear. UNEF was set up in November 1956 "to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities." At that time, it was clearly understood that the force was only to be "of a temporary nature." But how temporary? The answer to this seemed to depend on who was to decide when it had fulfilled its mission. Dag Hammarskjold, then Secretary General, foresaw that there could be heated dispute on this point. He recognized that UNEF could come into Egypt only with Egypt's consent. But what was necessary to get it out? He resisted the idea that the Egyptians alone could decide when to get rid of UNEF. In lengthy negotiations with the Egyptians, especially one seven-hour session with President Nasser on November 17, he arrived at a rather tricky formula, namely, that the force would leave whenever it had "completed its task." In an *aide-memoire* of November 20, Egypt promised that it would be guided by "good faith" in relation to UNEF. But who was to decide when the "task" was completed? According to Hammarskjold, in a private memorandum which he wrote about eight-and-a-half months later, he understood "good faith" to mean—and he thought the Egyptians had tacitly agreed—that the Egyptians and the General Assembly would have to agree on the completion of the task.[94]

But this private memorandum of August 5, 1957 was never entered into the official records or even files of the United Nations. Egypt never agreed publicly and, on at least one occasion, disagreed publicly with Hammarskjold's version, holding that it alone was entitled to decide the fate of UNEF on its territory. Interestingly, the Egyptian Foreign Minister also resorted to the "fire brigade" analogy by saying on November 27, 1956, that "no one here or elsewhere can reasonably or fairly say that a fire brigade, after putting out a fire, would be entitled or expected to claim the right of deciding not to leave the house." At this time, it should be remembered, the "task" of the "fire brigade" was still defined as solely to "secure and supervise" the cessation of hostilities.

Subsequently, in February 1957, UNEF was given the additional functions of serving as a buffer and deterring infiltration at the Egypt-Israel armistice line and at Sharm el-Sheikh. It is questionable whether the "good faith" commitment of November 20, 1956, applied to the additional functions three months later. Moreover, Hammar-

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skjold's understanding, whatever it was, implied that there was a task of a "temporary nature" that could be completed in a relatively short time, certainly months rather than years. The buffer and deterrent functions, which were added later, could go on indefinitely and did, indeed, go on for over ten years, a length of time never envisioned in 1957. In his report of June 27, 1967, on the withdrawal of UNEF, Secretary General Thant made what was, for me, a most convincing formal case.

So much for the legalities. Here again, they really made very little difference. Whatever Thant might have done to stall in New York, Nasser was making the real decisions in Egypt. UNEF consisted of only 3,400 men from seven countries, of whom no more than 1,800 were available for policing a line of 295 miles along the Egypt-Israel border and the Gaza Strip. All of 32 men were stationed at Sharm el-Sheikh, the main neuralgic point. India and Yugoslavia, which contributed over half the total force, informed the Secretary General that they were withdrawing their men whatever he decided to do. At most, UNEF was a purely symbolic presence. It had no authority to "enforce" the peace—in other words to fight, except as a last resort in self-defense. It was totally dependent on Egyptian good will for its logistical support. Israel had from the first refused to permit it to be stationed on the Israeli side of the border and, therefore, it could not be moved from the Egyptian side.

By the night of May 18, U Thant did not have to "withdraw" the force; he could merely recognize that it had already been, for all practical purposes, withdrawn. The Egyptian troops had simply shunted the UNEF units aside. As the Secretary General later reported: "Early on 18 May the UNEF sentries proceeding to man the normal observation post at El Sabha in Sinai were prevented from entering the post and from remaining in the area by United Arab Republic soldiers. The sentries were then forced to withdraw. They did not resist by use of force since they had no mandate to do so." Egyptian officers gave the Yugoslav detachment at Sharm el-Sheikh fifteen minutes to reply to a demand for an Egyptian takeover of the UNEF camp. As the Secretary General's report put it, "the effectiveness of UNEF in the light of the movement of United Arab Republic troops up to the line and into Sharm el-Sheikh, had already vanished before the request for withdrawal was received."

What, then, could stalling tactics at the UN by the Secretary General have achieved? They could possibly have put Egypt temporarily on the defensive in purely legalistic terms, assuming that the legalities were not on their side. They could not have prevented the Egyptian takeover of UNEF posts in the Sinai or at Sharm el-Sheikh. This takeover was accomplished by overwhelming superior forces on the spot, not by legalistic maneuvering in New York. Mr. Thant might have ordered resistance to the Egyptian diplomatic delegation at the UN but he could not order resistance to the Egyptian troops, tanks, and guns in the desert. The reports from the field on May 18 were such that the truly pressing, realistic problem was how to prevent bloody incidents between the virtually defenseless UNEF and the onrushing Egyptian forces and even to forestall the unseemly disintegration of the UNEF units. It should also be remembered that Mr. Thant held out for two days after he received the first Egyptian notification on May 16, and that war did not break out immediately after the order for withdrawal on May 18. Eighteen days intervened between May 18 and June 5, and it would have mattered very little in that period with respect to the efforts to prevent the war whether UNEF had still occupied their observation posts or not. UNEF could not get out overnight anyway; the first units did not leave until May 29.

Foreign Minister Eban's analogy between UNEF and a "fire brigade" may have been effective oratorically but it unwittingly betrayed what was wrong with his reasoning. In no sense was UNEF comparable to a fire brigade; or it was, at most, a "symbolic" one. The "smoke and flames" which this "fire brigade" was supposed to fight were made up of overwhelmingly superior Egyptian armed forces. UNEF had the alternative of "vanishing" or fighting fire with fire, of resisting physically. In practice, UNEF was so outnumbered and outclassed that it mattered little whether it stayed or left, except perhaps to establish a legal point. The melancholy fact is that the basis for UNEF's operation throughout its existence was, as the Secretary General's report of June 27 put it, "essentially fragile." It was, in a sense, a "fire brigade" as long as there was no fire; it was a "fire brigade" merely to signal by its forced withdrawal that a fire was coming; but it was not a "fire brigade" which the international community had set up with the authority, the numbers, and the equipment to put out a real fire.

Whose fault was that? Surely not that of UNEF or the Secretary General or the "United Nations." It is time to put a stop to the sanctimonious swindle the individual states which make up the United Nations have been perpetrating. The founders of the United Nations set it up in such a way that it has only the collective authority and force that its members, especially the great powers, and more particularly only two of them, the United States and the Soviet Union, permit it to have. The great-power veto in the Security Council prevents even a two-thirds majority in that body from getting anything through. The Security Council was immobilized by the Soviet Union between May 23 and June 5 despite the most urgent pleas by the Secretary General. But

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when his worst fears materialized, it was said that the United Nations or the Secretary General had "failed." That there was failure—tragic, ominous, and perhaps unnecessary failure—there can be no doubt. That the responsibility for the failure must be fixed on the individual states, there can also be no doubt. The United Nations does not live a life of its own; it does only what they permit or empower it to do; if it fails, they have directed and doomed it to fail. The worst of it is that the United Nations has become an alibi, a stratagem, a scapegoat, for deflecting attention from where the real evil hides—in the sovereign states. These states are not equally culpable in all cases, but where there may be guilt, it should at least be looked for in the right place—among them.

Finally, the campaign against U Thant was as tactically unsound as it was legally and realistically unjustified. One well-known columnist even used the phrase, "U Thant's war." This and other grotesqueries only had the effect of letting off the real culprits too easily. It may be called "Nasser's war" or perhaps "Nasser's and Kosygin's war," but to call it "U Thant's war" makes it appear as if U Thant had the power to prevent, let alone to start it. To some extent, the campaign against U Thant was based on a misapprehension of what UNEF could do in the circumstances of May 18, but some of those in high places who took part in the campaign should have known better. Instead of putting the blame squarely where it belonged, on the Egyptian leaders who ordered their troops to take over UNEF's posts in the hot desert before U Thant even ordered the force's official withdrawal, and on those powers, including the Soviet Union, India, Yugoslavia and others, which took Egypt's side in the UN, the anti-Thant camarilla pursued a vendetta of long standing, some of it based on his repugnance for the Vietnam war. It would be absurd to go to the opposite extreme and suggest that the Secretary General or the UN covered themselves with glory. They were reduced to impotence, and the cause of world community has suffered immeasurably. But they were as much victims of the real ringleaders and wirepullers of this war as the miserable *fellaheen* in uniform whose bodies rotted in the burning sands.

The United Nations is subject to periodic, built-in seizures of paralysis because it is primarily a place where the member-states pursue their individual self-interest. In order for the peacemaking or peacekeeping function to work reasonably well, one of two conditions is necessary: either the self-interest of the great powers must happen to coincide or the issue must happen to bypass their self-interest. The first condition has always been the *sine qua non* of United Nations usefulness, but the second has become increasingly rare of fulfillment. The more obvious reason for the latter state of affairs is the growing competition between the United States and the Soviet Union for the support—or to deny the other the support—of the "underdeveloped" part of the world and particularly of the nations founded since the last war. The new nationalism of the new nations is sometimes about all that holds them together, and the only virtue they have to sell. As a result, no nationalism is as obsessive and singleminded as the latest one. The great powers which seek to use them must do so through playing on a species of primitive self-interest that is far more difficult to control than that of the old-style client-states or the new variety of satellite-states. The Soviet Union, for example, wooed Nasser's Egypt more by serving Egypt's nationalistic interests than by getting Egypt to serve its own. But Egypt is neither an old-fashioned client-state nor a new-fangled satellite. It is rather a new-style "give-me" nationalism; Gamal Abdel Nasser has been one of the world's great practitioners of the new golden rule that it is better—for the great powers—to give than to receive. The United States has, of course, practiced handout diplomacy for the longest time and on the most lavish scale. It is, however, one of the less publicized aspects of the "affluent society" which the Soviet Union has of late attempted to crash.

But there is another, related reason why the great powers have exacerbated the nationalistic ambitions of the newer and smaller states. For a number of years, students of war have concerned themselves with the problem of small or big, local or general, guerrilla or conventional, nuclear or non-nuclear conflicts. This preoccupation was partially dictated by the obviously catastrophic character of the big, general, conventional, nuclear war. In order to avoid destroying themselves as well as their enemies, the great powers began to take an inordinate interest in small, local, irregular and non-nuclear conflicts. In theory, the latter seemed infinitely preferable because they could be "controlled," and a great deal of thought and ingenuity have been expended on the techniques and mechanisms for controlling them. But, increasingly, even this type of war has become too dangerous because of the reluctance of a great power to take a limited setback if it can give itself a second chance by escalating the struggle. This has typically happened to the United States in Vietnam. A new type of war, therefore, has been creeping up on us that is relatively small, local, non-nuclear but hopefully more controllable. It may be called the "war by proxy."

Wars by proxy are not new, and no one power has had a monopoly of them. The United States tried to wage a war by proxy in Cuba in April 1961 with a pitifully small Cuban exile force. Before 1966, when the United States began to take over the main fighting from the South Vietnamese, the Vietnam war was largely a war by proxy, especially in the U.S. view which then

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conceived of the real antagonists as being the United States and Communist China. But the third Arab-Israeli war was preeminently the Soviet Union's version of a war by proxy. The great Soviet Union was above regarding Israel as worthy of its unfriendly attention. To justify the expenditure of three billion dollars or more of economic and military assistance to the Arab states, a more deserving foe was needed. For this reason, Soviet propaganda and diplomacy were so insistent that Israel was merely an instrument of the "imperialist powers" or that they were behind Israel, so that by striking at Israel, the Arab states backed by the Soviet Union were really striking at "world imperialism." In his speech to the General Assembly on June 19, Premier Kosygin went out of his way to emphasize that "the events that took place recently in the Middle East in connection with the armed conflict between Israel and the Arab states should be considered precisely in the context of the general international situation." Later he helpfully provided the context by charging that the United States and Great Britain were "promoting" Israeli "aggression"—one of the more polite formulas of Soviet displeasure. The Arabs, as we have seen, had also taken the line that they were really fighting the "imperialist" West, though it is hard to know whether they really believed it or thought they were pleasing their Soviet benefactors.

IN ANY EVENT, this war by proxy showed how difficult and treacherous the new genre is. The nationalistic interests of both Israel and Egypt made it impossible for any of the great powers to "control" them. The Egyptians did not ask the Soviet Union for permission to reoccupy Sharm el-Sheikh and close the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel, and the Israelis did not ask the United States for permission to fight in order to reopen it. The war by proxy may be the safest species of small, local conflicts, but it is hardly safe. By not implicating the armed forces of a great power directly, it does enable that power to extricate itself more gracefully than would otherwise be possible. President Kennedy wisely insisted on having this escape-hatch in Cuba in 1961, and the Soviets could have it now in the Middle East. But the war by proxy still remains the most dangerous game of armed conflict the great powers are playing today. It requires far more attention than it has received. If the Soviet Union does not learn from our mistakes and seeks in the future to escalate its gamble in the Middle East to win for itself a second chance, the next round will be far more dangerous and costly to players and spectators alike.

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[1] United Nations, General Assembly, November 26, 1947, pp. 1360-61.

[2] Walter Eytan, *The First Ten Years* (Simon & Schuster, 1958), pp. 10-12, 138-39.

[3] Moshe Pearlman, *Ben Gurion Looks Back* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1965), pp. 140-41.

[4] United Nations, Security Council, March 30, 1948, pp. 248-50.

[5] Trygve Lie, *In the Cause of Peace* (Macmillan, 1954), p. 174. Lie confirms that the Soviet Union was "more steadfast" than the United States in support of partition (p. 164). Of private consultations in March 1948, in which the U.S., USSR, France, and China, took part, Lie writes: "Only the Soviet Union seems to be seriously intent upon implementing partition; the United States clearly was not" (p. 169).

[6] One of the oddities in the present heated discussion over whether Israel has the "right" to keep the West Bank of the Jordan, including the Jordanian section of Jerusalem, is the tacit assumption that Jordan has a better "right" to this territory. The West Bank and the Old City of Jerusalem were occupied by the troops of Transjordan, as the country was then known, during the Arab-Israeli war in 1948. King Abdullah of Transjordan refused to give up this territory despite the opposition of the other Arab states which wanted to form an Arab "Government of All-Palestine," with its headquarters at Gaza, then occupied by Egypt. But Abdullah had the best "Arab" army at that time, British-trained and commanded, and refused to give up the spoils of war. As a result, Transjordan increased its territory by 2,165 square miles and *trebled* its population because the East Bank, to which it had been formerly restricted, was over four-fifths desert. The new name, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, was adopted on April 26, 1949 (Raphael Patai, *The Kingdom of Jordan* [Princeton University Press, 1958], pp. 8-10, 48). Abdullah, grandfather of the present King Hussein, was the only Arab ruler who wanted to make peace with Israel, for which he was assassinated by fanatical Arab "nationalists" in 1951. The West Bank of the Jordan became Jordanian in 1948 solely by virtue of military occupation; it is hard to see why it could not be taken away from Jordan for the same reason.

[7] Article I of this Convention, which governs the conduct of the Canal, provides that it "shall always be free and open, *in time of war as in time of peace,* to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag" (my italics, T. D.). Article XI directs that even measures taken for "the defense of Egypt" should not "interfere with the free use of the Canal." Thus this is not an issue which depends on whether Egypt still considers itself at war with Israel.

[8] Lt. Gen. E. L. M. Burns, the Canadian head of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization, by no means uncritical of Israeli policy, wrote: "I felt that what Egyptians were doing in sending these men, whom they dignified with the name of *fedayeen* or commandos, into another country with the mission to attack men, women, and children indiscriminately, was a war crime It was essentially of the same character, though less in degree, as the offenses for which the Nazi leaders had been tried in Nürnberg, to cite the most recent examples" (*Between Arab and Israeli,* Ivan Obolensky, 1963, p. 88).

[9] An authoritative source says that in 1955-56 Egypt received about 150 MIG-15 and MIG-17 jet fighters, 40 IL-28 tactical jet bombers, several hundred tanks, and several submarines and destroyers. Major-General Moshe Dayan estimates that the Soviet arms deal gave Egypt an approximately four-to-one advantage in tanks and planes (*Diary of the Sinai Campaign* [Schocken ed., 1967], p. 4).

[10] Dayan, *op. cit.,* p. 68.

[11] Pearlman, *op. cit.,* p. 147.

[12] Dayan, *op. cit.,* p. 3.

[13] *Ibid.,* p. 192.

[14] *Department of State Bulletin,* March 11, 1957, p. 393.

[15] Sobolev (USSR), United Nations, General Assembly, March 4, 1957, p. 1298

[16] Kuznetsov (USSR), United Nations, General Assembly, February 2, 1957, pp. 1077-78, and Sobolev, March 4, 1957, p. 1297.

[17] Fawzi (Egypt), United Nations, General Assembly, March 8, 1957, pp. 1325-26.

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[18] *Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957* (Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office), p. 166.

[19] The eleven were Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Portugal, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden.

[20] On November 26, 1940, the German Ambassador in Moscow, Count Friedrich Werner Von der Schulenberg, wired Berlin on Soviet conditions for a Soviet-German treaty: "In accordance with the foregoing, the draft of the protocol concerning the delimitation of the spheres of influence as outlined by the Reich Foreign Minister [Ribbentrop] would have to be amended so as to stipulate the focal point of the aspirations of the Soviet Union south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf." A year earlier, on November 23, 1939, Hitler told his Chiefs of Staff that "Russia strives to strengthen her influence on the Balkan peninsula and aims towards the Persian Gulf. But those are also aims of our own foreign policy." This Nazi-Soviet conflict of interest in the Middle East was one, but by no means the most important, of the divergences which brought about the Nazi attack on the USSR in June 1941.

[21] Pearlman, *op. cit.*, p. 157

[22] *Mideast Mirror* (Beirut, Lebanon), March 5, 1965, p. 5.

[23] This view was openly expressed in the UN by the Syrian Ambassador, Dr. George J. Tomeh, on October 17, 1966, as a reason why Syria could not commit any aggression against Israel: "We as Syrians consider Palestine to be, and to have been, historically, geographically, and from every point of view, a part of Syria. It was only colonial rule and imperialist intrigues that divided Syria into so many States. When we speak of Palestine we feel we are speaking about part of our own country" (United Nations, Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record, October 17, 1966, p. 61). This claim, of course, put Syria as much in conflict with Jordan as wih Israel.

[24] The first citation is from the *Near East Report* (Washington, D. C.), May 31, 1966, p. 42; the second from *Mideast Mirror*, May 28, 1966, p. 2.

[25] This version appeared in *Mideast Mirror*, October 15, 1966, p. 3. Eban cited a somewhat different and fuller version of Zuayin's remarks: "We are not guardians of Israel's safety. We are not resigned to holding back the revolution of the Palestine people. Under no circumstances shall we do so. We shall set the entire area afire, and any Israeli movement will result in a final grave for Israel." Eban also cited a public statement on these incidents by the Syrian Chief of Staff, General Sweidani, on October 11: "These activities which are now being carried out are legal activities, and it is not our duty to stop them but to encourage and strengthen them. We are constantly ready to act inside Jordan and inside Israel in order to defend our people and its honor. We will mobilize volunteers and we will give them arms" (United Nations, Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record, October 14, 1966, p. 13).

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

[27] This project demonstrates how "unpolitical" and "without strings" Soviet aid programs can be. The Soviets first promised to help Syria build this dam in 1957, but the Syrian-Egyptian merger the following year dulled the Soviets' enthusiasm and led to a withdrawal of the offer to finance the dam on the ground that it was not technically feasible. In 1959, West Germany took over the project, but it withdrew after the breakup of the Syrian-Egyptian merger in 1961. The West Germans signed another agreement in January 1963, but it was called off after the Ba'athists seized power two months later. The Left-Ba'athist coup of February 1966 brought back the Soviets who suddenly discovered that the project was technically feasible after all.

[28] *Mideast Mirror*, November 26, 1966, p. 7.

[29] *Ibid.*, January 7, 1967, p. 7, and January 14, 1967, p. 2. I have used the original language as nearly as possible. The dates indicate when the alleged incidents took place.

[30] *Ibid.*, January 21, 1967, p. 2.

[31] *Ibid.*, February 11, 1967, p. 2; February 25, 1967, p. 6, and March 11, 1967, p. 4.

[32] In an interview with the publication *Al Hawadis* (Beirut, Lebanon) of March 26, 1966, Nasser said: "We could annihilate Israel in twelve days were the Arabs to form a united front. Any attack on Israel from the south is not possible from a military point of view. Israel can be attacked only from the territory of Jordan and Syria. But conditions in Jordan and Syria have to be in order so that we in Egypt can be sure we will not be stabbed in the back as in 1948" (quoted in *Near East Report*, April 5, 1966, p. 26).

[33] Joe Alex Morris, Jr. (Beirut, Lebanon), Washington *Post*, January 8, 1967.

[34] New York *Times*, April 8, 1967.

[35] *Mideast Mirror*, April 15, 1967.

[36] *Ibid.*

[37] *Ibid.*, April 22, 1967.

[38] *Ibid.*, April 15, 1967.

[39] *Ibid.*, April 29, 1967.

[40] *Ibid.*, May 6, 1967.

[41] United Nations, Press conference, May 11, 1967 (Press Release, SG/SM/708, p. 13).

[42] There are other indications that the Israeli government did not anticipate the seriousness of the crisis. At a luncheon of the Foreign Press Association in Jerusalem on January 24, 1967, Foreign Minister Eban said that Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt "do not wish to become directly involved in hostility with us" (*Weekly News Bulletin*, Government Press Office, January 24-30, 1967, p. 6). In an annual review in the Israeli parliament on February 14, 1967, Eban said that "Arab feuding and internal complications preoccupy the Arab leaders at this moment more than does planning of the fight against Israel" (*Ibid.*, February 14-20, 1967, p. 2). These statements may very well have been true at the time; if so, they would indicate that the May 1967 crisis developed at a pace which in a sense caught everyone by surprise. But they hardly suggest that Israel was putting into effect a long-prepared plan.

[43] I have used official Israeli translations of the May 12 and 13 statements.

[44] From monitored radio broadcasts. Nasser had made the same point in his previous speech of May 22.

[45] This is from the Reuters translation in the New York *Times*, June 10, 1967. There is a slightly different version of the same passage in a monitored radio broadcast: "Add to this fact [of Syrian and Egyptian information] that our friends in the Soviet Union warned the parliamentary delegation which was on a visit to Moscow at the beginning of last month that there was a premeditated plan against Syria."

[46] Speech of May 22, 1967, text in New York *Times*, May 26, 1967.

[47] Text in the New York *Times*, May 21, 1967, p. 2.

[48] This account is based on the Report of the Secretary General on the Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force, June 27, 1967.

[49] From monitored radio broadcasts.

[50] *Ibid.*

[51] Text in the New York *Times*, May 26, 1967.

[52] Report of the Secretary-General of May 26, 1967.

[53] Text in the New York *Times*, May 24, 1967 (read into the record of the Security Council, May 24, 1967, pp. 26-30). Yet the Soviet statement may have gone too far and may give the Soviets future trouble even if the apparent commitment was general. It said: "But let no one have any doubts about the fact that should anyone try to unleash aggression in the Near East, he would be met not only with the united strength of Arab countries, but also with strong opposition to aggression from the Soviet Union and all peaceloving states." And it concluded: "With due account taken of the situation, the Soviet Union is doing and will continue to do everything in its power to prevent a violation of peace and security in the Near East and safeguard the legitimate rights of the peoples." But none of this was spelled out concretely.

[54] Text in the New York *Times*, May 24, 1967.

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[55] From a monitored radio broadcast.
[56] *Ibid.*
[57] *Ibid.*
[58] Ahmad Samih Khalidi, "An Appraisal of the Arab-Israel Military Balance," *Middle East Forum* (Beirut), Vol. 42, No. 3, 1966, pp. 55-65.
[59] From monitored radio broadcasts.
[60] *Ibid.*
[61] *Ibid.*
[62] *Ibid.*
[63] This version appeared in the New York *Times*, May 30, 1967. The version in the monitored radio broadcasts is: "When I met with Shamseddin Badran yesterday he handed me a message from Soviet Premier Kosygin saying that the USSR supports us in this battle and will not allow any power to intervene until matters were restored to what they were in 1956."
[64] Subsequently, on June 12, Prime Minister Eshkol called attention to a "secret operation order" issued on May 27 by the Egyptian air force commander to his air force "to be prepared for a sudden attack on Israel." This operational order, signed by Major General Jalal Ibrahim Ziz, Chief of Staff, Eastern Air Command, was captured by an Israeli unit at El-Arish in the Sinai during the fighting. It gave specific instructions to five air brigades on their targets in Israel but left the time open "in conformity with conditions as they develop." This and other captured Egyptian plans show that the Egyptians were poised to go, and the massive bombing of Israel airfields and radar centers might have come at any moment.
[65] "Pourquoi Moscou a lâché Nasser," *Le nouvel Observateur* (Paris), June 14-20, 1967, p. 16. This article purports to be a version of the events given by "a high Soviet official" to an anonymous correspondent in Moscow. Unlike most such planted stories, however, it tends for the most part to be consistent with what we know from other sources and rings true. On this point, this article states that President Johnson and Premier Kosygin coordinated these efforts to restrain Nasser as a result of messages exchanged between them.
[66] Text of Nasser's statement in New York *Times*, June 10, 1967 (from Reuters).
[67] The sequence of events, as given by the "high Soviet Official" to *Le nouvel Observateur, op. cit.*, is as follows: Soviet intelligence evaluated as very serious reports of an Israeli plan to stage a deep raid in Syria on May 15 and eventually to push as far as Damascus to overthrow the Syrian government. Nasser massed his troops on the Sinai border, to discourage Israel from launching such an attack on Syria, with full Soviet approval. But Nasser informed the Soviets of the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba only after he had decided on it, and they warned him that he was taking the risk of unleashing "unpredictable reactions." When U Thant quickly agreed to withdraw the UN forces, however, Nasser's confidence in being able to handle the situation seemed justified. "From that date," the account goes on, "we warned Nasser, however, that we would commit ourselves only to neutralizing the United States, that is, we would respond by an escalation equal to any escalation on the part of Washington—and that our support would not go beyond this."
[68] This is the monitored radio broadcast version. The last sentence appeared in the New York *Times* of April 30, 1967, as follows: "Now that we have the situation as it was before 1956, Allah will certainly help us to restore the status quo of before 1948."
[69] United Nations, Security Council, Document S/7896, p. 5.
[70] *Ibid.*, Provisional Verbatim Record, May 24, 1967 (S/PV. 1342), p. 11.
[71] *Ibid.*, pp. 21 and 51.
[72] *Ibid.*, May 29, 1967 (S/PV. 1343), pp. 36-37.
[73] *Ibid.*, pp. 87-102 and 121-122.
[74] *Ibid.*, May 31, 1967 (S/PV. 1345), pp. 56-60 and 71-75. Federenko seems to have confused the refusal of the United States to trade with Cuba with a "naval blockade" of Cuba. Even Western powers, such as Britain and France, trade freely with Cuba. The only semblance of a U.S. blockade was imposed during the "missile crisis" of October 1962 for about a week and that was limited to offensive military equipment involving a nuclear threat.
[75] *Ibid.*, June 3, 1967 (S/PV. 1346), pp. 67-75 and 106-115.
[76] John C. Campbell, *Defense of the Middle East* (Harper, 1960), p. 242.
[77] In January 1967, King Hussein of Jordan said that his army had 55,000 men compared with 4,000 in 1948; his defense budget was $56 million; his army included 11 infantry brigades and 300 modern tanks, including 250 new Patton T-48's from the U.S.; his air force would soon have five fighter squadrons (New York *Times*, January 26, 1967). He did not say how much all this had cost the United States.
[78] This phase was reported more fully in the British than in the U.S. press. In his press conference in Washington on June 2, Prime Minister Wilson refused to answer a question about what Britain in concert with other nations might do if Egypt refused to open the Gulf of Aqaba. But, in the House of Commons on May 31, Foreign Secretary George Brown had already indicated that stronger measures were being contemplated than the maritime powers' declaration: "But we must face the fact that action in the United Nations, or declarations made by nations outside the United Nations, may not be enough to secure the right of innocent passage to which we and all maritime nations attach such importance. It goes without saying that we certainly hope that they will. I trust that it also goes without saying that we will use every diplomatic effort to see that they do. But we would be failing our duty if we were not now consulting with others concerned about the situation that will arise if these initiatives were to fail" (*The Times*, London, June 1, 1967). The London *Times*'s Washington correspondent, Louis Heren, reported on May 25: "The Americans are thinking in terms of a massive task force, while Britain believes that the job can be done with two or three destroyers." On May 29, the London *Times*'s Washington correspondent added: "Anglo-American contingency planning for the naval escort of ships through the Straits of Tiran is still going forward but clearly Mr. Johnson had decided against an early forcing of the passage." British sources do not seem to bear out the contention in the New York *Times* of June 12: "Britain had agreed to join the United States in a statement denouncing the blockade but she is said to have balked at committing herself to a show of force if nothing else worked."
[79] New York *Times*, June 10, 1967.
[80] Thomas T. Fenton, the Baltimore *Sun*, June 15, 1967; Bernard Gwertzman, Washington *Star*, June 15, 1967.
[81] Nes's story appeared in an interview with Thomas T. Fenton in the Baltimore *Sun* of June 13, 1967. A State Department spokesman, Carl Bartch, did not deny any of Nes's assertions but protested that "any inference that the United States regarded the situation in the Middle East as anything other than very grave is erroneous" (*Ibid.*, June 14, 1967). The "explanation" for Mr. Nolte's unguarded remarks at the airport seems to be that he thought he was speaking off-the-record, which hardly explains the substance of what he said.
[82] United Nations, Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record, May 29, 1967 (S/PV. 1343), p. 16.
[83] *Ibid.*, p. 31.
[84] What officials in the White House and the State Department were saying to editors and correspondents privately may be gathered from the experiences of one knowledgeable editor, Myron Kolatch, the *New Leader*, June 5, 1967, pp. 3-5.
[85] *The Times* (London), June 5, 1967.
[86] *Ibid.*, May 26, 1967.
[87] The story, as I was told it, is a classic of diplomatic nightmares. Leading officials were called to the State Department in the middle of the night on June 5. A message soon came in to the effect that five Egyptian airfields had been knocked out. This led to speculation on the part of junior

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officials that Egypt might not live up to Nasser's boasts. A senior official, at about 3 A.M., jokingly admonished them to remember that "we are neutral in thought, word, and deed." The same official later briefed Mr. McCloskey for the State Department's press conference that afternoon without using these words, and they did not appear in Mr. McCloskey's opening statement. But in response to a question about the possibility of U.S. intervention, Mr. McCloskey remembered the words he had heard at about 3 A.M. and used them in his reply. Still, it would appear that the White House and State Department found it so hard to recover from this incredible goof because they were confronted with a most awkward question: If the United States was not "neutral," what was it?

[88] From monitored radio broadcasts.

[89] This version appeared in *The Times* (London), June 5, 1967. The monitored radio broadcasts give the passage as follows: "We are confronting Israel, and the West as well—the West which created Israel and which despised us, the Arabs, and which ignored us before and after 1948."

[90] This point was made by the "high Soviet official" in *Le nouvel Observateur, op. cit.*: "He [Nasser] has partially been the victim of his own propaganda to the effect that the government of Tel Aviv is only a simple pawn of Washington, and that he could not see that this pawn could give proof of a certain amount of autonomy." But the high Soviet official neglected to mention that the government of Moscow was guilty of exactly the same kind of simple-minded propaganda which might have helped Nasser to deceive himself.

[91] This statement was signed by 54 persons, including myself. Such statements are basically expressions of sympathy, especially when they are as general as this one.

[92] This point was discussed by Eshkol a month before the outbreak of the war. Asked what help he would expect from the United States and possibly Britain and France, he replied: "Surely, we expect such help—but we would rely primarily on our own army. I wouldn't want American mothers crying about the blood of their sons being shed here. But I would surely expect such help, especially if I take into consideration all the solemn promises that have been made to Israel. We get these promises when we ask the United States for arms and are told: 'Don't spend your money. We are here. The Sixth Fleet is here.' My reply to this advice is that the Sixth Fleet might not be available fast enough for one reason or another, so Israel must be strong on its own. This is why we spend so much money on arms proportionately to our population" (*U.S. News & World Report*, April 17, 1967, p. 76). Curiously, the same magazine later distorted a reference to its own interview. In its issue of June 19, 1967, it stated: "Israeli Premier Levi Eshkol said in an interview April 11, 1967, that the U.S. Sixth Fleet would support Israel. Arab newspapers around the world headlined his statement. Despite denials of U.S. officials, Arab leaders assumed this was a firm commitment." As may be seen from the wording of the interview itself, Eshkol said *that U.S. officials had implied* the Sixth Fleet would support Israel, and he had been most dubious.

[93] An Israeli story, related by Terence Prittie of the *Guardian* (England), may cast some light on the recent Israeli victory. It seems that the Polish emigré leader, General Sikorsky, met a rabbi during the dark days of World War II and asked him how it might be won. "By one of two ways," the rabbi answered, "by a miracle or by a natural way." The general asked: "What would be the natural way?" Answered the rabbi: "To win it by a miracle." The general: "And what, then, would be the miracle?" The rabbi: "To win it in a natural way" (*Israel: Miracle in the Desert*, Praeger, 1967, p. 10).

[94] The text of Hammarskjold's private memorandum of August 5, 1957, was published in the New York *Times* of June 19, 1967. That Hammarskjold knew he was skating on thin legal ice is shown by his self-revelation that "I was guided by the consideration that Egypt constitutionally had an undisputed right to request the withdrawal of the troops, even if initial consent had been given, but that, on the other hand, it should be possible on the basis of my own stand as finally tacitly accepted, to force them into an agreement in which they limited their freedom of action as to withdrawal dependent upon the completion of the task—a question which, in the UN, obviously would have to be submitted to interpretation by the General Assembly." That Hammarskjold could really "force" anything on the Egyptians with a "tacit" agreement is more than doubtful. At most, his private memorandum suggests a "gentlemen's agreement"—but one of the gentlemen died prematurely and of the other it might be said that when men decide to go to war, they cease being gentlemen.

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WALTER LAQUEUR

ISRAEL, THE ARABS, AND WORLD OPINION

FOR EIGHTEEN YEARS, a state of almost permanent crisis, involving countless coups d'état and a war, left the political map of the Middle East virtually unchanged. Then, in a few hours of fighting on June 5, 1967, it was all at once spectacularly redrawn. True, many of the old landmarks remain: the oil, Arab nationalism, and Israel's will to survive in a hostile environment. Most of the actors are still around, too, including President Nasser. Before June 5, Middle Eastern affairs resembled a chess game (or a war game) that had been played many times before and that allowed of no variation in the moves. A lasting solution has not become any easier to find since June 5. But the game has become far less predictable, for it is now being played on a different board and with a number of new pieces.

Though the prehistory of the crisis of 1967 dates back at least a decade, the actual fighting lasted only four days; it was dramatic and it was conclusive. The first accounts are now being published, and the Israeli victory will no doubt become a textbook case studied by staff officers all over the world. In Israel the war has already turned into a legend, while most Arabs are reacting as many Germans did after World War I, blaming their defeat on a stab in the back.

Every war is a misfortune, and when the debris has been cleared away it may appear that in a wider perspective even this one has changed less than it seemed at first to have done. Could the war have been prevented? Reviewing the situation in Egypt two years ago I wrote:

> Nasser has waited patiently for a longer time than most observers thought he would; he has not only shown perseverance rare among Arabs, but also fortitude in the face of setbacks. But pressure on him is mounting, and he may be driven into seeking a desperate remedy for Egypt's ills even though he is militarily not yet ready for any target more formidable than Libya. He probably has no masterplan, no blueprint, no timetable. But the inner logic of Egypt's situation is driving him in the direction of war—an attack on Israel or an attempt to take over the oilwells of Arabia, or both. These eventualities may be retarded by a variety of circumstances, but it is difficult to see at present how they can be deflected altogether.*

There are no certainties in politics, only probabilities. In the case of Egypt, given the growing discrepancy between Nasser's ambitions and the country's basic weakness, given Soviet support and above all the nationalist fever and the expectations aroused by Nasserist propaganda, a new war seemed inevitable. The pressures on Nasser were overwhelming. Though cautious in his policy, though convinced that the time for the final settlement of accounts with Israel would not come for another ten or twenty years, he was to a large extent a prisoner of the general climate in the Arab world and of his own propaganda.

Among other factors, Egypt's worsening economic situation and the unpopular measures Nasser was forced to adopt to cope with the breakdown of his seven-year plan precipitated him—prematurely, and in all probability against his own better judgment—into a more reckless policy. On the one hand, the war in Yemen was going so badly that it made it more difficult for him to engage in another campaign. On the other hand, it was becoming imperative to regain the prestige he had lost in the Arab world over his failure to come to the help of sister Arab states whenever Israeli retaliatory actions occurred—such as at Samu (Jordan) in November 1966 and in Syria in April 1967.

There was yet another important new factor. In February 1966 the left wing of the Ba'ath party had come into power in Syria. The new government, headed by Dr. Yusif Zuayin, backed by some army officers, and possessing hardly any popular support, concentrated its efforts on three related objectives: purging the Ba'ath from which it had split, carrying out ultra-Left reforms, and establishing on Syrian soil units of the Palestine Liberation Army for launching a "People's War" against Israel. The propaganda of this Syrian government was extreme to the point of insanity; precisely because it had so little popular support, the regime felt it had to outdo Nasser. In the military field the application of "Maoist methods" proved to be disastrous. Though Israel hit

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* "Bonn, Cairo, Jerusalem," COMMENTARY, May 1965.

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back merely on a local basis against repeated acts of terrorism emanating from Syria, such retaliations were enough to shake the Damascus regime and send its emissaries scurrying to Cairo for help.

Nasser, who had followed the adventures of the Syrians with misgivings, was not surprised, and he probably exploited the opportunity to explain that he was not to be outflanked from the Left. Yet at the same time pressure mounted on him to come to the aid of the Syrians. A new generation of young Arabs, which had been educated in the belief that a holy war was inevitable and that the Arab might was invincible, had by now reached maturity. Arab newspapers and radio stations were announcing every hour of the day that America was a paper tiger, that Europe did not count, and that the Arabs had the full support of the Soviet bloc. They believed that on the day of reckoning the whole Arab, indeed the whole Islamic, world would rise as one man to throw the Jews into the sea. Ahmad Shukeiry, head of the Palestine Liberation Organization, had declared that hardly a Jew would survive to be repatriated to Europe. If this was so, what was the point of waiting? Should not the cancer be removed from the body politic of the Arab world immediately and once and for all?

ACCORDING TO most observers in the Arab capitals, the general mood—not only in Cairo—in April and May could be expressed in the simple formula: "We want war." Hassanein Heykal, Nasser's close confidant, reflected prevailing sentiment in Cairo when he wrote in his column on June 2:

> Israel is definitely heading toward final collapse from within or without. . . . It has been and still is an artificial state of poor quality, brittle material—something like plaster—which can change only when it breaks up.

Dr. Zuayin, the Syrian prime minister, said on May 29:

> We are now on the threshold of the battle for the destiny of all Arab people. Conditions today are most favorable for waging the battle of Arab destiny.

So too Ahmad Shukeiry, in a press conference on May 28:

> Zero hour has come. This is the hour our people have been awaiting for the last nineteen years. The UAR army alone is capable of destroying the Israeli aggression within a few hours.

And President Aref of Iraq told the Iraqi soldiers who were leaving for Jordan a week before the outbreak of hostilities:

> This is the day of battle. . . . We are determined and united to achieve our clear aim—to remove Israel from the map. . . . We shall, God willing, meet in Tel Aviv and Haifa.

Nasserite officials counseling prudence were shouted down at meetings. What about Nasser himself? In his "abdication speech" on June 9, he said that the news of an impending Israeli invasion of Syria had reached him from both Syrian and Russian sources. The Russians had told Nasser's close confidant, Anwar as-Sadat, when he was on a tour of the Soviet Union, that the security committee of the Knesset had decided in its session of May 9 to invade Syria on May 17, and there is some reason to believe that Nasser's Syrian sources also had their information from the Russians. No such Israeli decision had ever been made, but it is not clear whether the Russians deliberately spread false rumors in order to provoke a crisis, or whether they were genuinely misinformed.* We also know that on the night of May 26, the Soviet Ambassador requested an urgent meeting with Nasser and asked him in the name of the Soviet government "not to fire the first shot." On the evidence at present available, all one can say is that the Soviet government during the first phase of the crisis helped to exacerbate it, and that later on it played, without much success, a restraining role. But many questions still remain.

Initially, Nasser acted as if he were engaged in a limited exercise in brinkmanship—one that seemed to be going brilliantly. It has been argued that Nasser did not expect U Thant to give in immediately to his demand to withdraw the UN observers and that only U Thant's refusal of a partial withdrawal forced him to seize Sharm el-Sheikh. But this is not so: Egyptian troops reached the Straits and ordered out the forty-five UN soldiers encamped there even before Nasser had contacted the Secretary General. Nasser (as he said in a revealing speech on May 26) for the first time felt confident of military victory.

By June 4, he had scored a major triumph. He had humiliated Israel and rallied all the Arabs around him, again emerging as their undisputed leader. Yet Nasser's appetite grew with the eating. After his first success he announced that it was no longer merely a matter of the Straits of Tiran: the whole Palestine issue was to be reopened, the Arab homeland to be liberated. He did not have to fire the first shot, he could sit and wait for Israel to be strangled under his grip—or to make a last desperate attempt to resist. As Heykal

* Some observers believe that it was a speech by the Israeli chief of staff, General Yitzhak Rabin, that had alarmed the Syrians and the Russians. According to reports published in both the Soviet and the Western press, Rabin had threatened to "overthrow" the Syrian government; this news was based apparently on a UPI report from Tel Aviv quoting a highly placed Israeli personality. However, it had not been General Rabin but Prime Minister Eshkol speaking in a closed Mapai meeting on May 11. Nor had there been any talk about overthrowing the Syrian regime. Eshkol had only warned that unless the murderous attacks across the border ceased, a counterblow as extensive as the one on April 7 would be delivered.

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wrote in *Al Ahram*: "I say that Israel must resort to arms. For many reasons, chiefly psychological, Israel cannot accept nor remain indifferent to what has happened. Israel has to reply now. . . . An armed clash between the UAR and the Israeli enemy is inevitable." Heykal's appraisal was quite correct; a failure to react would have had the gravest consequences for Israel. Only seven days later, Heykal and his friends had forgotten about the "inevitable war." All they now talked about was Blitzkrieg, Pearl Harbor, and that dastardly, treacherous surprise.

This, then, was the situation on Sunday, June 4. Twenty-four hours later, it had dawned on Nasser that a Bismarckian policy cannot be pursued without the equivalent of Prussian battalions to back it up. Nasser, normally a rational man in the means he applies to pursue his policy, had become so enmeshed in the world of make-believe which he had helped to create that he threw all caution to the winds and embarked on what was obviously a collision course for which, despite all the rodomontade, he was not militarily prepared.

ARABS HAVE many engaging qualities but they also have an almost unlimited capacity for self-delusion. This is a streak in the Arab character that cannot be too strongly stressed, for it explains not only the coming of the war but also its aftermath. The constant stream of propaganda disseminated by the mass media from Algiers to Baghdad about Arab cultural distinction, economic progress, military might, and political power is accepted by the Arab public out of a deep emotional need. They are a proud people which has excelled in many respects in past centuries but has not been able to come to terms with its place in the modern world, and feels resentful about it. Hence the necessity to create a fantasy in which the enormous problems besetting the Arab world would have not merely been tackled, but already solved. The official communiqués published during the six-day war show that such fantasies clouded not only Arab attitudes in general but made it impossible for them to cope with the most immediate problems facing them. On the first day of the fighting, Cairo announced:

> The battle has begun. We have defeated Israel on the first day of the battle. We will defeat it every moment and every hour. We will conquer it in the air and on land and destroy it forever. Bid farewell, Israel.

The same day the Syrian defense minister broadcast over Radio Damascus:

> Israel has been bragging about the strength and supremacy of its airforce. Today you have ended this myth forever. You have trampled the enemy air force in the mud (June 6, 00.05 GMT).

In another broadcast, Damascus announced:

> Jewish settlements are wiped out, mountains are aflame. Syrian Arabs are sweeping plains and hills in a day of victory. Jewish flags are trampled underfoot and Arab flags are waving. The Zionist enemy is completely finished (June 6, 12.15 GMT).

On the same day, and at a time when the Arab air forces had ceased to exist:

> Pack your suitcases, Wilson. The aircraft is waiting to take you quickly to Jamaica. You have exposed the British air force to massive destruction at the hands of the Arab eagles (June 6, 10.00 GMT).

On Wednesday, June 7, when the war had already been decided, Damascus announced:

> The enemy's nerve has collapsed in the battle. The enemy posts along the entire Syrian front have fallen. The enemy's resistance has collapsed along the entire Sinai front. The rabbits of the Jewish army are falling like rats. . . . The march on Tel Aviv is thus a question of hours, not of days (10.25 GMT; 12.18 GMT).

On Thursday, June 8, when the war was virtually over, Ahmad Said, one of Cairo's star commentators, declared:

> Ask your cowardly enemy, where is the so-called Moshe Dayan? Where is he? Dayan, where is your so-called manhood? Where is your empty boasting? (05.35 GMT—the question could have easily have been answered: Dayan, or at any rate his soldiers, were at the gates of Ismailia).

A few hours later Cairo radio again went on the air:

> Today Moshe Dayan, the mouse of the desert, is speechless. Today his tongue is motionless, his bravado wrecked. Today Moshe Dayan is silent after our forces in Sinai have minced his armored brigade, destroyed it, and turned it into fragments and shambles of burnt iron. How you were bragging about your armor, Dayan. Now your armor is in hell. It has been destroyed and wiped out (07.35 GMT).

These few examples, chosen at random, are typical of the whole performance of the Arab press and radio during the campaign. But it would be incorrect to seek the explanation for such delusions solely in terms of the Arab national character, or even of simple wartime morale-boosting. In some ways the world situation during the last decade has been conducive to dreams of Arab power; to some extent even the United States and the Soviet Union have been susceptible to them. In the United Nations, at any rate—itself, according to unkind observers, a dream world—the Arab countries with their many friends and supporters certainly count for far more than Israel, whom they can easily outvote. Yet for the time being, the really decisive issues are not settled in the United Nations. There was more than a grain of truth in the comment of a

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British conservative writer (Peregrine Worsthorne) that the Arab-Israeli war was the first *post*-colonial contest between an advanced country and the underdeveloped world—the first time a modern Western-type state had been challenged frontally and was able to fight back unhindered by a colonial guilt complex.

After a few hours of fighting it was obvious that the Egyptian army had suffered a setback almost unprecedented in military history. To admit this was impossible; hence the story about Anglo-American air cover. Western diplomats were stupefied by this story, and there were angry comments about Egyptian mendacity. Had these diplomats studied Egyptian or Syrian propaganda over the last fifteen years they would have been less astonished. Within three days Nasser had already convinced himself that the Anglo-American air "umbrella" had actually existed, for without it, as he declared in his resignation speech, the united might of the Arabs would have been more than sufficient to defeat Israel.

Nasser's hold over Egypt was never really in danger; after the mass demonstrations following his speech, he returned with more power than ever. Nor was the make-believe world in which the average Egyptian had been living by any means shattered by the defeat. Western observers returning from Cairo all agreed that the Egyptian people had no conception whatever of the magnitude of the disaster that had overtaken them: it was merely a "setback" and "with Gamal Abdel Nasser at the helm again the final outcome cannot be in doubt."

True, one day the soldiers will come back and reveal the losses. But the scapegoats have already been named: "Nasser has acted correctly, he has dismissed the generals who let us down." There have been some lone voices calling for self-examination—for example, the Jordanian *Al Destur:*

> The catastrophe which has befallen the Arab nation is the result of many factors, causes, and defects prevalent in Arab society and in our social and political morality.... When armed confrontation takes place, false claims vanish. What count are the strength and the weakness of each side (June 12, 1967).

But these are voices crying in the wilderness; it can be predicted with near certainty that nothing is further from the mind of Nasser and the Ba'ath than genuine self-criticism or a sober re-examination of past events. Heykal and a few others in Cairo had second thoughts. Had it really been that clever to put so much emphasis on the physical destruction of Israel? ("We shall not spare women and children," the Cairo-based Voice of Palestine had declared.) Even the Arabs' best friends had been embarrassed. "We often say things we do not really mean," Heykal suggested. Yet the following week, *Akher Sa'a,* the leading Cairo illustrated weekly, carried a long report about Jewish ritual murder and the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion.* In short, most Egyptians and Syrians, not having been directly affected by the war, have reacted with increased hatred of Israel, and of the Western powers which during the crisis did so little to deserve their enmity.

II

ISRAEL WAS taken unawares by Nasser's demand for removal of the UN forces and his imposition of the blockade. It had been the underlying assumption of Israeli policy that Nasser was by no means ready for a third round; the war in Yemen, it was believed, ruled out a new Egyptian offensive for the time being. At first, therefore, the Israelis were unclear as to whether Nasser's move was just another political maneuver or a real challenge. The first news of Egyptian troop movements reached Jerusalem on May 15, the date of the Independence Day parade. On the afternoon of the next day, in a meeting between Eshkol and General Rabin, a partial mobilization of the reserves was decided upon. But during the many deliberations that went on during that day and even as late as May 17, it was still generally thought, both in army circles and in the government, that Nasser was merely out for a political demonstration. The security subcommittee of the Knesset which met on May 17 reached the conclusion that no immediate Israeli reaction on the military level was called for.

It was at a Mapai-Achdut Avoda executive meeting on the 18th that suspicions were first voiced that the danger of a war was nearer than had originally been supposed; the same night, in a meeting between Eshkol and the army command, an Egyptian blockade was first mentioned as a distinct possibility. In the weekly government meeting three days later (May 21), General Rabin reported that there were now 80,000 Egyptian soldiers in Sinai—more than ever before. By that time, there were notable differences of opinion within the government. One faction (which included Eshkol) maintained that a war was now very nearly inevitable, and that Israel must, if necessary, be prepared to go it alone; the moderates argued that Israel should not fight unless it had the support of at least one major power. The moderates won, and it was decided to make further diplomatic approaches in the Western capitals. Washington was contacted and advised Jerusalem to wait two days, by the end of which period Nasser had announced the blockade. Washington then told Eshkol to wait another fourteen days, so that diplomacy could play its role.

On May 23, upon Nasser's announcement of the blockade, a decision was taken at a meeting between the government and the leaders of the opposition parties (including General Dayan) to send the Foreign Minister to Paris, London, and Washington. Apparently, the only skeptics were

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Golda Meir and Moshe Carmel, the Minister of Transport, who expressed doubts as to the usefulness of Eban's mission. Their skepticism proved to be justified. President de Gaulle showed great personal warmth, but advised Eban not to annoy the Soviet Union and not to regard the closing of the Straits of Tiran as a *casus belli*; only through a four-power conference, said de Gaulle, could the problem be solved. The reaction in London was a little, but not much more, encouraging. Prime Minister Wilson promised to do something about the blockade, but it was obvious that Britain would act only in unison with others. At the meetings in Washington, President Johnson made it clear that he would be willing to act with other maritime countries to remove the blockade, but he refused to take Eban's warning about Egyptian troop concentrations in Sinai very seriously.

By this time, the chance for an immediate counterblow had passed. Nasser soon extended his demands, declaring that he was not just closing the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, but that he also intended to undo 1948—not merely 1956. The other Arab countries rallied around him—even Hussein, the "CIA dwarf from Amman," as the Cairo *Voice of Arabs* used affectionately to call him. The big powers made it clear that they would not use force to open the Straits; Russia fully supported the Arabs; and French official circles thought that legally Nasser had a strong case. Press opinion in the West was that Israel had suffered a decisive political defeat: was this perhaps the beginning of the end? True, not a single shot had been fired, and the military balance had not been affected. But in a part of the world where credibility counts for so much, Israeli stock had plummeted. Israel had always maintained that any interference with its freedom of shipping would be a *casus belli*, yet now that a blockade had been instituted Israel had countered with nothing more than ineffectual diplomatic maneuvers, obviously because she did not dare to resist the combined might of the Arabs.

Within Israel, once the first surprise had been overcome, anger began to mount. There was disillusionment with de Gaulle ("We thought we had a friend and we had only a supplier") and with the African and Asian countries to whom so much help had been given by Israel over almost two decades. (About Russia, needless to say, there had not been many illusions of which to be disabused.) But above all there was a growing irritation with the irresolution of the Eshkol government, which seemed invariably to trail after the events. Eshkol's declaration of apparent trust in the great powers, including even the Russians ("Spirit of Tashkent"), and Eban's unsuccessful flight to Washington, left the impression that the government lacked the stamina and determination to cope with the situation; open criticism of Eban and other ministers was widely voiced. The Soviet and Communist press spoke constantly of the "adventurist policy of the bellicose ruling circles in Tel Aviv," but the ruling circles, as it happened, were miles behind public opinion. The specter of Munich haunted the Israeli public; references to Neville Chamberlain, and the futility and danger of a policy of "peace in our time," became more and more common. There was dissatisfaction within the army, and some were asking whether Ben Gurion's bitter personal attacks on his former colleagues in the government might not have been justified.

To be sure, the hawks (including apparently Ben Gurion) had been as surprised as Eshkol himself by Nasser's move. But was there much reason for surprise? The government had received intelligence reports—quite specific ones, too—that something was afoot in Egypt, and in an interview with the Israeli broadcasting station on May 13, Eshkol had referred to the threat to bar Israeli shipping from the Red Sea. Evidently, however, he had not taken the reports or the threat very seriously.

WITHOUT KNOWING any details of what was going on behind the scenes, the Israeli public suspected that nothing was being done and that the situation was growing steadily worse. A spontaneous demand for a National Government arose in the press, in conversations, in meetings; demonstrations even took place. The actual political intitiative came from the Liberal and religious parties who threatened to leave the coalition unless a National Government was established. Menahem Begin, leader of the right-wing Herut party, contacted Ben Gurion, his bitter enemy, who, he suggested, should in this hour of national emergency again become prime minister in a war cabinet, with Eshkol as his deputy for civilian affairs. Ben Gurion refused to cooperate, as did Eshkol, who said he would rather step down altogether if necessary. The next day, Moshe Shapiro, Minister of the Interior, suggested that Eshkol should continue but that the defense ministry should be handed to Ben Gurion, a plan which was also rejected by those concerned.

By Tuesday, May 30, a stalemate had been reached, but public clamor for a National Government continued to grow. Petitions were circulated in the streets, groups of women demonstrated outside Mapai headquarters in Tel Aviv, Eshkol and Eban were attacked as "appeasers." The public was unaware at the time that in a cabinet meeting on Sunday, May 28 (after Eban's report from Washington), Eshkol had again sided with those in favor of military action and had again been outvoted. The coalition parties, now in permanent session, suggested bringing in four opposition leaders, including Dayan and Begin, as ministers without portfolio; their candidate for the ministry of defense was Yigal Allon, the former commander of the Palmach. Dayan refused and the religious parties again threatened to leave

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the coalition unless the "victor of Sinai" was appointed. Inside Mapai there was bitter resistance to Dayan by Golda Meir and some others of the old guard—a resistance stemming partly, no doubt, from the legacy of bitterness left by the Mapai-Rafi dispute (in which Dayan joined Ben Gurion in splitting off from Mapai to form the new party), and partly from the fact that they did not think him superior as a military leader to Allon or some other generals who did not even figure in the running. But the Mapai old guard was unable to resist popular pressure. They were outvoted at an executive meeting, in the course of which even some of Eshkol's closest friends deserted him. Allon withdrew as a candidate and on Thursday evening, June 1, agreement was reached about the inclusion in the cabinet of Dayan, Begin, and two other members of opposition parties.

Public relief was immense. It was not merely that the new government had a majority of 112 out of the 120 Knesset members; confidence in the leadership was also restored. When war broke out on June 5, even the Jewish Communists (Maki) supported the "government of national unity." "Everything for victory," *Ha'aretz* wrote in an editorial which recalled the emotions of World War II and expressed the conviction that the country's very existence was at stake in this war that had been forced upon the Jews of Israel. By Monday evening it was clear that the war had already been won and that the end was only a question of time. From Tuesday on there was euphoria: the victory was more complete than anyone had expected or hoped. By the middle of the week, everyone felt so secure that party polemics were revived, and Allon, the Minister of Labor, was attacked for allegedly belittling Dayan's part in the victory. Again it was asked whether Eshkol should not give way to someone else, and whether Eban was really the best man for his job. Everything was back to normal.

It appears in retrospect that the Eshkol government's failure to act had no crucial influence on the course of events. War would not have been averted by a firm immediate response to the blockade, nor could an earlier war have been fought in circumstances more advantageous from Israel's point of view. Similarly with U Thant's withdrawal of UNEF. Instead of acceding instantly to Nasser's demands, U Thant should of course have stalled, thus giving the big powers valuable time for diplomatic consultation. But again, with the benefit of hindsight, we know that this would have made little difference, for there was no chance that any constructive action would have been taken. Whether decisive American action would have prevented the war, and whether as a result America's position in the Middle East would have been stronger than it is now, is a more difficult question to which no authoritative answer can yet be given.

There was probably more than one reason for the hesitation of the Israeli government during the first days of the crisis. Israel has a citizen army which may not have been ready for an immediate counterblow on a massive scale. At the time, no one could have known that a delay of almost three weeks would make no difference to the outcome. If Israel had reacted immediately, the other Arab countries would still have rallied to Nasser while America, England, and the rest would have condemned Israel for preventing them (as they would have claimed) from finding a peaceful solution. And it is by no means certain that what would have begun as limited fighting at Sharm el-Sheikh would not have spread quickly into full-scale war.

WHAT IMMEDIATE lessons did Israel draw from the war? Above all, that big-power guarantees cannot be trusted: the copy of Dulles's letter which had been mislaid by the State Department was symbolic. Whether the United States would have intervened militarily had Israel faced extinction is a moot point in the eyes of most Israelis, and no one wanted Washington to be put to this test. Whatever the circumstances of the conflict, Britain and France would have been strictly neutral, the Soviet Union bitterly hostile. There has been a tendency in Israel for many years to discount threats and promises from the outside world. The feeling both before the war and after was that militarily Israel had little to fear, and even less to hope for, from the big powers.

What were Israel's war aims? Not much thought was given to this question—hence the confusion after the swift victory. Politically the war was defensive. Everyone agreed that it would end in victory, but that Israel would gain no lasting benefit from it, only a respite. On the eve of the war a columnist in an Israeli paper called for a National Government: "Party keys, socialism, and other pastimes will have to wait until we retreat from Sinai under American pressure." Mr. Ephraim Kishon is a humorist by profession, but on this occasion he was in dead earnest, and was moreover fairly accurately reflecting public opinion. But with the sweeping victory, expectations rose. In an address to the army on the first day of the fighting, General Dayan said that "we have no aims of territorial conquest; our only aim is to foil the attempt of the Arab armies to invade our country and to destroy the encircling blockade and aggression against us." Two days later, he declared that the Old City would never be given up. This was subsequently reiterated by Eshkol in a speech in the Knesset. There was some talk about Jewish settlement in the hills of Hebron (Ben Gurion), and about keeping the Gaza Strip (or part of it), Sharm el-Sheikh, Jordan west of the river, and the Syrian heights. Israeli attitudes hardened as it appeared that the Arab countries would refuse to negotiate directly, and were hard-

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ened still further by the decision of the Soviet bloc countries to break off diplomatic relations. There was going to be a protracted struggle ahead, and Israel could ill afford to give up in advance any of the advantages it had gained. Political parties, individual leaders, and newspapers continued to proclaim their private war aims. The government, wisely no doubt, merely announced that there should be no illusion that Israel was prepared to return to the situation prevailing before June 5, 1967.

III

THE ISRAELI-ARAB war had a profound impact on public opinion throughout Europe. It became a major domestic issue in France and Italy, it split the Left in several countries, it caused a number of minor political crises, it made temporary philo-Semites even of many Austrians and Poles, and it induced the Spanish Communists for the first time in their history to support General Franco. It could have such an impact because journalistically this was the best covered war in history. For the first time, the individual soldier through his transistor knew not only what was happening ten yards in front of him, he also learned at once about events on all other fronts, military as well as political. There was a feeling of immediacy, of direct personal concern, not only in the United States and Europe, but even in faraway Japan which had its TV camera crews ready for instant relay in Tel Aviv and Cairo. It is indeed uncertain whether Nasser would have survived politically but for television; within minutes of his resignation speech, his supporters throughout the Arab capitals organized mass demonstrations and the *Rais* returned to office on a wave of popular enthusiasm.*

Politically, the reaction inside France was the most interesting. At first de Gaulle took a strictly neutral line; later he became openly pro-Arab. This was part of a very complicated maneuver in which bigger issues were at stake than Israel and the Arab states. But it won Arab congratulations and caused disappointment to Israel.

To a certain extent, the French reaction was to be expected, de Gaulle and his ministers having worked for a reconciliation with the Arab world since the liquidation of the Algerian war. The trust put by some Israeli politicians, notably Ben Gurion, Dayan, and Peres, in de Gaulle's professions of lasting friendship had thus been a little naive and quite misplaced. But there were still strong pro-Israeli sympathies among rank-and-file Gaullists, and at one stage the general faced a revolt in his own party. French public opinion, with one important exception (the Communists), condemned government policy, and even the Communists, after taking an all-out pro-Nasser stand, had to retreat later on, partly because of the general mood in their own ranks.

The genuine wave of sympathy for Israel among the French Left came close for a while to threatening the recently established link between the Communist and non-Communist Left. Mendès-France published an impassioned plea to the Kremlin, Mitterrand after some initial hesitation followed suit, and countless intellectuals, including Sartre and some of the most vigorous opponents of American policy in Vietnam, in turn followed him in emphasizing Israel's right to survival. Perhaps most remarkable was the reaction of a group of Sorbonne professors who had been prominent for years in sponsoring all the causes of the Left—Vietnam, Algeria, and, of course, Arab-Jewish understanding. They now admitted (like Robert Mizrahi) that they had looked in vain for partners in the Arab camp, for even the most *progressistes* of the Arabs included the destruction of Israel as part of their program. This raised disturbing questions in their minds about

* From a professional point of view, *Le Monde* and the French radio (Europe I) provided the best coverage throughout the crisis. British and American coverage of the actual fighting was often excellent; the war reporters and photographers showed their usual daring. But they were much weaker on the complicated political ramifications of the crisis. The moment it became a political story once more, the reader of the British and American press in search of full and reliable information found himself at a loss. Italian, German, Swiss, and Swedish papers had countless representatives in the Middle East and devoted many pages to their reports.

At first, the Soviet press played the conflict down, for several days not even mentioning the Straits of Tiran. Nor could any Russian who did not listen to foreign radio stations have possibly understood why the story should suddenly have erupted into the front-page headlines. Nor had there been anything to prepare him for an Israeli victory. The accounts of protest meetings in a Minsk factory against "Israeli aggression" were more numerous than direct reports from the Middle East. The Israeli press was not very informative on the fighting—the reports in Western newspapers were often more interesting and vivid. Neither the feeling of isolation and the deep concern (in late May) nor the elation of victory were clearly reflected in the Israeli press; the Israeli radio, on the other hand, did a very competent job. Perhaps—a question for Mr. McLuhan—it was the medium after all. The radio could convey the drama which was so often missing in the press. As for the Egyptian press and radio, the less said, the better.

Nor was the performance of the Middle East experts convincing. In Britain and France (and, I believe, to a lesser extent in the United States) the majority of the specialists had been mistaken in their assessment of the real strength of the Arab countries. That most of them were pro-Arab is only natural; area experts often develop a genuine liking for and identification with their chosen region. There are more prosaic considerations too. In order to function as area experts, they have to be at least on speaking terms with the powers-that-be in the Middle East and they realize better than political commentators who lack a Middle Eastern background that the Arabs have a genuine case. Yet their concentration on the Arab world and its problems tends to distort their judgment. They will think of many extenuating circumstances to explain the lack of real progress in the Arab world under its new masters; for searching criticism of basic ills of Arab society one will look to their writings in vain.

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the character of the Arab Left. Could a party (or a government) which advocated the destruction of a neighboring country and its inhabitants be considered socialist and progressive?

There was much sympathy for Israel in Britain, though it was less apparent in parliament and in sections of the press than among the general public. Prime Minister Wilson reputedly leaned toward Israel, and so did some of his closest colleagues like R. H. S. Crossman and George Wigg. But George Brown, the Foreign Secretary, was thought to incline toward the Arab cause; he had met Nasser and in contrast to his predecessors formed the opinion that he could get along with him. The left wing of the Labour party was fairly evenly split between pro-Israelis and Nasserites. When Emanuel Shinwell, a former Minister of War, suggested in the House of Commons that the Prime Minister congratulate Israel in its hour of victory, he provoked a major fracas. There was no marked sympathy for either side in the Foreign Office or the editorial offices of the *Times*; the *Observer* and the *Guardian* (once the avowed champion of Zionism) wavered between neutrality and cautious support of the Arabs. The *Economist*, in an editorial on June 3, wrote Israel off: the Israelis had been outmaneuvered, they were no longer arguing from a position of strength, they had to make territorial concessions:

> President Nasser has to choose between being a local Arab Bismarck and a statesman with a claim to world stature. The Israelis have the unhappier and lesser choice of seizing the ball of peace if and when it is thrown toward them.

During the actual fighting, the general tenor became friendlier in the press. On British radio, TV, and in the press a great deal of unsolicited advice was offered to Johnson and Kosygin, and to Eshkol especially; it is doubtful whether anyone would have been better off had he taken it.

The state of affairs in Italy was much like that in France. The government took a strictly neutral position and refused to support the Israeli claim to freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba. Fanfani, Moro, Gronchi, and other leaders of the Demo-Christian party referred to Italian business interests in the Arab countries, and for once they had the support of the Communists. However, public opinion was behind neither the government nor the main opposition party; if the Communist party executive, including some of its Jewish leaders such as Sereni, gave strong support to Nasser (contrasting Moshe Dayan to—of all persons—Anne Frank), its Rome branch went its own way. Nenni and many others subjected the strange bedfellows to scathing criticism; there were mass demonstrations; and in Bologna the local Communist-Socialist municipal coalition fell in consequence of a quarrel over the Middle East.

The West German government was also strictly neutral (though it sent 25,000 gas masks to the Israelis), whereas public opinion, with the exception of the extreme Right and the pro-Chinese sects among the students, was overwhelmingly pro-Israel. The same was true of Holland, the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland, and even Austria, not traditionally a pro-Jewish country. The press reported the events in great detail and there were mass demonstrations. The courageous Israeli victory, said the influential *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* in an editorial, was a source of inspiration to all small countries because it showed that their fate did not entirely depend on big-power policies and that they could shape their destiny themselves, provided they had the resolution to do so.

According to reports from Warsaw, Budapest, and Prague, the Israeli victory was extremely popular, whatever the official propaganda had to say about the matter. Even in the Soviet Union the government found it difficult to whip up much enthusiasm among the population for Nasser, and the attacks on "Zionists," which since Stalin's day have had a special connotation, embarrassed important sections of the intelligentsia. Some Western Communist papers, (especially those from Sweden, Denmark, Holland, and Austria), widely read in Moscow, openly dissociated themselves from the unqualified Soviet support for the Arab war effort.

There was, of course, much less support for Israel in Asia and Africa. India behaved predictably, though at the beginning, much opposition to Mrs. Gandhi's policy was voiced. The Far East, from Japan to Indonesia, was neutral in the conflict, though some of these countries voted later in the UN for the Yugoslav resolution. In Africa, Israel suffered many disappointments (Tanzania, Guinea, Mali). Some countries, such as Kenya and Uganda, remained neutral and a few, like Malawi and Botswana, expressed sympathy for Israel. In view of the help given by Israel to these countries over many years, this was no doubt a grave setback. But it was not really surprising: Soviet-Arab propaganda about "Israeli imperialism" was more in tune with the political climate prevailing in these countries, and it outweighed all the patient Israeli efforts at constructive help.

The lineup of governments, public opinion, and newspapers was followed in Israel with interest, occasional concern, and sometimes amusement. But by and large the feeling was that though Israel would need outside support in the coming months, there was no point in devoting excessive attention to the political shifts in the world capitals. In that area Israel's possibilities were in any case restricted, and in the last resort the country could rely only on its own armed strength and the support of the Jewish people. There were differences of opinion as to the extent of this "orientation toward ourselves." But basically, for better or worse, this was the dominant mood in Israel on the morning after.

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IV

WHAT NEXT, then, in the Middle East? The Arab world, while utterly opposed to accepting Israel's existence, is for the time being unable to effect Israel's destruction. Nevertheless, the Arabs are firmly convinced that it is just a matter of one more try. Only peoples who have suffered total defeat, like the Germans or the Japanese in 1945, are ready to forgo the stab-in-the-back myth. The Israeli victory was quick and sweeping but in no way total; for most Egyptians and Syrians, not to mention Iraqis, the war was something outside their own experience and the reason for the Arab defeat therefore remains a riddle. The story of the Anglo-American conspiracy is universally accepted in the Arab world, even though King Hussein of Jordan has had second thoughts about it. Such a frame of mind makes a new attempt to attack Israel almost inevitable; it also makes it unlikely to succeed.

For how will the Arabs ever overcome their plight unless they have the courage to confront squarely the deeper causes of the catastrophe of 1967? Radical and painful self-criticism (a new "generation of 1898") is almost unthinkable; it would mean sweeping away most existing governments in the Arab world, changing basic attitudes, giving up cherished beliefs. Instead, the Arab citizenry has been offered ridiculous historical analogies: did not the Prophet Mohammed also suffer bitter defeat at Uhud before moving on to final victory?

Two years ago, there was some ground for believing that, economically, Egypt would muddle through and would in ten or fifteen years be strong enough, with the help of other Arab countries, to defeat Israel. After the debacle of 1967 there is much less reason to assume that Egypt will muddle through, and Nasser cannot afford to wait another ten or twenty years. In 1965 the new Egyptian five-year plan promising "massive industrialization" was launched. It was never quite clear where the capital for investment would come from. One-third was to be provided by income from the Suez Canal, tourism, and the sale of cotton, but two-thirds was to be brought in from outside the country. In June 1966, the American government decided to discontinue its grain shipments, and the plan had to be amended; by the autumn it seemed obvious that it could never be realized. Nasser, accordingly, began to lose interest in domestic affairs and devoted more and more of his time to foreign political initiatives. At the beginning of 1967 things worsened; there was a financial crisis so acute that half the remaining gold reserves in Swiss banks had to be sold quickly to pay Egypt's short-term debts. Meat and sugar had to be rationed, and Nasser asked his compatriots to restrict their intake of rice—their staple food.

This was not a temporary crisis, but a manifestation of the deeper malaise afflicting Egypt. True, 650 factories had been built in recent years but most of them functioned uneconomically (none has published a balance sheet since 1961) and they employed only 300,000 workers. The Aswan Dam is to be completed next year, but the experts have known all along that in view of the population explosion, the dam would only be sufficient to prevent a further decline in the Egyptian standard of living.

The economic results of the war of 1967 are incalculable. The Suez Canal is out of action, tourism at a standstill, and the cotton crop indefinitely mortgaged to the arms program. During the last ten years Egypt has been living on borrowed money skillfully extracted by Nasser from both West and East. Who will now provide loans, never to be repaid in future? Surely not private investors. Nasser can expect substantial gifts for restoring diplomatic ties with the United States, but it is unlikely that he will get them in the very near future.

The political consequences of the situation are no less somber. Nasser or whoever may succeed him will be under even greater pressure to seek a solution to Egypt's problems outside the country. The Soviet Union will replace much or all of the arms that were destroyed, but it cannot afford to underwrite Egypt's deficit for an unlimited period. For Nasser the only alternative, then, is to get his hands somehow, perhaps with Soviet help, on part of the royalties (three billion dollars a year) from Arab oil, perhaps by occupying Libya and Saudi Arabia. Yet militarily he is not now in a position to tackle even a country like Saudi Arabia. And what good would the oil be to him unless he could sell it to the West?

Whatever the economic prospects, pressure for revenge on Israel will be overwhelming. The military lessons of the defeat seem to be lost on Egypt and Syria. It is generally believed in the Arab capitals that the combined might of the Arab armies is more than a match for Israel; they would have won the war if only they had got in a first strike before the Israelis did. All this makes a new military adventure extremely probable not in ten or twenty years, but well before. And the next round of the Arab-Israeli conflict may be nuclear; the big powers could impede this, but what could they do to prevent it? To be sure, if Nasser were to pin his hopes on a devastating first nuclear strike, he would be able to destroy Israel only at the price of self-destruction, for Egypt, with its concentration of population around Cairo and the Delta (not to mention the Aswan Dam), is as vulnerable as Israel. But can a balance of fear be relied upon to prevent a nuclear war in the Middle East, as it has so far done in the world at large? With so much hate and fanaticism now rampant in the Arab world, and with the lack of realism among both Arab masses and leaders, a nuclear war in the Middle East cannot be ruled out.

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Whether Egypt in the coming years will be ruled by Nasser or by some other military ruler is almost immaterial. In its present violent mood Arab public opinion is unlikely to stand for a more moderate policy or for a reorientation in foreign affairs—toward Africa, for instance. There may on the other hand be a relapse into anarchy. The mob carried Nasser back to power on June 10, but mobs are notoriously fickle. Thus an Egyptian or a Syrian "cultural revolution" is at least a possibility.

The long-term economic prospects of Syria and Iraq are better than those of Egypt; Jordan at present carries little weight. Syria faces basically the same problems as Egypt: it has to industrialize and lacks the means to do so; unlike Egypt, however, it has no population explosion to worry about. As for Iraq, it has a considerable income from oil, which covers almost 90 per cent of its imports. But if the economic potential of these countries is more promising than Egypt's, their present governments are worse and there are few signs of any change for the better. Some Arab governments, notably those which have no oil themselves, are great believers in an embargo on oil exports. Those more intimately concerned with the problem know that the long-range movement is away from oil toward other sources of energy, and that the production of oil in other parts of the world could easily be stepped up. It is not really a propitious situation in which to threaten anyone.

V

THE MAGNITUDE and excitement of the victory made most people in Israel forget for a while the enormity of the problems facing the Jewish State. It was clear from the beginning that Israel would be under tremendous pressure to surrender the occupied territories. Since Russian military intervention seemed most unlikely and other sanctions probably doomed to failure, at least in the short run, there was only the danger of isolation in the United Nations. Israel faced that danger with equanimity, believing that the country could hold on indefinitely to its conquests in the absence of a real peace settlement.

But were the conquered territories worth holding? The administration and policing of large areas populated by Arabs were bound to create nightmarish problems. It could be predicted with near certainty that there would be an increasing number of acts of sabotage, and that the Israeli authorities would have to respond sharply. And it was easy to imagine world reaction to such incidents. Meanwhile, the occupation of Sinai was already creating problems of a logistical character. But these were minor considerations in comparison with the long-term difficulties facing the state: the absorption of more than a million Arabs would decisively affect its character in a way unacceptable to most Israelis. The various schemes outlined by Israeli leaders (of an Israeli-Jordan co-dominion, or a semi-independent Arab state with Israel in effective military control) were unworkable hybrids. Was it all really worthwhile? A violent dispute over this question was likely to erupt sooner or later between annexationists and their critics, and there were weighty arguments on both sides. The annexationists were already saying that since the Arab countries were openly preparing for a new round of warfare, it would be madness to give up any military advantage. Their critics answered that the undoubted advantages were outweighed by other military and political considerations, and that in any case sweeping annexations were undesirable, for Israel's ultimate aim was to win not merely the war, but also the peace.

Sometimes the claims of the annexationists ran a little wild: there was a mass petition not to give up a single inch. Moshe Dayan got in trouble over the Gaza Strip but he had wide support among the populace. Never before had there been so much public discussion outside the established political parties—in ad hoc conventions, newspaper advertisements, and the letter columns of the Israeli press. Criticism of Eshkol and, above all, Eban continued, and there was an outcry over the failure of Israeli propaganda: was the victory on the battlefield to be lost as a result of the shortcomings of the Israeli information services? Committees and commissions were set up in Jerusalem, Paris, and London; there was a lot of good will but usually it was not channelled in the right direction. Some brilliant minds suggested calling in advertising agents and public-relations experts. As if public relations, a doubtful institution in the best of times, could replace a clear policy. And a clear policy about borders and refugees Israel simply did not have.

It was a most difficult situation, and no one familiar with all its complexities was likely to choose without hesitation the one solution or the other. Israel had obviously planned far more efficiently for war than for peace; a peace-planning committee was not established until a week after the cease-fire. Already some opportunities had been missed. Immediately following the cease-fire Israel should have made it absolutely clear that the war had not been fought for territorial gain, that Israel's only concern was to live in peace with the Arab world. A gesture of compassion and of active help to the new Arab refugees who had suffered from the folly of their leaders was made in the end—but the Israeli government still had no agreed-upon policy on this issue.

But the nation was hardly in a mood for such actions and gestures; if the war had brought out many sterling qualities in the people, it had also hardened feelings. It is, of course, easy to be generous from afar; perhaps it was too much to expect

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magnanimity toward an enemy who had vowed to destroy the state and its inhabitants.

As the implications of the victory became clearer, euphoria began giving way to a more sober view, even to partial disillusionment. There was a growing realization that the victory had only removed the immediate threat of an Arab attack, and that there would be months and years, perhaps decades, of great tension and dangers ahead. Immigration remained the basic problem. The Jews of other countries had shown great solidarity with Israel during the crisis, but how many of those who had participated in demonstrations or given money were willing to settle in Israel? The basic purpose of the Zionist movement had been to restore dignity and security to the Jewish people in its own land. The land had been restored and the dignity, but there was still no security. In the country that had been built to make the Jews secure, they were less safe than in any other part of the world, and they had to reconcile themselves to an unlimited period of siege. For the advice of some of their well-wishers to the effect that Israel ought to integrate itself into the Middle East is not really very helpful. There has been much talk about a convergence in the world at large toward a single industrial civilization. Perhaps one day there will be a convergence in the Middle East—but convergence toward what kind of society and what kind of political regime? If it is to be a modern, reasonably civilized, and democratic society, it is the Arab countries that will have to do the converging, not Israel. It is doubtful that Israel would want to become a country similar to Egypt or Syria, and it is even less doubtful that this would be a desirable objective.

Israel now faces hard times. There is a massive propaganda onslaught from the East about the new Hitlerites and their barbarous atrocities; already we have heard about Israeli *Gauleiters* and *Lebensraum*, and next, no doubt, there will be talk of an Israeli Gestapo and Israeli extermination camps. The impact of such propaganda should not be underrated—some of the dirt always sticks. This will be a difficult period for the Jews of the Soviet Union, too, and the other East European countries. However emphatically they dissociate themselves from Israel, their loyalties will be suspect in the eyes of the regime—not a small thing in those parts. There may in time be second thoughts on the Middle East in Moscow; after all, the Russians too have good reason to feel aggrieved with the performance of an ally which has shown little to commend itself. The Soviet leaders are unlikely to forget that they were told by the Arabs before June 5 that Russian military intervention was not needed—and that they were bitterly criticized later on by every Arab from President Nasser down for not having fought their battles for them. Yet even if the Arabs have made a poor showing, even if they cannot be controlled by Moscow at a time of crisis, no radical reorientation of Soviet policy in the Middle East can be anticipated in the foreseeable future.

Pressure will be exerted on Israel not only from the East. France needs the Arabs for its big-power ambitions, Italy wants to get a stronger foothold in the Arab oil industry, England is fearful of the withdrawal of Arab funds from the City, Turkey and Greece want Arab support for their respective claims on Cyprus. The list could be prolonged indefinitely.

On the other hand, neither European nor American interests in the area are vital—the oil can be replaced, and the importance of the strategic bases has greatly decreased over the years. Indonesia alone has a larger population than the whole Arab East from Morocco to Bahrein. The Arab world in brief needs the West far more than the West needs the Arabs. If this could be made clear to the Arab capitals, forcefully and over an extended period, it would be the best contribution toward a cure of Arab ills. While passions would not necessarily die down, the governments and the peoples of these areas would realize that the Middle East is not the center of the world. The Arabs still would not accept Israel, but the conflict might be reduced to manageable size.

THERE IS at present little hope that this will happen, for the belief that the Middle East is economically and strategically one of the world's key areas dies hard. Western statesmen will continue to devote much of their energy to regaining Arab good will. There will be no lack of honest brokers in London and New York, Paris and Rome, offering their services to restore a "just and equitable" peace: restoration to the Arabs of the land occupied by the Israelis, security guarantees for the Israelis. (The word "guarantees" has a hollow sound at present, but perhaps it can be refurbished.) The Middle East has become a vacuum of ideas, says the London *Times*—as if peace in the area depended on brilliant new ideas. Only the passage of time and the deflection of general attention away from that unhappy part of the globe can lead to peace. Perhaps a new major world crisis elsewhere will bring this about; perhaps the Chinese will make their contribution. An agreement on some limited aspect such as the Suez Canal seems possible, because the Egyptians badly need it, and the maritime powers also want it urgently. But will Israel accept this short of a general settlement? The Arab states have been beaten, but they have not been decisively defeated; they want to renew the war, but they will not be able to do so for some time to come. The Soviet Union does not want a war that may spread, but neither does it want real peace, and it will not impose a solution the Arabs do not like. The outlook in the Middle East, in short, is neither for war nor for peace.

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AMOS ELON

LETTER FROM THE SINAI FRONT

FOR US, it all began on Independence Day, May 15. It was a late spring day in Jerusalem. At the Municipal Stadium, the sun shone brightly on a festive, select crowd—chosen by electric computer, for equity's sake, from a list of Jerusalem taxpayers. Present at this official celebration of Israel's nineteenth birthday was Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, flanked by his Chief of Staff—General Yitzhak Rabin—cabinet members, and the few members of the diplomatic corps who recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital city. Conspicuously absent was former Prime Minister David Ben Gurion, who two days earlier had viciously attacked the Eshkol government for bowing to Western pressure by agreeing not to hold a full-size parade in the divided city. In fact, the whole show—a modified military display—was commonly referred to as "Eshkol's mini-parade."

Flags fluttered in the wind. Infantry and light armored units, carefully selected to comply with armistice regulations prohibiting artillery and other heavy equipment in the Jerusalem area, rumbled past to the gay sounds of an old Austro-Hungarian marching song, played by a ribbon-bedecked military band. As the mini-parade drew to a close, a fleet of jeeps carrying service banners passed the grandstand. It was at this moment that a few persons in the crowd noticed the Prime Minister lean over to his saluting Chief of Staff and whisper something in his ear. No one could then know that this act marked the beginning of the intense drama that was to unfold in the next few weeks.

Eshkol had asked General Rabin to meet with him at his home immediately after the parade for an urgent consultation. Rabin just nodded. Moments earlier, he, too, sitting in his grandstand seat, had received an upsetting message from army intelligence. The report stated that two Egyptian armored divisions were moving in the Sinai desert, in the direction of the Israeli border, and that Nasser's deputy Field Marshal Amar, had visited advance headquarters in Sinai that very morning. Coupled with this intelligence was the fact that Radio Cairo had announced on the same morning that Egyptian Chief of Staff Fawzi had met with Syrian military leaders to "coordinate joint military action." The radio had added that Egypt was prepared at any moment "to fight Israel in order to restore the Palestinian homeland, stolen by the imperialists, to its rightful owners."

For the moment, however, this report did not generate great alarm. At their meeting later in the day, Rabin and Eshkol agreed that President Nasser was undoubtedly engaged in yet another one of his extravagant propaganda moves. The United Nations Emergency Force was still stationed along the Sinai borders and in the Gaza Strip as a buffer against any Egyptian action. There was, in addition, no abrupt change in Israeli intelligence estimates of Arab forces: Nasser—with much of his army committed in Yemen—was clearly neither willing nor ready to wage war at this particular time. British and American intelligence strongly corroborated this judgment. It was not until a week later, when the Egyptian military buildup was reaching its peak and the Straits of Tiran were closed, that officials began to wonder whether Israeli and Western intelligence experts had not talked themselves into a comfortable fairy tale. A top government expert reportedly lamented then to a full staff meeting, "I was mistaken, I was mistaken, I was mistaken...."

On May 15, however, such doubts had yet to rise to the surface. The general feeling that Nasser was only engaging in a propaganda move was strengthened by the fact that Egyptian troop convoys on their way to Sinai had been circuitously routed through Cairo, where they were paraded almost under the windows of Western embassies and hailed by masses of civilians waving flags and banners. One banner reportedly saluted Egypt's glorious army now on its way to a quick annihilation of the Zionists; another proclaimed, "This week in Tel Aviv!" Nevertheless, despite the ominous overtones of Europe in the summer of 1914, most Israeli observers thought of this as one gigantic propaganda stunt, designed to reassure Syria and other Arab states that Nasser's Egypt, though in its eleventh year of uneasy coexistence with Israel, was still in the forefront of the Holy Arab War against "imperialism and its Zionist

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lackeys." "Nasser is bluffing," said one highly-placed Foreign Office official, "we must do likewise." Few people at that early stage paused to think that if fighting were indeed to break out, it would not be the first time in history that actual war resulted from mutual bluffing and shows of force.

As Independence Day celebrations went on throughout Israel, Prime Minister Eshkol continued to meet with his top advisers. After Rabin came Foreign Affairs Adviser Yaacov Herzog, and Foreign Minister Abba Eban. Together they decided on a wait-and-see course, and meanwhile to consult with friendly powers, notably the United States. That afternoon, the annual Bible Quiz was held in Jerusalem and Eshkol presented the awards. In the evening he was guest of honor at a party for servicemen and their families that was held at an air force base. But he met a second time with General Rabin later that night, and they decided it would be wise to call up a few reserve units, particularly from the air force, and to accelerate the delivery of vital military equipment that had been ordered but not yet received. "I don't think anything will happen," the Prime Minister reportedly told a friend, and added—as is his custom—in Yiddish, *"ober sicher iz sicher"* ["There's no harm in being sure"]. The next day, the cabinet met and approved these measures, though most members agreed they were only a safeguard.

So began three weeks of nervewracking waiting, a period that was quickly nicknamed, "The Phony War." Pressures mounted slowly. On May 16, the morning after Independence Day, newspapers made no mention of the impending crisis. *Ha'aretz,* Israel's leading independent daily, headlined, "Two Hundred Thousand Watch Parade Through Jerusalem"; a single editorial discussed recent changes in the British administration of Aden. In *Davar,* the newspaper of the ruling Mapai party, Ben Gurion published another scathing attack on the Eshkol government for not holding a full-scale military parade. Another paper discussed internal Mapai dissension, still another editorialized on a recent conflict between a cabinet minister and the chief of Israel's police.

But by the following day, May 17, the newspapers had caught up. *Ha'aretz* led with "Egyptian Army Movements to Sinai Seen as Show of Force to Pressure Israel," and its editorial discussed how "Egypt encourages Syria." An uneasiness began to set in. What could Nasser be up to? Some observers in Israel offered answers to this question. Israeli leaders had been making particularly strong statements at patriotic rallies both before and on Independence Day, all warning Syria against the continuation of terrorist attacks by Syria-based El Fatah Palestine Freedom Fighters on Israeli settlements and roads. Perhaps this had indeed given the Syrians, and their Soviet patrons, the erroneous impression that Israel was about to march on Damascus in order to topple the present regime. Many Israelis felt that the Soviet Union, anxious to preserve a leftist regime almost as dear to it as Castro's Cuba (as one Soviet leader told visiting Minister of Labor Yigal Allon in Moscow later that week), had asked Egypt to frighten Israel into inaction in Syria by staging a big military show in Sinai (and then calling in Western television teams to photograph it). There was a dissenting minority view, however, which held that the Soviet Union was deliberately aiming to open a new East-West front in order to strengthen its bargaining position in Vietnam.

Meanwhile, one dramatic event quickly followed another. On May 17, Nasser ordered the United Nations Emergency Force out of its positions in the Gaza Strip. On May 18, the United Nations responded by ordering the removal of all of its troops from Egypt. What might have happened if U Thant had refused to comply, or had limited the UN withdrawal to the troops in Gaza while maintaining those in Sinai and along the Straits of Tiran, is a question undoubtedly to be debated by historians for years to come. It is not likely to be settled.

Had Nasser deliberately planned all this? Had he thought it all out in advance, carefully effecting, step by step, a grand design? Did he actually assume the time was ripe for a final reckoning with Israel? Or was he making up his mind as he went along, grasping the opportunity handed to him by U Thant, then going further to call what he must have thought was Israel's bluff? Perhaps he had taken seriously the long and intense personal campaign led by Ben Gurion and the Rafi party against the leadership of Levi Eshkol, the constant insinuations that Eshkol was weak, indecisive, even guilty, in Ben Gurion's words, of an unspecified horrendous "failing" in vital defense matters. Could it be that Nasser thought all this was true? Israel, moreover, was in its sixth month of a grave economic crisis and was paralyzed militarily. Did Nasser think it possible to execute a tremendous political victory by closing the Straits of Tiran without Israel lifting a finger to stop him? Could he have thought that after the dismissal of the UNEF troops and the successful blocking of the Gulf of Aqaba, *fedayeen* attacks against Israel could again be launched as in 1956, but this time with impunity? Unless Nasser himself speaks up, we will never really know what lay behind his actions.

By Monday, May 22, at any rate, the first visible effects of the crisis began to be seen. Life in Tel Aviv was still fairly normal, but partial mobilization had already left it a town of women, children, and middle-aged men. In this bustling, vivacious, normally swinging city of crowded sidewalk cafes, lively discotheques, and bars, the young men had suddenly vanished. Nor was Tel Aviv

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alone in this atmosphere of sudden emptiness. All over the country young men were being called up, some by telephone, others by cable or personal message. That evening, Eshkol played host at a state dinner for the Prime Minister of Finland, who had arrived the week before and was now going through all the pomp of an official visit—planned months before and now determinedly unfolding as though nothing was amiss—complete with visits to chicken farms, social institutions, and museums. At dinner, the possibility of war was scarcely discussed. Eshkol stayed up late, entertaining his guests with old Jewish tales. It was long past midnight when he went to bed.

At four o'clock in the morning, his telephone rang. It was General Rabin, informing him that the expected had come to pass. Nasser had ordered the Straits of Tiran closed to all ships headed for Israel. Within an hour the Prime Minister was on his way to army headquarters in Tel Aviv.

It was now that the most terrible of apprehension began to make itself felt: an awareness that war was "inevitable," and that men were now reduced to being the slaves, rather than the masters, of events. In *Ha'aretz*, Avraham Schweitzer, a journalist sympathetic to Rafi and long opposed to the Eshkol government, with a venom that had been typical of Israeli politics in recent months, called for war against Egypt before it was too late, before Nasser had a chance to complete the movement of his troops into Sinai.

Thus, whether Nasser actually wanted war or not, the danger point had been reached. The machinery of war began to gain control over men, like robots overpowering their masters. Few observers now thought that Nasser would or could turn back. Too many words had been spoken, too many soldiers had moved into position. Israelis have always lived reconciled to the idea of war. Now it was here. The country, under a pleasant spring sun, the fields abloom with wild flowers, the pretty girls in miniskirts and gaily printed cotton dresses filling the sidewalk cafes, was somberly, stoically waiting for war, as if for the impending visit of a tedious, meddling mother-in-law. Some said, fatalistically, that maybe the price for Israel's existence was a periodic bloodletting, as regular as income tax. There was little hysteria, but the fear was considerable among civilians—the wives and oldsters left behind in seemingly indefensible cities. Stocks of food were ample, but markets were soon cleaned of staples by those who remembered the last war. Most Israelis, however, refused to hoard under any circumstances.

WATCHING THE entire Middle East move inexorably closer to war, drawn as a magnet toward a calamity in which thousands must die and whole cities go up in flames, one could feel only despair, and a disgust tempered only by disbelief in the absurdity of the situation. Not a few of the men in uniform shared this feeling of absurdity, as they awaited the cataclysm in hastily prepared field positions throughout the Negev desert. I spent most of that week with the army in the south. The vast emptiness of the desert had been turned into a gigantic waiting-room, a movie-set ready to go. The expanse had suddenly been populated by masses of uniformed men. Soldiers in green fatigues lay alongside mud-camouflaged tanks and armored half-tracks, in the hot, ankle-deep dust, waiting. Camouflage nets were perched like tents over tanks and trucks. A vast army spread out across the desert, folded into the sides of rock mountains, waiting, brushing off thousands upon thousands of flies. Some were regular conscripts, serving their thirty months of national service. The majority were reservists; just yesterday their units had existed only on paper, or in a card index. Today they were out and active, a coiled spring suddenly released. A clerk from Tel Aviv operated the wireless set; a baker from Haifa cleaned the release mechanism of a jeep-mounted recoilless rifle; a mechanic, a college boy, and a kibbutznik waited in their Centurion tank, snatching catnaps when they could. A salesman from a Tel Aviv supermarket opened tins of goulash, made in Brazil and marked "kosher," and poured the contents into a huge pot. From the mobile van office came the clatter of typewriters. Inside, two young girl soldiers typed out intelligence reports and orders. Two other girls, who had worked all night, were napping on an inflated rubber mattress spread out under the wheels of the van. All four—in their early twenties—had recently completed their military service, but were now back with the reserves. Three of them had been recently married. One said she had been called three days before her husband.

A brigade commander, called at his law firm by telephone, had brought his private secretary and chauffeur along with him, and within ninety minutes was busy getting his brigade out of the card index into the field. The brigadier noted that, for some inexplicable reason, more reservists had shown up than were actually in the files. One sixty-three-year-old, who had served twenty-five years ago in the British army, also came down and insisted that he be taken along. *"Dachilak!"* exclaimed the Brigadier (in the Hebrew equivalent of *"For Christ's Sake!"*), *"Dachilak,* I can't take you along. I haven't anything for you to do." The man insisted and the Brigadier gave in. "Okay, I'll take you if you bring a jeep." The next day, the old man showed up with a jeep rented from Hertz. Now he too was sitting under the hot desert sun, next to a mobile field kitchen, waiting.

In the meantime, back in Jerusalem, Foreign Minister Eban was pleading for patience. He felt that the United States must be given a fair chance to honor its 1957 commitment to keep the Straits

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of Tiran open to Israeli shipping. As the cabinet divided into the proverbial hawks and doves (with Eshkol reportedly a hawk), Eban anxiously requested to be allowed first of all to exhaust all diplomatic opportunities. Eban reportedly held the view that any future military action by Israel would more likely be condoned by the outside world if diplomacy were first given a chance to work. In this he was eventually proven correct, but the decision to delay was actually less the result of international diplomatic considerations than of indecisiveness within the cabinet itself. Though confident of eventual victory, Israel's political and military leaders could not overlook the appalling toll it would undoubtedly take in human lives and property. This war, they felt, would hardly be the same as the walkover of 1956, when Britain and France had bombed Egyptian airfields and maintained an effective air umbrella over Israel's cities. This time, the hinterland would not remain untouched; thousands would die in battle, and cities like Tel Aviv and Haifa, without adequate air shelter, could be devastatingly attacked from the air.

As Eban continued to plead for time, and then took off on a much-criticized visit to Paris, London, and Washington, the cabinet met in marathon sessions lasting for days on end to debate the pros and cons of military action. With Egyptian troop concentrations in the Sinai growing ominously every day, it now became clear that even if the United States were to send a battleship through the blockaded Straits, Israel would still be faced with the threat of close to 100,000 Egyptian troops in Sinai, and some 800 tanks.

Eban returned from Washington with an apparent promise of diplomatic action by the United States and other maritime powers, to be followed, *in extremis*, by the dispatch of an allied armada through the Straits. Nothing, presumably, was to be done about the Egyptian troops in Sinai. Criticism of the Foreign Minister became more severe, even within his own party. Most of his critics thought it unlikely that the United States would take any active role, but even if a ship were sent, this would in no way solve the growing Egyptian menace in Sinai. There were cries for Eban's resignation as well as nasty insinuations, never proved, that he had "misled" the cabinet on the true outcome of his talks with President de Gaulle and President Johnson.

Nevertheless, Eban's policy of restraint, supported by powerful factions within the cabinet, would probably have prevailed, were it not for the sudden eruption of a long-simmering crisis of confidence in Prime Minister Eshkol himself. The resentment felt by hawks and doves alike at Eshkol's failure to provide firm leadership was the culmination of a long-brewing dissatisfaction inside his own party as well as outside of it (among the members of the National Religious party, a partner to the government coalition). The crisis was brought to a head by Eshkol himself, in a most unfortunate, badly prepared, apparently unrehearsed, half incoherent, stammered short radio address to the nation. In his statement, Eshkol announced that the blockade of Tiran was an act of aggression and that Israel's army was ready, if necessary, to take action. His message was clear and uncontroversial; his delivery was disastrous. It raised grave doubts throughout the country, and in particular among members of the armed forces lying in their field positions. All over Israel, people began to feel that the nation's security must be placed in firmer hands.

I WAS WITH a tank regiment that evening, on a dusty desert plain south of Beersheba, listening to the Prime Minister's faltering voice on a transistor radio. We were lying on blankets spread out in the dust under a camouflaged Centurion tank. We were not the only ones listening. This time Israel's reservists—unlike in past wars—had joined their units carrying transistor radios in their knapsacks. All over the vast fields of the Negev, where armored and mobile infantry units had taken up positions, men listened to the radio. After Eshkol's address, there was a feeling of severe frustration among the troops. "Our real problem is not Nasser, but the Second Aliyah," one officer aptly commented, referring to that generation of early pioneers—the age group of Coolidge or Ramsay MacDonald—who still hold power as they have for forty years among Israel's Jews.

The cries for strong leadership now became a unified chant throughout the country. And the strong man most clamored for—in speeches, letters-to-the-editor, and paid advertisements—was ex-General Moshe Dayan. Eshkol, so the demand went, must relinquish his second role as Defense Minister to the war hero of 1956, victor of Sinai, now a leader of the Rafi opposition.

Despite fears and internal wrangling within Mapai, Dayan was finally swept into office by two completely unrelated events: a demonstration of Tel Aviv housewives, and demands by the normally apolitical National Religious bloc within the cabinet coalition. The Mapai Secretariat was meeting for the umpteenth time when the housewives appeared under the window angrily chanting, "We Want Dayan," and tired, harried party dignitaries nervously counted many more heads below than the seventy-five that were actually there. The seemingly spontaneous demonstration had been organized by Rafi ladies, but shocked Mapai members were effectively impressed. Coupled with this in the end was the demand by the National Religious party that the major opposition blocs be included in the government as an absolute necessity. Religious party members of the cabinet were doves; they pressed to gain time for America's efforts to save Israeli interests without war. They actually felt that General Dayan would

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oppose the war, in agreement with his mentor Ben Gurion, who at that time was advising National Religious cabinet ministers that Israel was not ready for war, but must dig in and wait until it gained active military support from a friendly power. At that time Dayan did nothing to contradict this assumption; nor did he, in talks with politicians and newsmen, commit himself to any single course of action. His advice to all who asked was to play it cool.

His appointment on June 2—after long political bickering—was greeted with immense relief. Even the most docile doves hoped that the mere appointment of Dayan would simply frighten Nasser into backing away from a confrontation. There was no time even for a swearing-in ceremony; Dayan's appointment was only confirmed two days later when the Knesset met. But he went to work immediately in a subterranean war-room in Tel Aviv.

Dayan held his first press conference the following day. The vastly swelled press corps now numbered more than 250 foreign newsmen. Calmly, even brightly, he answered and evaded all questions, stating that the time was not ripe for war, it was both too late and too early. Diplomatic means must first be exhausted, he deadpanned, but if war should come, Israel would fight alone; there was neither the desire nor the need for American or British boys to die in battle for Israel. We would be sure to win, he said smilingly. The feeling swept across the country that Israel was in for another period of waiting.

Two days later, at 7:50 A.M. the air raid sirens began to wail through Tel Aviv, and then through the entire country. There was considerable confusion; some sirens were sounding an all-clear while others were just beginning the alert. There were few shelters in Tel Aviv; even those persons who had manged to pile a few sandbags in entrance halls or who had dug trenches in their gardens did not bother to seek shelter. Automobiles, in the early morning rush to downtown offices, continued uncertainly along their way. Citizens scanning the skies could see only a KLM passenger jet leaving on a normal run from Tel Aviv, apparently having just taken off from nearby Lydda. No, it was undoubtedly a test, a false alarm, a small incident like several that had occurred over the past few days.

It was only on the 8 o'clock news program that the announcement came. It was terse: "The Israeli army spokesman announces that air and armored battles have been taking place since the early hours of the morning following an enemy move toward Israel." Then, total mobilization began by radio. Reserve units were called up over the radio by their code names: "Lovers of Zion," "Good Dish," "Lily of the Valley." Meeting-points were also relayed by code. In Tel Aviv, people went about their jobs solemnly, not talking much. It was no time for talk. By nightfall most of the houses had been blacked out; car headlights were painted black, windows were taped, and shelters readied for occupancy. Few knew that within two hours of the beginning of the war the entire Egyptian air force had been virtually destroyed, for the most part on the ground; nor that a few hours after Syria and Jordan had joined in, their air forces too lay in ruin. It was not until late Monday night that Army headquarters confirmed the almost incredible fact that Israel had gained full control of the skies; it was this feat that determined the outcome of the battle from the very beginning.

THAT AFTERNOON, a few hours after Israeli armored columns had begun to push into Sinai, I joined the Southern Front Commander, General Yeshayahu Gavish, in a military helicopter flying south to the advance command position of General Avraham Yaffe, commander of one of the three advancing armored columns. Just over the Sinai border we suddenly saw, through the open door of the Sikorsky helicopter, a collection of camouflaged transport lorries, jeeps, and armored half-tracks. Were it not for the forest of wireless antennas sticking up from the yellow nets, it might have been an encampment of Bedouins.

The helicopter landed in a cloud of dust. Out jumped General Gavish, bareheaded but wearing dark goggles against the sun and dust, a tall, uncommonly goodlooking man, born forty-four years ago in a Tel Aviv slum to a cartman who has since become general manager of a Tel Aviv trucking company. Gavish brushed some dust from his pants and proceeded to a consultation with Yaffe in his war-room, a hastily constructed enclusure protected by nets slung between two trucks. Maps were unfolded, positions marked by colored pencils. Some fifteen minutes later Gavish returned to his helicopter and took off. I stayed on. The sun was just setting over Sinai, and soon it was pitch black, except for the dim light emerging from the folds of the tents. From the south, rolling over the darkened hills, came the thunder of cannon fire.

I was told to dump my sleeping bag and rucksack on the back seat of a jeep. A little while later I stood in General Yaffe's war-room, where huge maps were tacked onto wooden boards, haphazardly leaning against canvas sheets. Past and future Israeli moves were plotted in blue ink, enemy positions and movements were marked in red. A group of staff officers continued to mark the maps, or talked on the radiophone. As the night wore on, we watched the first stage of the battle that was to end just ninety-two hours later with a cable from General Gavish to the Chief of Staff: "Am happy to inform you that our forces are stationed along the banks of the Suez Canal. The entire Sinai Peninsula is in our hands."

That first Monday night, the short, bloody battle of Rafiah—the first town south of the Gaza

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Strip—had already ended and an armored column headed by General Israel Tal had moved on to begin wiping up last-ditch pockets in El Arish, an important supply depot enroute to the Canal, on the Sinai shore of the Mediterranean. Further south, near the crossing point of Nitzana, General Yaffe was perched on a wooden stool in his war-room, talking by wireless to his units a few miles ahead. Yaffe is a large man in his early fifties, heavy-set and portly, with broad, sympathetic features and the goodnatured, warm sense of humor that mark many men of his proportions. To most Israelis he is known less as a military commander than as the head of the National Parks Commission, a dedicated conservationist who has taught Israelis not to pick wild flowers, and who spends much of his time lecturing high-school students on the importance of preserving pockets of wildlife in the midst of a country threatened by urban conglomerations. Here in the desert he was a reservist general, just as a week earlier most of his men had been busdrivers, farmers, shopkeepers, or unemployed individuals queuing up for the dole. Their job was to break through central Sinai and reach the southern part of the Canal at a point between the city of Suez and the Bitter Lakes.

By 10 P.M. Monday night, Yaffe's advance column had already penetrated Sinai along a dust track and partially mined route north of Abu Ageila. This column was the lower part of a pincer movement; its upper part, under General Tal, was pushing west along the seashore. Yaffe's column had already reached Bir Lachfan, some fifteen miles south of El Arish, when it found itself —a column barely of brigade strength—facing heavy attack from two sides. On one side Egyptian tanks were trying to break through toward the north to pave the way for reinforcements to El Arish from Djebl-Libne, a second junction further into the desert which controls the approaches to the Canal zone. On its other side, Yaffe's column faced the remnants of Egyptian forces dug into heavily fortified Russian-style positions between Bir Lachfan and El Arish, a force which had begun to feel, and was now trying to resist, the final squeeze of the Israeli pincer movement.

The Egyptians relied on Russian manuals. Their defenses were in depth: long lines of trenches feeding into well-situated concrete bunkers, and dug-in tanks surrounded by barbed wire entanglements extending six to nine miles. They had some two hundred Russian tanks, including T-55's which are about the latest word in tank design, complete with infra-red equipment for night fighting, long-range guns, and special armor plating that can take a great deal of punishment. These tanks, in short supply even in Russia, have not yet been provided to most of Russia's Warsaw Pact allies. In addition to the tanks there were SU-100 mobile cannons, enormous steel monsters transported on tank-like, steel-plated vehicles, and capable of both intensive fire and quick maneuverability.

The battle lasted the entire night. Commanding the Israeli forces was a veteran officer* whose brigade was responsible for destroying more Egyptian armor than any other. He too was a reservist, barely two weeks back in uniform; in civilian life, ironically enough, he is general manager of a business corporation called "Shalom, Inc." The brigadier's voice, growing more and more hoarse, came through every few minutes over the radiophone in the war-room to report both successes and failures. Again and again he begged for air support, but Yaffe refused, saying he was certain they could make it without it. Later on, the brigadier finally did get air cover. "Be sure you mark yourselves carefully," Yaffe called into the microphone. "I don't want our planes mopping you up."

Then came the calls for helicopters to evacuate the wounded. Fuel and water were ordered, to be parachuted to the embattled brigade. At dawn the Egyptian positions between Bir Lachfan and El Arish were still holding. Then the Israel air force arrived and the long lines of trenches and tanks dug in alongside the hills turned into a sea of fire. An hour later some fighting still continued, but the battle had been decided.

General Yaffe had spent the night by his maps and radiophones, and, except for a short half hour after midnight, had had no rest. Adina, his secretary at the National Parks Commission, a buxom girl in her late twenties who had gone to war with her boss, handed him a hot cup of tea. Tired, but relaxed, his thick, paternal voice emerging hoarsely between sips, he said: "I'd like very much to be in Nasser's headquarters now. What can he do? He's got quite a problem on his hands." Then he rose heavily from his uncomfortable seat, stretched a bit, watched with fascination the magnificent sunrise over Sinai, and walked off to shave.

SOON AFTERWARD, a helicopter flew in to take him forward to the front at Bir Lachfan. We flew over the sand at a height of about thirty feet. Through the open slide-door Yaffe followed the line of advance his troops had taken the day before. "Their first line of defense is obviously broken," Yaffe said. He assumed the Egyptians would maintain a second, even stronger line of defense further south, around Djebl-Libne, in order to block further Israeli advances toward the Canal. At that early stage, on Tuesday morning, it was impossible to know, or even to conceive of the possibility, that from now on the battle would turn into a hot, almost non-stop pursuit, a chase at speeds unheard of in the history of armored warfare. Below us, rear supply units could already

* Israeli censorship prohibits the mention of any names other than those of a few top-ranking officers.

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be seen establishing themselves on the barren dunes, bathed in the soft lights of an early desert morning. White parachutes, used only a short while ago to drop fuel and water for the advancing units, lay spread out on the sand like sails drying on a beach. We landed outside of Bir Lachfan, some fifty miles inside Sinai, alongside a tank regiment.

Yaffe climbed into his Advance Command Position, an armored half-track sent ahead the night before. It was a specially built vehicle, unarmed except for one machine gun, but equipped with complicated wireless sets that enabled instant voice communication both with GHQ in Beersheba or Tel Aviv and with his own units in the fields nearby—a mobile headquarters, able to move with the troops. Forward, some six feet above the driver, where the normal armored half-track is equipped with a light gun, there was a wooden, slightly inclined board covered with maps under a cellophane cover, and behind it a broad, padded, rotating armchair. Yaffe settled into his seat, his broad figure towering above the vehicle, his right hand clutching a microphone. We scrambled in behind him.

We started moving north toward El Arish at great speed. Heading toward us from the north were General's Tal's units, the other arm of the pincer movement. Suddenly we stopped short. On a low hill to our left, some twenty Israeli tanks were poised like infantry horses, spitting fire. Clouds of black smoke gathered along the road ahead of us. Through loudspeakers attached to Yaffe's seat came the echoes of battle. "Fire northeast . . . fire north . . . ten Egyptian tanks engaged, four directly hit, the others seem to be abandoned. . . ." We started moving forward again through the thick cloud of smoke, dust, and the sickening smell of burning flesh. A few miles further on, at a road junction littered with burning Egyptian tanks, we had a dramatic meeting with the forces of General Tal, who had pushed south from El Arish. Dozens of soldiers jumped from their tanks and armored cars for quick embraces and victory hugs. The smoking remnants of Egyptian fortifications could be seen on both sides of the road; they spread for miles out into the hills. Trenches and blown-out concrete bunkers, barbed wire entanglements, dug-in tanks, burned like torches in the sand. There were burning trucks, burning jeeps; other vehicles seemed to have been abandoned before battle and looked ready to be put to use again immediately. Corpses, hundreds of them, were spread out in the sand, some charcoaled, others just blackened, their arms spread out on the sand in gestures of horrifying helplessness. An Israeli helicopter came in to pick up the wounded. Some of the engines in the abandoned Egyptian vehicles were still running. The faces of the corpses that filled the shallow ditch next to the road were twisted in the frightened grimace of sudden death. A black, buzzing army of hungry desert flies settled over torn limbs covered with slowly congealing blood.

Yaffe's column now turned around and started rolling south again, this time toward Djebl-Libne. It was 1:20 P.M. on Tuesday, June 6. By now the Sinai Army had begun to withdraw at top speed to the Suez Canal. Egyptian communications had broken down to the extent that some orders were being broadcast over Radio Cairo. Israel's task was now to rout and destroy as many Egyptian units as possible. The big chase began that was to last for the next three days, interrupted only for brief spells to refuel. We moved south at twenty-five miles an hour. Here too, the air force had preceded us like a broom of fire; there were burning tanks everywhere, and Egyptian uniforms, hurriedly cast off, lying about in the fields. Fleeing Egyptian soldiers had thrown them off, hoping to be taken for civilians. And shoes—tens, hundreds of shoes, cast off when their owners, broken as soldiers, had turned into frightened men and tried to escape into the dry hills—barefoot, in their underwear, bareheaded, and without water. Wandering through the desert toward the Canal, still some hundred miles away, they were doomed to die of hunger, or thirst, or sunstroke, unless they came back to surrender.

LATER that evening we watched a tank battle at Djebl-Libne from a nearby hill, much as Napoleon at Dresden in the famous painting. As we watched, someone tuned his transistor radio to Radio Cairo's Hebrew broadcast. "Israeli soldiers, you are fools," came the pronouncement in heavy, guttural, ungrammatical Hebrew. "We have lured you to the desert so we can destroy your hinterland at our ease . . . we still haven't used our secret missiles . . . O Israeli fools, our soldiers will beat you; they are courageous, yes courageous, even too courageous. . . ." A little later, the voice added, "Soldiers of Israel, where is your Prime Minister Levi Eshkol now? He is enjoying himself with his young wife Miriam in the air raid shelter . . . our heroic air force has reduced Tel Aviv to dust . . . we have taken 4,026 prisoners so far . . . O foolish Israeli soldiers, we'll catch your one-eyed General Dayan and take out his other eye."

Next day, and the day after, the pursuit continued over roads littered with the burning of abandoned remnants of the Egyptian army. We encountered our first prisoners of war, lining the road, hands bent over their heads, for the most part dark-skinned, undernourished, emaciated frightened *fellahin* from the Nile valley. They were ordered to wait alongside the road for rear units to come and fetch them. They said their officers had abandoned them, driving away in their cars. Early one morning, south of Djebl-Libne, we captured an Egyptian colonel, the commander of an artillery brigade. Moments later, a jeepload of soldiers seized Major General Salach-a-Din Mohammed Yakum, who claimed he belonged to the

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Army Accounting Inspectorate in Cairo, and had been since Monday on a routine inspection visit to Sinai. General Yaffe asked him: "Why are we fighting? Let us be frank, General! What is the sense in all this, when you have so much territory and we so little?"

"I am a soldier, carrying out orders," General Yakum answered. "And we aren't fighting this war for ourselves but for the people of Palestine whose land you have robbed." Later, I asked another captured colonel how he felt about Nasser now. "No, no!" he exclaimed. "Nasser has not let us down. It is true we have been beaten twice. But this is war. Sometimes you win and sometimes you lose."

ONE CAPTURED GENERAL had been wounded in the leg. He was carried on a stretcher to field headquarters, where a young girl soldier brought him some tea. A doctor was called to his tent before he was evacuated north by plane. Inestimably more bitter was the fate of wounded Egyptians of less exalted rank. During the first stages of battle, during the surge forward, many Egyptian wounded lay along the road, under collapsed or overturned vehicles, or among corpses in the fields, trying to attract attention with the little strength they had left. Their dark faces, above their torn and bloody bodies, were terrible to look at. Even worse was the feeling that one was powerless to do anything for them at the moment. At this early stage, as the army was rushing to prevent the escape of the Egyptian army through passes leading to the Canal, it was impossible to render any useful assistance. Some Israeli soldiers jumped from their trucks to leave their own water bottles beside their wounded enemies. By the time the rear guard moved up, with its ambulances, field hospitals, and military police, it was often too late.

It was difficult, too, to assemble the unwounded prisoners who gathered alongside the advancing columns and to arrange for their dispatch to camps in the north. Everything had happened too fast, much ahead of schedule. Those who had been captured at a point within a day's walk to the Canal were disarmed and told to swim across. There, it happened more than once that they were fired on by their own compatriots as they scrambled ashore.

They had left behind them in the desert an immense array of equipment—some of it destroyed, but much of it abandoned, unused. It was as though children had been given a complicated electronic computer to play with. Doubtless, these men were also obeying an ancient, healthy, peasant instinct—one to be seen in operation in many stupid wars—which told them to quit the fight and try to survive. Even in the heat of battle, and despite heavy losses to Israel, one was filled with compassion at the sight of these poor wretches, who looked like nothing so much as characters in an anti-war play by Bertolt Brecht. Their bitter fate must be reckoned as part of the crime committed by Nasser against his own people. By all rules of military strategy they should have been the victors. They were trained and equipped by the Russians down to the last and finest detail, superior to the Israelis in all but the human element. It is clear that what failed was less the army than the social structure of Egypt, which simply collapsed under the stress, despite—or perhaps because of—fourteen years of "Arabism" and socialist doctrine. Western and Israeli intelligence experts had been partially right after all: Nasser, even if willing, was not ready for war.

No one had as yet counted the captured equipment. But it already appeared that more than half the Egyptian armor had been captured or hit. Still lying in the desert were T-34, T-54, and T-55 tanks, some brand new and without a scratch, straight from the factory; amphibious tanks, cannons of all sorts, some with their barrels still protected against the dust by airtight plastic covers. Large parts of Sinai looked like enormous junkyards. The biggest single area of devastation was the Mitla Pass, leading from central Sinai to the Canal. We drove through it a few hours after its capture and saw a shocking valley of death, littered with corpses and hundreds of burning tanks and trucks in the now familiar cloud of smoke and the disgusting sweet smell of burning human flesh.

On Friday morning we began our final descent toward Suez. Here too the remains of battle were to be seen along the blown-up road. Then the mountains parted like a curtain, ahead of us lay the Canal, shimmering in the distance like a silver knife. On our right were the Bitter Lakes; on the left, the southern Canal. Over on the other side, trees, welcome greenery, and a few isolated houses. On this side, only the desert. Israeli soldiers lay on the bank, under their tanks and trucks (there was no other shade) unmindful of occasional snipers, exhausted, their faces unshaven for three days and covered with dust, grease, and carbon. Some had fallen into their first exhausted sleep in sixty hours. After a while they gathered together—still sitting or lying down—under the road sign, "Ismailia-Suez." General Yaffe stood, addressing them. "I am sorry I can't talk very well," he said hoarsely, his voice almost inaudible from fatigue and the layers of dust covering his vocal cords. "But actions are more important. Anybody who wants to destroy us now knows he'll pay dearly. It's been said that we're turning lazy, soft, that we care for nothing. But there's apparently something that ties us to this land. You are civilians who suddenly donned uniforms and beat the aggressor. I can only cheer you all and thank you for everything you did."

Then he saluted the tired men who sat or lay before him on the incline of the small hill. The soldiers—at first—did not respond; they remained prone. Then someone started to shout: *"Kefak Hey,* for he's a jolly good fellow!" Everyone joined in.

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As THE CEASE-FIRE finally went into effect on Saturday, June 10th an eerie silence descended over the desert. Occasionally it was broken by shots fired from across the narrow canal at Israeli vehicles moving along the east bank. That afternoon I drove back north, bouncing in the back seat of a jeep, back again through all the debris of the war and straight across Central Sinai to Beersheba. Israeli army salvagers were beginning to clean up the ruins that lay directly on the road. Huge supply convoys heading south were held up at mountain passes and road junctions in hopeless traffic jams. Military police were collecting POW's in busses and trucks. We crossed at Nitzana, which less than a week before had been the front-line command headquarters. It was an odd feeling to approach warning signs in Hebrew reading "Attention! Mines, Frontier Ahead"—but from behind. I reached Jerusalem late that night. The city was ablaze, and few signs of the heavy shelling it had sustained were immediately obvious. The blackout had been abolished three nights before. It was a city changed beyond recognition. While we had been racing toward Suez, Israeli troops had seized the Old City and the entire West Bank of the Jordan River, and had pushed King Hussein back into his ancestral desert Emirate on the East Bank, a kingdom first granted to his grandfather by Winston Churchill following the First World War. For nineteen years the Old City, with its religious and historic monuments, had been like the other side of the moon; now it was suddenly open.

Syria, too, had toppled. Israeli troops, quickly moved north following the fierce and terrible battle of the Old City, had conquered the steep mountain ridges from which Syrian artillery had for years been shelling the Israeli settlements lying below.

There was an air of euphoria in Jerusalem that night. "I can't believe it, I can't believe it" was on everybody's lips. Newspapers, the next day, envisioned the Messiah walking behind advancing Israeli tanks. There was much genuine jubilation, a great deal of apprehension about the future, and not a little doubletalk as well. Officials and newspapers began to speak of the "liberation" of Jericho, El Arish, and Kuneitra in Syria. Indeed it was a victory notable for its lack of hate, but tempered by a share of arrogance. Only a few days after the Old City fell to Israel, David Ben Gurion publicly demanded the razing of the Old City walls because they had been constructed not by Jewish hands but by Ottoman sultans in the 15th and 16th centuries. He was wildly cheered by a select Rafi audience in Jerusalem. Members of the right-wing Herut party called for the annexation of the West Bank with no civil rights for the million Arabs who live there—a Middle Eastern Rhodesia. Others proposed a puppet-state on the West Bank, surrounded by Israeli territory, a kind of Bechuanaland for Arabs.

A more ominous case in point was the Wailing Wall, where action followed immediately upon the heels of victory. Two days after the conquest, bulldozers moved in to destroy some thirty or forty old houses facing the ancient Wailing Wall, creating an enormous parade ground in front of what had for hundreds of years been a place of intimate and solemn prayer. It is not certain who ordered this rash act of destruction at the site holiest to Jews everywhere. "It just happened. It just grew of itself," those directly involved explained. "We had to clear space for the masses expected at Shavuoth." Others justified the act by saying the houses that were removed had been an ugly slum and a disgrace to the Wall. Mayor Teddy Kollek of Jerusalem wholeheartedly supported the deed. One angry interviewer, Herbert Pundik of *Davar*, told the mayor bluntly he felt it an outrage to turn a place where prayers have been offered up for hundreds of years into a "vast, noisy Piazza del Popolo." Mr. Kollek disagreed. "It was the best thing we did and it's good we did it immediately." In a vein characteristic of the new feeling, he added, "The old place had a *galut* character; it was a place for wailing. Perhaps this made sense in the past. But it isn't what we want in the future."

Whether the time for "wailing" and intimate prayer is now over for all time is a matter for conjecture. But as the days wore on, Israelis settled down to consider what had been achieved and what had not. In less than a week Israeli forces had beaten three Arab armies to the ground and found themselves in possession of enormous territories many times the size of the state. From the moment of cease-fire it was clear that winning the war had been hard but winning the peace would prove even harder. Some talked of setting up a semi-autonomous Arab state, under Israeli tutelage, on the West Bank. Others, like members of the Herut party, were in favor of clearcut annexation. Still others held out the hope that King Hussein would settle for peace in exchange for the occupied West Bank territories minus Jerusalem. And almost everyone agreed that the time was ripe for a settlement of the Palestine Arab refugee problem, especially since most of the refugees now inhabited lands occupied by Israel. Whatever the eventual fate of the occupied territories, it was felt that any workable plan would have to be accompanied by a solution of the refugee problem. Necessary now was imagination and initiative in high places, farsighted statesmanship, and the generosity of wise victors, lest the potential fruits of this victory be lost as they were in 1948 and 1956.

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ARTHUR HERTZBERG

ISRAEL AND AMERICAN JEWRY

As soon as the Arab armies began to mass on the borders of Israel during the third week in May, the mood of the American Jewish community underwent an abrupt, radical, and possibly permanent change. In general, the immediate reaction of American Jewry to the crisis was far more intense and widespread than anyone could have foreseen. Many Jews would never have believed that grave danger to Israel could dominate their thoughts and emotions to the exclusion of all else; many were surprised by the depth of their anger at those of their friends who carried on as usual, untouched by fear for Israeli survival and the instinctive involvement they themselves felt. This outpouring of feeling and commitment appears to contradict all the predictions about the evaporating Jewishness of the American Jews. What happened here between the middle of May and the middle of June therefore demands explanation.

Unfortunately, it did not occur to any of the research agencies in the social sciences to initiate a disciplined study of the American Jewish response as the events were unfolding. So we have to rely, at least for the moment, on impressionistic reportage. Obviously no single person can have firsthand knowledge of everything that went on during the weeks in question. I myself was involved most directly as the rabbi of a suburban congregation on the edge of New York—in Englewood, New Jersey. At the height of the fund-raising activity throughout the country I also addressed a number of rallies and meetings in several different towns. In addition, I witnessed the besieging of the offices of the Jewish Agency and the Israeli Consulate in New York by hundreds of young people who volunteered, when the Israeli army was mobilized, to go to work in Israel. And finally, I have compared my own personal impressions with those of friends who were active in other communities and concerned with other aspects of the American Jewish response. On the basis of all this, let me try to describe the situation, at least in its major outlines, before attempting to speculate on what the extraordinary behavior of the American Jewish community during the crisis may mean for the future.

It is ingrained in the American Jewish soul that the correct response to a danger is to give money. This was certainly the most immediate reaction to the Middle East crisis, but with one important difference: much more money was given by many more people than ever before in history. There are innumerable stories from every Jewish community throughout the United States not only of giving on a fantastic scale by people of large means, but also of the literal sacrifice of their life's savings by people of modest means. It all moved so quickly that the bookkeeping has lagged behind the giving, and exact figures are still not available. We do, however, know that during the little more than two-week period which marked the height of the crisis—between the day when Nasser closed the Gulf of Aqaba on May 23 and the end of the war on June 10—well over *one hundred million dollars,* the bulk of it in cash, was realized for the Israel Emergency Fund of the United Jewish Appeal. This was a fund-raising effort unprecedented not only in Jewish experience, but also in the history of private philanthropy in the United States.

It is in itself a significant fact that the drive did not begin from the top. The national board of the United Jewish Appeal met in special session on Monday, May 29 in New York to launch its nationwide emergency campaign, but by that time —six days after the inauguration of the blockade —local campaigns were already under way in dozens of communities which had not waited for anyone to ask them to move. Moreover, it was not only the old-line, late-middle-aged leadership of these communities who were acting in this way. Many people in their thirties and forties who had never participated in organizational Jewish life suddenly emerged to take the lead both in giving and in working. The financial contributions of these newer elements were astonishingly large—perhaps because of a desire to make up for past neglect and a wish, or even a need, to be counted in during a moment of manifest danger.

In my own synagogue a congregation approach-

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ing High-Holiday size walked in on Friday night, May 26 in a subdued and very somber frame of mind. An hour or so later, after we had done something never before done in our synagogue's history—an appeal for money at a service with the calling for open announcements of contributions—the mood had changed to one of elation. Anxiety over the danger to Israel had not diminished, but by giving substantial sums of money, we had to the best of our immediate ability enlisted in the struggle and become participants instead of passive spectators. Similar things happened wherever Jews live. If it was true in Israel that more reserves showed up in some places than had been ordered to mobilize, American Jewish fund-raising was, in its own way, a comparable phenomenon.

CONCURRENTLY, a no less remarkable political change was taking place within American Jewry. The most striking fact was the unanimity of opinion. The pollsters found that 99 per cent of all the Jews in America undeviatingly supported the Israeli position. Even when Israel went to war, not a single voice was raised in public among Jews to deplore a resort to arms. Yet in the 1940's there had been a vocal minority within the American Jewish community which kept arguing in public that a Zionist solution to the problem of the European Jewish refugees was against the interests and desires of American Jewry, and during the first days of the 1956 Suez campaign, important elements of American Jewish opinion—including organizations which were usually pro-Israel—had been more than uncomfortable when Israel launched its attack. In the months of diplomatic haggling after the guns were stilled in 1956, Israel reluctantly settled for an arrangement which did not require Nasser's formal and public agreement, and which did not make effective at all any rights of passage for its ships in the Suez Canal. The pressure on the Israeli government to accept such a solution then came largely from the United States, and the White House and the State Department managed to persuade some very influential American Jews to counsel Israel to temper its demands.

Ten years later the picture was entirely different. Even the militant anti-Zionists of the American Council for Judaism, who had always appeared at critical moments to attack Israel, refrained from issuing any public statements until the end of the war, and the mutterings since then have been isolated. More surprising still, a number of prominent Council figures are now actually supporting Israel as devotedly as the most passionate Zionists.

The question of Vietnam might have been expected to be divisive, but it turned out not to be. Many of the Jewish establishments, especially those of the Conservative and Reformed rabbinic and lay bodies, are more or less officially dove-like in their positions on Vietnam. In this they are at one with such non-Jewish leaders of American religious opinion as Martin Luther King and John Bennett. All these people, including several important Christian doves, rallied instantly to the side of Israel, and they did not withdraw their support even when Israel went to war. There were, of course, jibes at the Vietnam doves now transformed into Middle Eastern hawks. The reasons advanced to counter these complaints may or may not have been convincing, but the truth of the matter is that no one had the time or the inclination to produce a theoretical case which would harmonize the two positions. American Jews, and some of their friends, acted instinctively in the face of a threat to the survival of Israel, and their concern for the life of the besieged Jewish state was not to be compromised by any embarrassment that might come to them out of any other views on other matters, even one so serious as the war in Vietnam.

Within a very few days, however, a rationale began to be developed. The pro-Israel Vietnam doves argued that American support of the government of South Vietnam represented an involvement in a regime which had no popular roots. The last thing that could be said of the State of Israel, by contrast, was that it lacked popular roots. A similar contrast was drawn between American diplomatic commitments in the two cases: they had always been less than perfectly clear in Vietnam, whereas no one could possibly deny that to support the integrity of Israel has been a solemn American obligation for nineteen years. Why then was it inconsistent to demand that America honor its commitment to a rooted democracy fighting for its life, and to withdraw from a dubious venture to prop up an unpopular military clique?

Though this case is reasonable, it does not solve all the problems of the pro-Israel Vietnam doves. The opponents of the war in Vietnam have all repeatedly rejected Johnson's domino theory, and even though the White House has said little overtly to suggest that the President is supporting Israel for comparable reasons—in order, that is, to keep Russia from spreading further into the Middle East—this connection is clearly in his mind. My own reading of my friends in the peace movement is that they hope that the Russian attacks on Israel, violent though they are in public, will indeed lead to such a linkage of the two problems—not, of course, because they want to open another cold-war front in the Middle East, but rather because they think that a tandem settlement of both questions by the superpowers may become possible.

PERHAPS THE MOST complicated and difficult problem is to assess correctly what really did happen in the response of American Jewish young people to the crisis. In the last days of May, Israeli consulates and the Hillel directors in the

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colleges were overwhelmed by hundreds of young people who wanted to go to Israel to take over the civilian jobs of their peers who had been mobilized for the army. By the day war broke out, when the American ban on travel to the area was imposed, some ten thousand such applications had been recorded throughout the country, more than half of them in New York at the offices of the Jewish Agency. On June 5 itself, the outpouring of young people completely swamped every one of the bureaus. A high official of the Jewish Agency told me that as he arrived at the front door of the building very early that morning, a cab drew up and a man jumped out followed by two younger men. He stopped this Agency official and said to him: "I have no money to give but here are my sons. Please send them over immediately." That day this was no isolated incident.

But who were the young people who came? Dr. Arnulf Pins, Executive Director of the Council on Social Work Education, offered his services to help process the volunteers at the New York office of the Jewish Agency. He had some questions included on the forms they filled out concerning their Jewish educational and organizational background and their involvement in such causes as Zionism, race, and peace. Dr. Pins has not yet had the time to tabulate his results adequately, but he took the trouble to give me a reading of what he found in a random sampling. Those who came in May and who therefore constituted the large majority of the young people who actually did get to Israel before June 5, were from *yeshivot* and from the relatively small circle of American Jewish youth whose main interests are Jewish. At least a third of all the ten thousand who ultimately came to volunteer had had a substantial Jewish education and a continuing Jewish concern. In their answers to the political questions, another third showed that they had spent their young adult years worrying about race and Vietnam, and that they now lacked any organizational Jewish ties. Yet even this group had had some Jewish education in childhood or even into the teens. What seemed to be happening to them was that a dormant loyalty had suddenly been stirred and had become at that moment an overriding passion.

WHAT OF the young Jews of the New Left? I am told by friends who are in close touch with these circles that they were, if not enthusiastically pro-Israel in their mood (though some were), much less hostile than might have been anticipated. My own impression is that the Jews of the New Left were on the whole sufficiently Jewish to care, but that this concern was neutralized by their sympathy for Nasser as a "progressive" Third World leader. In any event, unlike many Jews of the old Left, the young in the New Left are generally unwilling to look upon the fact of their Jewishness as a dimension of being deep enough to justify a reordering of intellectual and moral priorities at a moment of high drama and crisis such as was experienced last June.

A radical shifting of priorities was, however, effected in another circle of Jewish opinion—the circle which has been most directly influenced in recent years by the spirit of ecumenism. Despite some quite vocal opposition to the broadening of the Jewish-Christian dialogue, the majority view within both religious and secular Jewish organizations has cherished the increasing contact between Jewish and Christian groups and the greater openness to which this contact has led. When the crisis broke, Jews found that leading individual figures within the various Christian denominations—Niebuhr, King, Schmemann, Higgins, and Archbishop Hallinan, to mention only a few—were quick and firm in their public commitment to justice for Israel, but that the formal establishments of both the Protestant and Catholic churches remained largely silent. In the last days of May, as the crisis was building toward war, almost no statements could be elicited from any of these communions even supporting Israel's right to exist.

As soon as the war was over, several emergency meetings were arranged between Jewish figures with a large stake in the dialogue and their Christian peers. As individuals (though not as spokesmen for their churches), some of the Christians present had supported Israel's right to life, but the prevailing Christian sentiment in those tension-filled rooms was directed toward the question of Arab refugees and the status of Jerusalem. Israel was denounced as the aggressor in the conflict and there was general discomfort in being pressed hard by Jews to think differently.

THE JEWISH participants in these discussions had not prepared any statements in advance, and yet they were as one in their answers. Every one of the Jewish ecumenists—including Rabbi Marc Tanenbaum of the American Jewish Committee, perhaps the leading figure in this field—arose in turn and said to the Christians that the existence of Israel was not a negotiable matter for any Jew, and that Jews would regard Jewish-Christian relations in America as greatly damaged if the organized Christian community failed to support Israel's right to live. It was made very clear that Christian emphasis on the Arab refugees, no matter how correct the argument might be both morally and politically, would be taken by Jews as an evasion or worse, because the effect of such talk, if it was not linked to Israel's right of existence, would be to encourage the Arabs to remain obdurate. The day had now come when Jews could afford to dispense with good will from the churches if that was the price they might have to pay for their passion for Israel's existence. (Rabbi Tanenbaum and a number of others, however, did concede that the Jewish ecumenists had been

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at fault in having failed to make clear to their Christian colleagues in the past that Israel is no less important to the Jews of America than such "diaspora" issues as the Christian roots of anti-Semitism and the theological status of Judaism as a religion.)

These battles were not confined to private meetings. Rabbi Balfour Brickner, speaking at the convention of the Central Conference of American Rabbis, and the present writer, in a column for the *National Catholic Reporter,* said similarly sharp things in public. Brickner and I were answered in a very tough article by Monsignor George Higgins, the executive secretary of the American Catholic hierarchy. Higgins, who had personally been courageously and consistently pro-Israel, was angered by Jewish pressure on the Church as a whole to take such a stand, and he accused Brickner and myself of trying, in the name of our ecumenical ties, to blackmail the Church into supporting Israel.

At the very least, these passions and counter-passions are shaking some of the ecumenical bridges that Jews have been building in the last few years. The issues of Arab refugees and the Old City of Jerusalem will go on being debated, and will continue to have a palpably different weight in the thinking of Christian establishments than they will for Jews. Not even the hardest of hardliners in Israel—and certainly no Jew in America—doubts that Israel has a responsibility to make a large contribution to the solution of the Arab refugee problem. No one denies the international interest of all the major faiths in all the holy places. Nonetheless, American-Jewish opinion is overwhelmingly convinced that these matters can be dealt with only as part of a larger peace settlement. Many Christians, the Pope among them, are being very precise in their concern about the Old City and the Arab refugees, and very vague in their concern for Israel's safety and peace. American opinion as a whole is going to be divided in the months ahead over how the crisis should be settled. The likelihood is that the Jews of America will be arrayed in overt battle, not only with known adversaries, but even with some of their friends. The American Jewish community today seems not to be afraid of such a confrontation.

THE MAIN outlines of the effect that the Middle East crisis has had on American Jewry are, then, relatively clear. It has united those with deep Jewish commitments as they have never been united before, and it has evoked such commitments in many Jews who previously seemed untouched by them. Very large numbers of American Jews now feel their Jewish identity more intensely than they have for at least a generation, and they are much less worried than ever before about what the rest of the world might be thinking of their feelings or of the actions through which they have been expressing these feelings. This crisis has forcibly reminded many, perhaps most, American Jews that the posture and destiny of Jews in the world continue to be quite unique and that Israel is not a state like all other states. Thus for the moment, at least, the organized Jewish community in America has a different look about it. It is enlarged and refreshed in numbers and its courage and resolution are high. It will yet have to grapple with the problem of maintaining connection with all the new or relatively new people who worked as Jews at the height of the crisis. Whether it will be able to do so is not at all certain.

Any estimate of what this transforming moment might mean for the future of American Jewry must necessarily rely on an assessment of the factors that underlay the responses we have been examining. Here one can only guess, but I would say that the most widespread influence—on Jews in Israel and America alike—was a revulsion against the passivity of the Jewish victims of the Nazis. "Good" Jews have been largely arguing since 1945 that this passivity was a distinctively Jewish form of heroism, but it is now apparent that many who have interpreted it in this way never really succeeded in convincing themselves. Now, confronted by a threat to Israel's existence, Jews almost universally felt that precisely because of the horrifying prospect that Israel might go down, let it go down fighting. A related element was the memory of Jewish conduct in the United States and, for that matter, in England during the years of World War II. These two communities had made little dent on Roosevelt and Churchill, because Jews were not then bold enough to engage in a vehement confrontation with the two war leaders over the parochial destiny of the Jewish people. The response to the Middle Eastern crisis was a way of saying that, come what might, Jews would not repeat such conduct.

But Israel evoked more in American Jews than a sense of moral reparation for the memory of the passive victims of mass murder. The sense of belonging to the worldwide Jewish people, of which Israel is the center, is a religious sentiment, but it seems to persist even among Jews who regard themselves as secularists or atheists. There are no conventional Western theological terms with which to explain this, and most contemporary Jews experience these emotions without knowing how to define them. Perhaps the point can best be made by recounting an incident. Two days after the end of the war there was a major gathering in New York of Jewish leaders from all over the country, many of whom, as I happen to be able to attest, are remote from the synagogue. Yet when the meeting was concluded with a very simple recitation of the blessing in which we thank God for "having allowed us to live and be present to witness this day," almost everyone in the room wept.

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At the deepest level, the American Jewish response was the result of a paradox. Jacob Klatzkin once observed that Theodor Herzl could not have arisen directly out of the East European ghetto. What made Herzl possible, in his bold openness about the situation of the Jews and his straight-backed stance before the powers of the world, was two generations of assimilation in Central Europe. The Jewish community has now undergone two generations of comparable acculturation in America. Because Jews are now so very much at home in America, more at home than Herzl ever was in Budapest or Vienna, it was possible for them in this crisis to be boldly Jewish in very angular ways. Perhaps it did not quite happen ten or twenty years ago because Jews were then more nearly an immigrant group.

It is possible to believe that the Middle East crisis of 1967 occurred at precisely that moment in the history of American Jews when an ascending curve of nearly complete outer and inner emancipation intersected with a descending curve of Jewish commitment. If this is so, then such a moment is not likely to recur, for these two forces will diverge ever more widely as the years go by. It is, however, also possible, on the evidence now at hand, to take another view. Israel may, as some Zionist theoreticians predicted a Jewish state in Palestine would, now be acting as a very strong focus of worldwide Jewish emotional loyalty and thereby as a preservative of a sense of Jewish identity. There is some reason for thinking that American Jewish education, despite all its inadequacies, has played a significant role in implanting an often deeply hidden Jewish loyalty in many younger people (and most now receive some Jewish training). Perhaps the force of Jewish commitment and the attractions of the almost completely open society are on the point of reaching an equilibrium which might endure indefinitely or even permanently. If that is the case, then the American Jewish community is realizing, at last, the two-centuries-old hope of the Jewish emancipation: that Jews and their Jewish loyalties could survive and even find new space in which to express themselves in a free society.

Which of these two interpretations is right I do not know, but in either case it is clear that the Middle East crisis represented a lightning flash which has illumined the landscape of the American Jewish future.

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

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TWO ISSUES IN PLANNING

Paul Goodman

IN PRINCIPLE, technology, the use of instruments, is a branch of moral philosophy, subject to the criteria of prudence, efficiency, simplicity, and so forth. I need not demonstrate, in 1967, that those who abuse our technology at present are not interested in moral philosophy, they are certainly not being prudent, and they are only in a narrow sense careful of efficiency and costs—they altogether neglect social costs. But even if we are mindful of moral philosophy and want to use our technology prudently, there are modern dilemmas that are hard to solve. Let me make two small points of philosophical analysis that are obvious but are usually overlooked.

In the first place, as technology increases, as there is a proliferation of goods, and civilization becomes more complex, there is a change in the scale on which things happen. Then, if we continue to use the concepts that applied to a smaller scale, we begin to think in deceptive abstractions. There are certain functions of life that we think we are carrying on, and that *were* carried on, on a smaller scale, but that now, on a larger scale, are only apparently being carried on. And sometimes, indeed, because of the error in our thinking, the effects are contrary to those we intended.

Consider a rather poignant example, penology. When some fellows sat in the stocks in the town square and people passed by and jeered at them or clucked their tongues, it is possible (though the psychology is dubious), that the effect might have been reform or penitence. (In my opinion, the old Russian practice of public confession in the square was more likely to lead to penitence and social integration.) The Tombs in New York, however, where many thousands are locked in cages, has no relation whatever to penitence, reform, or social integration; and in fact it is a school for crime, as is shown by the rate of repeaters who come back on more serious charges.

Thus, this kind of penology on this scale has the opposite effect from that intended: it produces crime. Yet we have come by small steps from the fellow in stocks in the town square up to the Tombs or San Quentin. It seems to be "penology" all along the line, but there was a point at which it ceased to be penology and became just torture and foolishness, a waste of money, and the creation of crime. And even the social lust for vengeance, which is probably the chief motive for punishment, is not satisfied; instead, there is more blotting out of sight and *heightening* of social anxiety.

The change of scale has produced the same contrary effect in schooling. When there was academic instruction for many over a short period or for a few over a longer time, it is likely that some academic education occurred. To be sure, most education for most people happened by other means than schools; society functioned very well and many people became very expert and learned without going to school. In 1900, 6 per cent graduated from high school in America; less than half of one per cent went on to college. Now, however, 100 per cent are forced to go to high school; last year 75 per cent graduated. Nearly 40 per cent now go to college and by 1970 we plan to have 50 per cent. On this scale, it is my observation, very little education is occurring. For academic purposes, we might do just as well if we closed all the schools (though of course they serve for babysitting, policing, and killing time). We could provide the academic instruction that is achieved by far simpler and cheaper methods. Yet by small steps we have come to the present, using the same framework of administration and the same language, although the reality has entirely changed with the change of scale. And instead of education into society, we achieve increasing youth alienation.

SOMETHING SIMILAR has occurred in communications. Newspapers and public speaking meant one thing when communication was generally available to all; they mean another thing when we have mass media, semi-monopolies, and licensed channels. The effect, by and large, has been homogenization and brainwashing—that is, precisely to prevent communication. With the mass media there is certainly very little back-talk. Indeed, since TV time is so expensive and by law the TV networks must give equal time on "controversial" isssues, the inevitable result has been to avoid controversy altogether.

Grimly, the same abstracting process has been occurring in medicine. There is a tendency in urban medicine—since the doctors are swamped—to deal in vital statistics rather than health. I was recently at a conference in San Francisco concerned with the contraceptive pill. The doctors agreed that it was a good policy to push the pill since it was a sure method of contraception and since there was population pressure and economic pressure among the poor. Yet in private conversation they were more dubious, because of the different effects on different women. Classically, however, medicine was primarily concerned with the maximum health of each individual. Certainly each of us is very much concerned about his own health. Vital statistics and the welfare of society ten years from now are another kind of question—also very important. But because of the change in scale of operation, medicine has begun to lose its classical function; practice begins to have

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only an approximate relation to that function; and this process can go very far. In schooling it already has gone very far.

And let me conclude with a global example that includes the previous ones. We now see that city-planning has turned into something called "urbanism," planning for urban areas. There are no "cities." Similarly, in this planning there is no such word as "home," but only dwelling units and housing. Yet it is a real question whether it is possible to have good housing, to provide people with homes, if we slip into thinking of dwelling units. It is a question whether "urban areas" are governable, or whether just this way of thinking does not worsen anomie. Historically, when the city existed on a smaller scale and with smaller bureaucracies, an average citizen could understand the way it worked, even when he did not control its workings. There was shape and style, something to belong to and be loyal to. I think this sense of citizenship is indispensable for the high culture that is one of the most interesting functions of cities. Florence in its heyday had a hundred thousand inhabitants, Athens about the same; Goethe's Weimar had twenty-five thousand. And in New York, a metropolitan region of fifteen million, I doubt that there are more than one hundred thousand who take part in the city with the feeling that in some sense it is theirs. The vast majority just live there. The effect has been to degrade authentic high culture into pop or drive it to chance.

Instead of pretending to educate and communicate or aim at health and citizenship in a mass context that makes these things impossible, it would be better if we began to provide *two distinct sets* of services: the old, and indispensable, professions with a personal responsibility to clients; and the disciplines of social engineering (a term I here use uninvidiously) working mainly on background conditions and treating persons only in respects where individual differences are unimportant and personal response is not called for. Our present procedure, however, both destroys the old professions and embarrasses forthright social engineering.

Thus, the ancient academic ritual of text, examination, and commencement, that made sense for academic types in a community of scholars, makes no sense in mass-universities; yet massifying it, we cannot forthrightly use teaching machines and television for brute instruction, while finding other ways of usefully occupying the time of the non-academic.

Physicians are not trained for home-visits, family medicine, and preventive psychiatry, and the conditions of medical practice become more and more routine; yet we cannot forthrightly provide mass routine checkups, and it is only a few specialists in Public Health who show any medical concern for the background conditions of physical and mental disease.

Local and competing newspapers have lapsed, town meetings and ward politics have lapsed, political oratory is ghostwritten and not subject to cross-examination, there is no vaudeville or local theater. Instead, in the mass media we imitate them with packaged opinion and bland controversy, and there is no effort either to raise the cultural level by high standard fare or to open the media to searching extremes.

Architecture and neighborhood planning are determined by bureaucrats according to abstract standards rather than the preferences of the inhabitants, and all planning is subordinated to highway planning; yet we do not forthrightly clean the air and the rivers or rationalize transportation.

If we took into account the consequences of difference of scale, we could both enrich life and simplify the background; as it is, we degrade life and complicate the background.

I SPEAK OF the "disciplines of social engineering, working mainly on background conditions." This brings me to the second philosophical issue I want to raise. In fact, at present, we do not really have these disciplines; the social-psychological, anthropological, and ecological studies that are necessary for good social engineering and the right use of new technology are not sufficiently developed. We do not know the remote effects of what we institute in education, medicine, or urbanism; and I have given a few examples to show how the effects might be the opposite of what we intend. We are using computers to estimate requirements, costs, and benefits, but in the fields we are discussing the theories on which the programs are based are usually puerile.

Let us imagine, however, that we do have better studies and better programs. There then arises the philosophical question: can we directly apply our good theories to human and social situations? I think not, for to pre-plan too thoroughly is to kill life; and the more subtle the theory, the more dangerous the attack. This is the invidious sense of "social engineering"; prudence and science are one thing, predetermining how people are to live and breathe is quite another. It is probably best just to open a space in which they can live and breathe in their own way. That is, we should aim at decency, not at the "best." Though we cannot draw the lines *a priori*, in every case there is something to plan for and much to refrain from planning for.

Contrast a forest preserve and a state park. The forest preserve is a kind of museum. We put a hedge around a piece of the past, the antiquity of the globe untouched, and we say that this place is not to change. You come there by car but enter on foot. You may camp where you choose but there are no camp sites and you don't need a permit (only be prudent and don't set the trees on fire). But the State Park is part of the urban complex; it is an extension into the green places of the rules of the city. You need a permit to camp and must camp at the specified places. This has advantages: a platform and wood and water are provided; the fee is nominal. But there *is* a fee.

When I was young, we could freely pitch a tent on Fire Island beach and build our fires, or build a shack and squat. Because of the pressure of real-estate developers, this has been forbidden, and one now cannot squat in the sun and wind; many more cops patrol the beach, and it is part of their duties

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to see that one does not. Then one feels trapped. One must make social arrangements and pay rent (not nominal, either!). But it is not the money that is onerous, it is that one has to obey the rules of others. They have predetermined our behavior, no matter how benevolent the plan.

The possibility of an escape into freedom from social rules is, of course, the pastoral ideal, as well described by Leo Marx. But the pastoral ideal can apply also in urban places. (Some of my novels have been called pastorals, and so they are.) One of the objections to recent architecture and public housing is that it presents an impenetrable glass front; there are no holes and basements to creep into, for games and sex. The waterfront has been improved into a concrete wall or a lovely promenade; but there are no railroad yards or abandoned piers, where a child could hide from truant officers or fish. It is interesting that Jane Jacobs, who is zealous against the new architecture because she wants to preserve neighborly sociability, nevertheless balks at the pastoral ideal of dark places and nooks. She wants everything bright and public, for safety; and to be sure, urban life has become more dangerous than the jungle. But I doubt that safety can be assured by architectural design or doormen. People who feel trapped and powerless will follow you home or finally assault you in public.

The philosophical point I wish to make is that there must be a kind of constitutional limit to planning, even at the expense of efficiency and the "best" solution. An analogy is freedom of speech. In the interpretation of the "absolutists," Justices Black and Douglas, freedom of speech is not to be balanced in terms of its social effects; rather, it is anarchic, prior to law—you can say what you damned please, up to the limit of actual emergency, however troublesome or provocative of conflict your speech may be. And as a writer, let me say that unless I have *this* kind of freedom of speech, I do not have freedom at all. I cannot know beforehand what will come to me to say; and if I feel that there is a limit to what I can say, then nothing new will ever come to me to say.

A realistic method of guaranteeing freedom from excessive physical planning and social engineering is to condone or even encourage people's resistance to them. I say "realistic" because there is in fact a rising wave of populist protest in the country. The courts have encouraged resistance by a tolerant attitude toward sit-ins, certain kinds of trespass, and civil disobedience. And it would be advantageous to replace many bureaucratically run social and welfare services with a guaranteed income, for this would enable powerless people to form their own cooperatives and suit themselves. These countervailing factors would then have to be taken into account in the programs of social engineers. At present, needless to say, politicians who have to cadge votes are acutely conscious of inarticulate popular resistance and they do draw the line. But planners disregard it precisely because it is inarticulate; and since they, organized, rational, and well-financed, have more staying-power than the populace, there is a steady encroachment on freedom.

And this brings me back to the first point in this article, the importance of reviving old-fashioned professionals responsible to clients and the immediate community rather than to society and social trends. Unless people become things, they will always live in the small scale as well as the big scale, and more intensely in the small scale than in the big. It is the role of their professionals, whom they ought to be able to hire and fire, to articulate, interpret, and design for them their small-scale needs in education, medicine, law, housing; these needs will inevitably include spontaneity, individual differences, personal response, options, freedom. Big-scale planners and social engineers will then have something articulate to cope with.

PAUL GOODMAN, *a frequent contributor, is the well-known novelist, essayist, and social critic. Mr. Goodman's new book,* Like a Conquered Province, *was published in May by Random House. The present essay was adapted from a talk at the Smithsonian Institute.*

ART-MOVIE STYLE

Robert Garis

EVERYBODY KNOWS that the smallish "art-movie" houses are the dependable moneymakers these days, and everybody knows too that "art-movie" deserves the quotation-marks around it. Some peculiar things can pass for art if they are shown under the right physical conditions, and the wrong prices. But the term "art-movie" is probably here to stay in this corrupted sense, and the international movie industry has in fact developed a special popular entertainment style to produce non-works-of-art suitable to these conditions and prices.

Thinking about how to talk about the art-movie style reminded me of a fine low blow in Harold Rosenberg's *The Tradition of the New*: he suggested that the reason the analysts of mass culture spent so much time with the stuff was that they really liked it. This was certainly unfair to the best operators in the field, who frankly admit and in fact examine their own susceptibility to the bad art they are analyzing. But I enjoyed Rosenberg's crack because much routine mass-culture-analysis is patently self-protective and self-preening as it speculates about other people's reasons — including my own—for liking junk. For I hadn't been able to keep away from the formula Hollywood movies of the 40's and 50's. Perhaps I was merely protecting myself by acknowledging that I was not an analyst but an addict and by refusing to get interested in the cultural or personal implications of addiction. But it seemed to me then, and still does, that my addiction had led me to see something artistically valuable in those mostly bad movies; and it seemed to me that this value was what was worth talking about. I operate under the same principle about the art-movie style, to which I happen not to be addicted (though perhaps it is merely that I am no longer addicted to the physical act of movie-going). I am interested in this style not because it represents something about the state of our culture but for the moments of interesting art that, like the

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older Hollywood style, it makes possible. Now unaddicted, I can see that these moments are few and far between, as they are probably bound to be in any commercially-based art. Yet there are enough of them to make the style worth discussing and worth comparing with the style it replaced.

The Hollywood that produced the Marx Brothers' farces, Astaire, W. C. Fields, Garbo, Cary Grant—I am trying to make a list that will be clear enough even if you disagree about single items included or excluded—never gave anybody trouble and of course it has rarely come under the scrutiny of the culture analysts; liking this kind of movie wasn't addiction at all. And liking Bette Davis and Joan Crawford heartbreakers seems to me pure addiction. The mixed case was the kind of movie that represented a melodramatic codification of serious dramatic realism—the movies of city crime and violence, for instance. It was to movies in this style that I was particularly addicted. When I went to see them I took it for granted that the overall effect would be false, and all the more false when there was a strong intention to be serious, as in Stanley Kramer's strenuous engagements with contemporary problems. I looked instead for less strenuous movies, and in them for those moments when the smooth operation of the formula gave somebody—the director, the writer, the photographer, the actor—the freedom to use his gifts naturally and in harmony with the basic realism of the style. What was valuable at those moments, then, was realism in its commonest sense—not Beckett's painful "how it is" but garden variety "how it looks." To this day it doesn't seem to me foolish to say that these bits of realistic observation were not only beautiful and valuable in themselves, but that they derived a not insignificant, though accidental, poignancy from their surroundings. The only analogy I know is the effect of one of Beiderbecke's aristocratic entrances when he was with the Whiteman band. It seemed almost miraculous to find, in the middle of a completely synthetic dramatic action, a passage that showed that somebody had looked closely and well at American behavior. The way Yvonne de Carlo was dressed when she met Burt Lancaster in the drugstore in *Crisscross,* for instance, a Robert Siodmak gangster-formula movie of the late 40's (six months later you might be hearing her say, "My father, the Sultan of Baghdad, will reward you handsomely"). Or the authentic American eroticism in the love scene on the steps in *The More the Merrier,* a pleasant George Stevens comedy of 1943 (ten minutes later Jean Arthur's charm would get way out of hand). Some directors were more likely than others to produce, or make possible, these moments, so you kept an eye out for their movies. But you didn't think of them as great artists; you were addicted, and such moments could happen in almost any movie of this style anyway. They had more to do with expertise, accuracy, production know-how, than with poetry. But to me and my friends—and I think we had many counterparts—the incidental realism of the movies satisfied a hunger for the non-rhetorical representation of the surface appearance of American life that simply wasn't satisfied by what we were experiencing in the other arts. Perhaps it was only we who were out of touch. *The Naked and the Dead* is ten times more coherent and serious in style than the movies I have just named, and Mailer's intention was just as straightforwardly realistic; nor does this novel have that deadly sound of Hollywood significance. But I believe I was the only one of my friends who read it, and it made almost no impression on me. Our hunger for realism was a hunger of the eye.

THE NEW art-movie style is mainly non-realistic. You can see it in movies as different as the big-budget spy and science-fiction thrillers, Gilbert's *Alfie,* the comedies of Richard Lester and Tony Richardson, Lelouch's *A Man and a Woman,* and the Italian-Spanish westerns starring Clint Eastwood. It is missing in movies like *A Man for All Seasons* or *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf?* The art-movie entertainment style actually has some claim to its name, since it is a commercial adaptation of several recent highbrow art styles. The relation to New-Wave and Pop is obvious; further in the background are the Epic Theater and the Theater of the Absurd. There is also some cross-fertilization with magazine and TV advertising, and the teachings of Sontag, McLuhan, and even Norman O. Brown are not far away. This style has a big appetite for fashion and the digestion of a meatgrinder, which means that what is most valuable in these influences has undoubtedly been vulgarized or coarsened. You are likely to get relaxed kidding instead of high irony, jokes instead of wit; doodling with the movie-medium instead of expanding its possibilities; casual borrowing of the conveniences of non-realism instead of coherent stylization; playfulness rather than "play." But these less dignified effects aren't necessarily synthetic, and they can be used naturally by skillful experts to express something genuine that gives real pleasure.

The art-movie style came of age, it seems to me, in Richard Lester's *A Hard Day's Night,* that "surprisingly good movie about the Beatles." *The Manchurian Candidate,* the early James Bond thrillers, and other movies had already been kidding the movie medium and its conventions but Lester made the process more obvious by an amusing inversion, and he made a very attractive movie at the same time. You expected a "musical" starring the Beatles and got instead a friendly semi-documentary about four nice boys fooling around. You watched Ringo taking a solitary walk and realized that the sequence was in the lyrical mode of documentaries about lonely children. This was a kind of joke-realism, an unexpected and arbitrary way of handling its subject. When realism is surprising it comes to seem like a very special style. You notice it. Before the movie, the Beatles had been a formidable show-business fact; Lester's documentary style gave you a way of taking them easily. The art-movie style is rather a way of "taking" life than a way of seeing it, and it takes life easily and playfully. Of course Lester was also telling the truth and it turned out

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that the Beatles took themselves easily too. Their style and their tricks matched Lester's style and his tricks. This nice consonance makes the movie unusually coherent for an "art-movie." In fact, if it didn't seem to depend so much for its value on the exact time at which it was made, I would call it a work of art instead. But when it came out it was irresistible.

As in the old formulaic realism, the playfulness of the art-movie style is better when it isn't very strenuous. Some directors work as hard having fun as Stanley Kramer ever worked at being significant, and with similarly depressing results. *That Man from Rio* and other Belmondo movies are nervewrackingly hyper-manic; *Cat Ballou* laughed and laughed at its own jokes; and in *A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Forum* Lester's cinematic stunts diminished the vitality and even the size of the superb comic style of Zero Mostel, Jack Gilford, Phil Silvers, and the others—it made Lester seem as if he were jealously upstaging his betters.

The sheer usefulness of the new-style's habit of borrowing non-realistic dramatic devices from the serious theater shows up if you compare last year's *Alfie* with the 1963 *Hud,* a late bloomer in the old realistic mode. In both movies you are supposed to be attracted by the irresponsibility of the title character at the same time that you're being morally uneasy about it; both movies then try to think this ambivalence through fairly, and try to come down convincingly on the side of responsibility. Neither makes it through to this conclusion safely, but the art-movie style of *Alfie* sets up the double view of the character far more convincingly than the realistic mode of *Hud.* Realism requires that the ambiguity come up naturally out of the dramatic situation; but this takes skill and hard work and the people in charge didn't want to take any chances, so they took the Hollywood way out by casting a glamorous superstar, Paul Newman, as Hud in order to guarantee audience sympathy. This decision seemed facile and insincere in the first place, and it produced muddle and insecurity instead of ambiguity; you were always trying to second-guess the intention and there was more than one intention at work, since Paul Newman is a big star who takes himself seriously as an actor. *Alfie* avoids this clumsy and inadvertent mixture of modes by casually borrowing a standard device from non-realistic theater. Alfie can be played by a deliberately anti-glamor star, Michael Caine, because the character is constantly allowed to interrupt the realistic illusion by talking directly to the audience, mocking the behavior of the women he has just made out with, announcing and defending his principles as an operator, and so on. Instead of having to win the audience's sympathy naturally, he is allowed to appeal directly for it, and of course he gets it. Meanwhile good English realistic acting makes you see the women as real people, with feelings that can be hurt, so the ambiguity is set up very clearly. Very easily too, but there's nothing gained when a work of art takes on a hard assignment that it can't handle. The new art-movie style is lazier and luckier. Paul Newman's presence in *Hud* inevitably defines the character's attraction as sexual domination, as power, with all the attendant falsities of this melodramatic theme; Caine's direct address to the audience lets the movie identify Alfie's attraction as his capacity for sexual enjoyment, a far more interesting theme and one characteristic of the new style, which is at its best when it is taking life most hedonistically.

THE PHOTOGRAPHIC style of these movies is also appropriately hedonistic, and here I begin to find less cause for satisfaction. The important critic of the old Hollywood realistic formula movies was James Agee, who also worked with the important American realistic art photographer of the period, Walker Evans. And we admired the photographic style of Hollywood movies most when it approached, as it often did, Evans's non-rhetorical clarity, respectfulness, purity, and accuracy. The luxurious photographic style of the new art-movies doesn't, to anything like the same degree, match the genuine life in these movies. It is often pleasant enough to look at, but even at its best its opulence is a bit inert, slick, merely expensive rather than really hedonistic; and sometimes its relation to advertising techniques becomes unpleasantly obvious. Take Lelouch's immensely successful and very bad *A Man and a Woman,* for instance. Nobody, I suppose, would deny that this is basically a soap-opera—there's hardly a touch of art-movie playfulness in it. "Can the widow of a carefree movie stuntman find happiness with a glamorous champion racing-driver?"—this question is asked very solemnly, and it was sad too to see that even Anouk Aimee can throw her charm around pretty self-indulgently when no strong director is in charge. But what I liked even less than the pretty people and the sugary sexuality was the de luxe color photography, which is probably exactly what identifies the movie as in the art-movie style.

It astonishes me to be asked to find something fresh and appealing in the colors and textures of an international travel-ad or the romantic atmosphere you're supposed to get from a menthol cigarette. I know that we're supposed to take advertising more easily these days, and doubtless I am out of touch with this phase of modern liberation. But the associations with pure commercialism in Lelouch's photography wouldn't, I think, bother me so much if his photography didn't also share that awful, insinuating tastefulness of modern advertising. My impression is that the subtle tonalities of modern color photography, which gave such pleasure when one saw them first fifteen years ago, are by now not only a mannerism but perhaps also a limitation inherent in the technical process itself. The story goes that Antonioni had to paint the grass in that London park in *Blow-up* to make the color look as naturally alive as he wanted it to be. The art-movie color in *A Man and a Woman* makes me see why.

ROBERT GARIS, *who reviewed Antonioni's* Blow-up *in our April issue, teaches English at Wellesley.*

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AN INTERVIEW WITH HO CHI MINH—1923

Osip Mandelstam

A critic writing in the Times Literary Supplement *(May 11, 1967) declared that the name of Osip Mandelstam "has ceased to be the esoteric password of cognoscenti and is probably known to most people in the West who . . . take a reasonable interest in modern literature." However much one would like to believe that, it is probably best not to take chances. Mandelstam is more and more coming to be recognized as the most significant poet of modern Russia. He was born in Warsaw in 1891, grew up in St. Petersburg, published a few books of verse and one of criticism that earned him an enormous authority among the literary intelligentsia, fell afoul of the regime in the 30's and died a peculiarly hideous death in one of the camps in 1938. Although there does exist a scrap of judicial paper—a faint mimeographed blank with the details filled in—to prove that Mandelstam is now officially rehabilitated, he has scarcely more than begun to reappear in print in the Soviet Union. His* Collected Works *(now enlarged to three volumes) are appearing in Russian in this country under the editorship of Gleb Struve and Boris Filipoff.*

Aside from his criticism, his prose consists for the most part of memoirs and of two extraordinary works of the imagination, The Egyptian Stamp *and the little known* Fourth Prose. *In the early 20's, he published a number of fugitive bits of journalism. Most of this, if it had not been written by Mandelstam, would not interest us today, though it is interesting to notice how his sharpness of observation can put life into the drabbest hackwork (as in a piece headlined "The First International Conference of Peasants").*

One of his contributions to the magazine Ogonëk *(December 23, 1923) was an interview with a young Annamese revolutionary named Nguyen Ai Quoc who was, like Mandelstam, in his early 30's. A member of the Comintern, he later became known to the entire world under his party name, Ho Chi Minh. I find that most people, when they hear about this interview today, tend to laugh at the slightly comic effect of such an extraordinarily improbable juxtaposition of personalities. But it was, also, a juxtaposition of two fates that have come to force themselves upon our consciousness as emblematic. And so it is not only sensational but poignant. It is moving to reflect upon this conversation (in French) between two young men in Moscow who looked into the future to the year 1947—about as far distant from them in one direction as it is from us in the other—and imagined, one fervently and the other with a gentle indulgence, a Congress of the International. Neither Mandelstam nor, in fact, the Comintern itself would live that long.*

But Ho Chi Minh would outlive the despised French to confront another army that was, for the most part, not yet born in 1923. It would probably be best to seek no further significance in this brief episode. Some of the lessons of history are mute, or they are muffled in what Mandelstam calls "the oceanic silence of universal brotherhood."

—CLARENCE BROWN

"AND HOW HAS Gandhi's movement been reflected in Indochina? Haven't any of the reverberations, any echoes, reached there?" I asked Nguyen Ai Quoc.

"No," answered my companion. "The Annamese people—peasants—live buried in the profoundest night, with no newspapers, no conception of what's happening in the world. It's night, actual night."

Nguyen Ai Quoc is the only Annamese in Moscow and represents an ancient Malaysian race. He is practically a boy, thin and lithe, wearing a knitted woolen jacket. He speaks French, the language of the oppressors, but the French words sound dim and faint, like the muffled bell of his native language.

Nguyen Ai Quoc utters the word "civilization" with disgust: he has traveled the length and breadth of practically the whole colonial world, been in northern and central Africa, and he's seen his fill of it. In conversation he often uses the word "brothers." His "brothers" are the Negroes, Hindus, Syrians, Chinese. He wrote a letter to the Frenchified Negro, René Maran, author of the densely exotic *Batouala* to ask him a question point-blank: did or did not Maran wish to aid the liberation of his colonial brothers? René Maran, crowned by the French Academy, answered reticently and evasively.

"I come from a privileged Annamese family. In my country such families don't do anything. The young men study Confucianism. You know, Confucianism is not a religion but rather a study of moral practice and decent behavior. In its very foundation it presupposes a 'social world.' I was a boy of about thirteen when I first heard the French words for liberty, equality, and fraternity . . . for us, you see, every white man is a Frenchman. And I wanted to learn something about French civilization, to explore what lay concealed behind those words. But the French are training parrots in the native schools. They hide books and newspapers from us and ban not only modern writers but even Rousseau and Montesquieu. What could I do? I decided to leave. An Annamese is a serf. We are forbidden not only to travel but even to move about at all inside the country. The railroads have been built for 'strategic' purposes—the French don't think we're yet grown up enough to use them. I managed to get to the coast and . . . just left. I was nineteen. The elections were going on in France. The bourgeois were slinging mud at each other." A spasm of almost physical revulsion passes across the face of Nguyen Ai Quoc. Normally wan and dull, his face suddenly lights up. He squints his large liquid eyes and stares at one with the penetrating gaze of a blind man.

"When the French came, all the decent old families scattered. The bastards who knew how to worm their way into favor grabbed the abandoned houses and estates. Now they've grown rich—a new bourgeoisie—and they're able to bring their children up in the French way. If any boy in my country goes to school to the Catholic missionaries it means he's just trash, scum.

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They pay money for that. So they go, the morons, and it's just the same as joining the police or the militia. Catholic missionaries own a fifth of our whole country. No one but the concessionaires can compete with them.

"What is a French colonizer? Oh, what an untalented, limited type that is. His first concern is to make arrangements for his relatives. The next is to grab and steal as much and as quickly as possible, and the aim of his whole policy is—a little house, 'one's own little house' in France.

"The French are poisoning my people. They've made the use of alcohol obligatory. We take a little rice of good quality and make a nice liquor—for when friends come or for some family celebration of ancestors. The French took bad, cheap rice and distilled barrels of liquor from it. No one wanted to buy theirs. There was a surplus of liquor. So the governors were directed to make an obligatory apportionment of it on a per capita basis and they forced people to buy liquor that nobody wanted."

I had a vivid image of the way these gentle people, with their love for tact and moderation and their hatred of excess, had been made to drink hard liquor. Nguyen Ai Quoc's whole presence was imbued with an innate tact and delicacy. European civilization works with bayonet and liquor, hiding them under the soutane of a Catholic missionary. Nguyen Ai Quoc breathes culture, not European culture, but perhaps the culture of the future.

"In Paris now there's a group of comrades from the French colonies —five or six men from Cochin China, the Sudan, Madagascar, and Haiti—who are publishing a little magazine called *Pariah* devoted to fighting the French colonial policy. It's a very small magazine. All the staff make up the cost of publishing it out of their own pockets—instead of receiving an honorarium."

A bamboo cane with an appeal carved on it went around surreptitiously from village to village. It was replanted from one place to another—and a secret agreement was made. It cost the Annamese dearly. There were executions. Hundreds of heads rolled.

"The Annamese have no clergy and no religion in the European sense. The cult of ancestors is a purely social phenomenon. There are no priests. The eldest member of the family or the village elder performs the memorial rites. We know nothing of priestly authority.

"Yes, it's interesting how the French authorities taught our peasants the words 'Bolshevik' and 'Lenin.' They began hunting down Communists among the Annamese peasantry at a time when there wasn't a trace of a Communist. And that way they spread the propaganda."

The Annamese are a simple, courteous people. In the nobility of his manner and in the dim, soft voice of Nguyen Ai Quoc one can hear the approach of tomorrow, the oceanic silence of universal brotherhood.

There's a manuscript on the table. A calm, businesslike report. The telegraphic style of a correspondent. He's indulging his fancy on the theme of a Congress of the International in the year 1947. He sees and hears the agenda, he's present, taking down the minutes.

When we were saying goodbye Nguyen Ai Quoc recalled something. "Oh, yes, we had one other 'rebellion.' It was led by a minor Annamese prince named Zjuntan. Against the deportation of our peasants to the slaughter in France. Zjuntan escaped. He's now in exile. Say something about him, too."

Excerpts from OSIP MANDELSTAM's The Noise of Time *appeared in our October 1965 issue, in the translation of* CLARENCE BROWN. *Mr. Brown, who also translated the present piece, is the editor of* The Prose of Osip Mandelstam, *which Princeton University Press published two years ago.*

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LITERARY FASCISM

THE REACTIONARIES: A STUDY OF THE ANTI-DEMOCRATIC INTELLIGENTSIA. By JOHN HARRISON. *Schocken. 224 pp. $6.00.*

Reviewed by DENIS DONOGHUE

IN BOOK V of *A Vision*, which is dated February, 1925, Yeats wrote:

> A civilization is a struggle to keep self-control, and in this it is like some great tragic person, some Niobe who must display an almost superhuman will or the cry will not touch our sympathy. The loss of control over thought comes towards the end; first a sinking in upon the moral being, then the last surrender, the irrational cry, revelation—the scream of Juno's peacock.

In its syntax it reminds us of "Leda and the Swan"; in its tone it recalls "The Second Coming." In all its notes it sends the scream of Juno's peacock through an entire generation. We hear it in Eliot's "The Hollow Men" (1925), in D. H. Lawrence's *The Plumed Serpent* (1926), in Wyndham Lewis's *The Apes of God* (1930), in Pound's *Jefferson and/or Mussolini* (1935), in Yeats's *The Tower* (1928). Mr. Harrison's book is a study of this scream. "It is a strange and disturbing phenomenon," he says, "that five of the greatest literary figures of this century, Yeats, Lewis, Pound, Eliot, and Lawrence, were attracted by Italian and German Fascism before the Second World War." This is, to Mr. Harrison, the particular form of the scream. And he asks: "Why is it that great creative artists can totally reject a liberal, democratic, humanitarian society, and prefer a cruel, authoritarian, bellicose society?" Mr. Harrison tends to answer his question by begging it: this is the form his bewilderment takes. Wise after the event, he cannot even conceive the possibility that the event might have been different.

Meanwhile he has prepared an indictment which would not stand in any court of law. I am afraid he has not done his homework. The body of the book is a study of his five writers, but he does not study them as writers, poets, novelists. He makes no attempt to register the strain of their art, to feel the violence of their imagination. At the start he promises to consider the presumptive relation between their political tendencies and their styles, but he does not keep his promise. Now and again he tries to impugn the literature by impugning the politics, but this is merely the pious hope that poets write better when their sentiments are congenial. I have often wished that this could be demonstrated. But the relation between feeling and style is more ambiguous than Mr. Harrison allows. Besides, at the back of his bewilderment there is a certain poverty of response which threatens to disable his entire work. This is particularly evident in his chapter on Lawrence. To him, Lawrence's concern with blood and sacrifice is "near-lunatic." Lawrence was lucky, it seems, to catch malaria and be driven out of New Mexico: if he had stayed any longer he would have gone mad. Besides, what on earth was he doing in New Mexico, "of all places"? This is jolly stuff, but it is unlikely to touch the more profound matters at stake.

Indeed, Mr. Harrison's thought tends to be rough and ready. His chapters are mere approximations. Writing of Eliot, he quotes a passage from *The Criterion* (December, 1928), saying of it that it exhibits "an extreme intellectual approach to politics, and is simply a defense of the status quo." This is not so. Mr. Harrison forces Eliot into the rough pattern which he has already drawn. He does not make his pattern conform to the facts. Indeed, in that particular issue of *The Criterion*, Eliot's contributions are entirely in line with standard liberal opinion. The first editorial deals with censorship in Ireland, referring to a recent essay in which Yeats raised the matter. The Free State Government had drafted, Yeats wrote, "a bill which it hates, which must be expounded and defended by Ministers full of contempt for their own words." The editorial quotes this sentence and goes on to speak of censorship as "indefensible." The enforcement of the bill "would reduce Ireland to barbarism." The next comment seems to me extremely cogent and fair: "The situation thus summed up casts, of course, an interesting light upon popular government in general, and upon democratic tyranny." In the essay itself, "The Literature of Fascism," Eliot reviews five books on the subject, but he declares that he is interested in one question, and one only; "whether Fascism is the emergence of a new political idea, or the recrudescence of an old one." He concludes, incidentally, that as a religious faith Fascism is "humbug," that it does not contain any new idea of general interest. Eliot came back to the matter in the July, 1929 issue of *The Criterion*. Fascism now seemed, as an idea, thoroughly sterile; "the natural idea for the thoughtless person." It is "a combination of statements with unexamined enthusiasms." "In the *success* of a man like Mussolini (a man of 'the people') a whole nation may feel a kind of self-flattery; and the Russian people deified itself in Lenin. Both Italy and Russia seem to me to be suffering from Napoleonism." It is quite clear that Eliot, faced with an English society which had not entertained a single new political idea since Fabianism, was checking to see whether there might be anything fruitful in Fascism. His conclusion was "no";

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

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there was nothing. I do not say that this is the whole story, but it is a part of it which Mr. Harrison chooses not to tell. Eliot makes no bones about his feeling that democratic government in England was already "watered down to nothing." "From the moment when the suffrage is conceived as a *right* instead of as a privilege and a duty and a responsibility, we are on the way merely to government by an invisible oligarchy instead of government by a visible one." This is at least an arguable position. On the face of it, there is nothing stupid or vicious in those words. Indeed, Eliot could claim to be defending true democracy. "The modern question," he says, "as popularly put is: 'democracy is dead; what is to replace it?,' whereas it should be: 'the frame of democracy has been destroyed: how can we, out of the materials at hand, build a new structure in which democracy can live?'"

Again, in writing of Yeats, Mr. Harrison takes some pains to misunderstand the words on the page. Practical politics was for Yeats, he says, "the dirty piece of orange peel in the corner of the stairs as one climbs to some newspaper office." This is a phrase from *The Trembling of the Veil*. Mr. Harrison thinks it so compelling that he repeats it three pages later. But in fact he misinterprets the words. Yeast was giving a fanciful account of Sir Charles Gavan Duffy:

> One imagined his youth in some little gaunt Irish town, where no building or custom is revered for its antiquity; and there speaking a language where no word, even in solitude, is ever spoken slowly and carefully because of emotional implication; and of his manhood of practical politics, of the dirty piece of orange-peel in the corner of the stairs as one climbs up to some newspaper office; of public meetings where it would be treacherous amid so much geniality to speak or even to think of anything that might cause a moment's misunderstanding in one's own party.

This means that Yeats despised the culture of the middle-class shopkeeper, the fumblers in a greasy till. He detested the kind of political activity that Joyce describes in "Ivy Day in the Committee Room." But the orange-peel is not his image for practical politics, an activity to which he chose to devote many years of his life. What Yeats wanted was a liaison of spirit between folk and aristocracy, peasant and prince; "rule of kindred" based on independence and personality. Indeed, Fascism had a better chance of his approval than, say, Nazism, because its most spectacular version was enacted on his beloved Italian soil and he couldn't help believing that somewhere beneath those marching boots one could hear the sweet sounds of Urbino, "the wise Duchess," and Lady Emilia giving the theme. So he found it easy to mistake Mussolini for the Duke Frederick and Gentile for Castiglione and to think of them all in civilized association with Parnell, John O'Leary, Kevin O'Higgins, and the great immortals. Besides, it was precisely because he had no real power in Ireland that he was determined to speak out. There is no reason to think that, if he had been given power, he would have used it to extreme purpose. Mr. Harrison makes no imaginative effort to understand what was going on in the Ireland of 1919-1936, or to see why it incited violent thoughts in Yeats. "Desire some just war," Yeats wrote, "that big house and hovel, college and public-house, civil servant . . . and international bridgeplaying woman, may know that they belong to one nation." If you can't understand why Yeats wrote that and other violent things, you can't even begin to grasp the politics of modern literature.

On Pound, Mr. Harrison is a little rueful. The verse is too hard to follow, the economic theories are only Major Douglas, but poor Pound was an innocent abroad. "Pound's political unworldliness" accounts for a lot. So much is forgiven him because he has, in recent years, confessed much. Go thou and sin no more. Again, it is an approximation. In this account it is not necessary to cope with the words. In *Thrones*, Canto 102, Pound gives a Chinese ideogram which I cannot read, followed by this:

> *But the lot of 'em, Yeats, Possum,*
> *Old Wyndham had no ground*
> *to stand on*
> *Black shawls still worn for Demeter in Venice,*
> *in my time,*
> *my young time . . .*

Mr. Harrison thinks that this means that Yeats, Eliot, Lewis, etc. "were not firm enough in their support of Fascism." On the contrary, it seems to mean that the trouble with the political sentiments of these writers was that they had no relation to their soil, whereas the Fascists were articulating "the spirit of the place," the genuine Italian tradition. There is a lot to be said for this view. Indeed, Eliot himself warned that "sound political thought in one country is not to be built upon political facts in another country." It was not merely a matter of transport. It had to be the "speech of the place," to use a phrase from another idiom; not "enclosures of hypotheses."

These are details. The main defect of Mr. Harrison's book is that he is only interested in ripping political ideas from the poems and novels in which they appear; not at all interested in the engagement of those ideas with the poetic imagination. This is to say that he is interested in ideas and only ostensibly in literature. So his own mind is the typical bourgeois liberal mind of his generation. Its force is the force of the typical; its weakness is the fact that it is no more than typical. This is to say that Mr. Harrison's mind has none of that quirky imaginative vigor which would make it more than typical. What it represents is what every other bourgeois liberal mind represents; but no more. This is why he writes approximations; essays in the typical. The book is full of misprints, many of the quotations are wrong, and this would matter if it were another kind of book. But it does not matter here. If a phrase from Yeats's "Blood and the Moon" comes out as "Laughter-headed Burke" instead of "haughtier-headed Burke," there is a sense in which this approximation, one in four on that page, is more congenial to Mr. Harrison's book than the accurate version. Transcribing "All Souls'

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Night" he puts in "corner" where Yeats wrote "quarter," and again in a crazy way it seems appropriate. If you are not proposing to read the stuff very carefully there is no point in transcribing it with any attention. It is not surprising that Mr. Harrison writes of these poets and novelists as if they were a gang of wretched journalists, Beaverbrook hacks.

PART OF THE difficulty is that Mr. Harrison cannot conceive of a profound case that might be directed against the kind of mass society which we have today, or the kind of democracy which determined English life between the wars. He does not understand the sense in which liberal democratic life is, as Pound called it in the *ABC of Economics,* "a mess of mush." Or the forces which drove Yeats to write "Lapis Lazuli," or anyone at all to conceive a "sympathy with the abyss." In *The Lion and the Honeycomb* R. P. Blackmur spoke with something of that profundity. His theme was the New Illiteracy, "the development of energy without a corresponding development of intelligence." The fact that much of his thought was animated by his reading of Henry Adams makes no difference. That book is not the work of a reactionary, in Mr. Harrison's term, but it implies in its distress the sense in which bourgeois democracy has already failed. I do not ask Mr. Harrison to share this sense; but I ask him at least to confront the genuine issues which incite it.

There was a moment when I thought he was going to do this. It was the eleventh hour in his book, the summary near the end. But it would still have been possible. Mr. Harrison was speaking very well, arguing that "Yeats, Lewis, Pound, and Eliot were really interested in society only in so far as it would allow the arts to flourish." Then he said that these writers "based their political and social criticism on the same principles as their imaginative writing and literary criticism." They "transferred their value-judgments from aesthetics to politics." This is extremely illuminating. It might be developed further by referring to Veblen's concept of "trained incapacity"; mean-

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ing that one is often prevented from seeing certain possibilities by the fact that they are not allowed for in the grammar of his professional skill. Training in one direction is a disability in another. Skill, a particular vision, is also a squint. It might be argued that the modern poet, trained in one way, is for that very reason disabled in other ways, including ways readily available to less talented men, It is common in philosophy to derive an ethic from an aesthetic. It is equally natural to derive a politics from the same source. Think of modern aesthetics for a moment. The single idea which goes without dispute in the Babel of modern critical theory is the primacy of the creative imagination. It bloweth where it listeth, but it is deemed to be indisputable and imperious. It gives no quarter. It does whatever it wants to do. Above all, we are admonished to think of it as singular and unanswerable. Indeed, it is odd that we have accepted such an authoritarian notion in aesthetics while choosing to be scandalized by its counterpart in politics. The poet is free to deal with his matter as he wishes, to use words in his own way. It is universally conceded that he may impose himself, his own particular sense, whatever form it takes. Much of this thought is descended, in the English line, from Coleridge, who said in the *Biographia Literaria* that the primary imagination is the finite counterpart of God's creative act, "a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM." The modern understanding of imagination assumes that order is imposed upon experience by those exceptional men, the few, who are capable of doing so; that it is natural for such men to do this, as an act corresponds to a prior capacity; and that the rest of us should appreciate those men for doing what we are incapable of doing. It seems clear, for instance, that Wallace Stevens's idea of the poetic imagination implies a politics of self-determination: call it capitalism. It would be possible, presumably, to devise an aesthetic theory which would chime with a democratic politics; but no theory of this kind has made any mark in modern literature. If you start with the imagination, you imply an elite of qualified men. The relation between this elite and the masses is bound to be a critical relation; as Kenneth Burke said that the law of the imagination is, "when in Rome, do as the Greeks." In *The Necessary Angel* Stevens refers to the statue of Andrew Jackson in Lafayette Square, Washington. General Jackson, Stevens remarks, is raising his hat in a gay gesture, saluting the ladies of his generation. "One looks at this work of Clark Mills and thinks of the remark of Bertrand Russell that to acquire immunity to eloquence is of the utmost importance to the citizens of a democracy." I was reminded of this passage by reading some of the more facile parts of Mr. Harrison's book.

SOUNDING THE ALARM

MOST NOTORIOUS VICTORY. By BEN B. SELIGMAN. *Free Press. 441 pp. $7.95.*

Reviewed by ROBERT LEKACHMAN

AUTOMATION, that vague and portentous word, has come to signify two major processes. One is the profusion of information created by more and more powerful generations of computers; the other is the movement, rapid in industries like oil refining and chemicals and slower in most others, toward the creation of nearly automatic factories equipped with masses of machinery, animated by sensitive control devices, and overseen by a few—a very few—human custodians. When the computer is linked to the factory, as in the almost uncanny maneuvers involved in numerical control, little occasion seems to remain for the exercise of human judgment and human skill.

Almost intuitively, it is hard for anyone to escape the sense that such technical events as these are fated to transform the society that permits them to occur. This is indeed the opinion of a good many students of American society. Automation was prominently featured in the manifesto of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Triple Revolution, and the guaranteed annual income was identified as the major way to cope with automation's consequences. The Santa Barbara group led by W. H. Ferry at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions has taken an equally serious view of the impact of automation and plumped for extensive national planning as the sovereign remedy. Ben Seligman's excellent book supports this position.

SINCE AT LEAST the English Industrial Revolution of the 18th century, technical change has been a defining characteristic of Western societies. Hence to argue that automation substantially differs from the incessant intrusion of technical novelties upon routine industrial processes is to allege that the speed of contemporary innovation has increased to the point where the disruptive consequences of technical innovation strain the absorptive capacities of the social system. The *impact* of automation, in other words, is distinguishable from previous technological effects because in so many industries, offices, banks, universities, schools, and government agences *all at once* work has been redefined, old skills and specialties consigned to the scrap heap (along with their proprietors), and new capacities demanded of human beings too elderly or too set in their vocational habits to stand a chance of acquiring these new talents. Accordingly, the adjustment problem is far too grave now and potentially almost catastrophic to permit ourselves the complacencies of such received solutions as tax cuts, wars on poverty (on the cheap), and manpower retraining schemes. In this view, the effective remedies for the present, and still more for the future, must be as substantial as the social effects of automation themselves. Possibly we require new concepts of work and leisure. Certainly we need to invent mechanisms for the distribution of the material abundance which automation creates; and these mechanisms should be quite independent of any need to labor at "jobs" as they are now defined.

This "alarmist" case is accepted by only a minority of professional economists. The official professional view is quite different and quite comforting. For example, summarizing and endorsing the analysis of

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last year's report on the National Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress, three well-regarded economists in a Brookings study write:

> The Commission found: (1) that appropriate use of fiscal-monetary policy could ensure a continuing compatibility between rapid technological progress and high levels of employment; (2) that there was no evidence that the increasing demand for highly educated and skilled workers was generating structural imbalance in the labor market; and (3) that the evolution of private and public policies had done much to reduce the cost of adjustment for individual workers, but there was considerable room for future progress.

If the Commission (which included the distinguished MIT economist, Robert Solow) is correct, then the automation problem is, despite all appearances to the contrary, not really very different from our historical experience of technical change. If, as the Commission's own researches imply, we are in the 1960's moving a little more rapidly than in the past and the typical lag between the invention of a new process and its general diffusion is shortening, this measure of acceleration is still far from great enough to swamp the effective responses of conventional economic weapons. The mixture as before—a combination of prudent tax reduction, responsible expansion of public spending, and alert loosening of credit—will maintain or restore full employment. When employment is high, we can depend upon the adaptability of employers and employees alike to smoothe individual transitions from old to new jobs. Where the mechanism falters, an improved program of publicly supported job retraining and labor mobility will see us through.

This "conventional" view is more or less accepted by economists whose political preferences range from Left of Great Society to Right of Milton Friedman. And certainly the steady downward drift (painfully slow and incomplete though it has been) of unemployment during the last six years seems a testimonial both to the failure of automation to cause massive job displacement

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

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and the capacity of fiscal policy to maintain a near-full employment level of Gross National Product.

UNTIL RECENTLY I have myself found the official position reasonably convincing. What has somewhat shaken me now is Ben Seligman's persuasive book. Let me say at the outset that this is by far the most impressive study of the impact of automation that I have seen. Seligman provides a useful history of the new computer and factory technology and a lucid sketch, case by case, of how the new devices operate in a considerable variety of blue- and white-collar situations. The peril in generalizing from example is notorious: as the proverb goes, "for instance" is no argument. However, when the instances are themselves important, their number is large, and they occur in variegated activities—in this case as variegated as baking, printing, machine tools, shipbuilding, medical diagnosis, teaching, and legal research—the aphorism loses its power to convince. On the evidence, computer technology can be applied to almost any productive activity. How soon it will be applied is in part a question of cost and in part a question of identifying the areas where human beings still possess a comparative advantage over their electronic rivals.

Seligman's exposition makes it plain that even if the conventional confidence in our national capacity to maintain full employment is generally valid, there are still enormous difficulties in converting assembly-line workers into computer technicians and hand bookkeepers into programmers, let alone the unskilled into any marketable category. Non-emotive, economists' labels like flexibility, adaptability, and mobility conceal an uncomfortably large incidence of shattered pride in suddenly worthless skills, assured statuses rudely revised, and community relationships broken. At the very best, this is what the medication of job retraining in a high-employment economy promises. At worst, the medication fails and displaced workers never again find a satisfactory place in the workaday world.

I have nothing but praise to contribute to the pages in this study which discuss the scope and prospective incidence of automation's impact upon work, skills, and attitudes. I am less happy about the polemical skirmishes into which Seligman enters with such upholders of the "conventional" view as Herbert Simon, Daniel Bell, Charles Silberman, and Peter Drucker. The points at issue are frequently both technical and moot. Certainly this is true of the argument over the adequacy of our productivity measures. My impression, for what it may be worth, is that Seligman scores some shrewd points, particularly against Silberman, but that too much space and polemical energy are wasted upon issues which are beginning to assume only historical significance.

The conventional wisdom, I am inclined to think, does have the better of the argument about the effects *to date* of automation. More significant is the question of what is likely to happen next. And here I find myself increasingly convinced by the kind of evidence marshaled by Seligman that automation is on the threshhold of creating dramatic social change. In the end I do not differ with Seligman on the issue of the need for social invention. My remaining point of separation from Seligman and other "alarmists" is only this: they think that the storm has already broken. I see the heavy clouds which portend the oncoming storm. Soon, it appears we will all be on the same side.

JEWISH ART

CONTEMPORARY SYNAGOGUE ART. By AVRAM KAMPF. *Union of American Hebrew Congregations. 276 pp. $10.00.*

Reviewed by CECIL ROTH

THE MOST IMPORTANT thing is that people are now beginning to think in terms of synagogue art. For a very long time there was a positive cult of ugliness in the synagogues of the Western world: as in music, and certainly in decorum, anything with an aesthetic appeal was considered, as it were, to be *Hukath haGoy*, the Way of the Gentile, and *ipso facto* undesirable. When there was any attempt at renewal, it was

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along the old familiar lines, and the synagogues themselves were unadventurously constructed in what has been termed the Meshugothic style.

It had not always been so. The old synagogues and synagogal appurtenances not only in Italy (where this might have been expected) but also in Central and Eastern Europe were not infrequently splendidly designed and executed. Nor was figurative art wholly excluded. One of Dr. Kampf's introductory chapters deals with the interpretation of the Second Commandment in the past, with conclusions which to some persons will seem surprising.

The fact is that Jewish religious life, while always rejecting iconolatry (that is, the veneration of the image), wavered in accordance with the circumstances of the age and the environment between iconoclasm and iconopathy (if we may use this term to describe the toleration of the image); and this, not only in marginal religious objects, such as those used in domestic rituals, but even in the synagogue as well as at other central foci of public worship.

All this has been slowly revealed, to a great extent only in the course of the past few decades. Indeed, Jewish art in the past went even further than it can venture to go today—even in the most "liberal" circles—sometimes not even excluding the delineation of the Godhead.

IT HAS, however, only been in the past generation that art in the contemporary sense has reentered the synagogue to the full extent. The reasons are obvious enough. For it is only in the past generation that art in the contemporary sense has entered to the full extent into the Jewish home. A very large proportion of contemporary modern artists are Jews; a very large proportion of the patrons of the arts are Jews; and the growing well-being of the Jewish communities of the Western world has made inevitable the attempt to secure their embellishment in the modern idiom and without overmuch regard for expense. The revelation in these years of the existence of Jewish synagogal art even in the hyper-religious past has no doubt helped to create a favorable psychological atmosphere for this new development. It is perhaps significant that at the entrance to the monumental Beth Tzedek synagogue in Toronto (not mentioned by Dr. Kampf, who patriotically restricts himself to the geographical confines of the United States) there is a reconstruction by Perli Pelzig of the famous synagogue mosaic of Beth Alpha, in Israel, depicting among other things the sacrifice of Isaac, the discovery of which marked the beginning of the revolution in our ideas regarding Jewish synagogal art of the past.

AFTER DISCUSSING general problems and present attitudes, Dr. Kampf deals methodically with the art-work to be found on modern American synagogue exteriors, in the vestibule, in the prayer-hall, and finally in stained glass windows (anticipated, as we are informed, in medieval rabbinical literature in the Rhineland, six or seven centures ago!). He devotes special attention to the B'nai Israel synagogue in Millburn, New Jersey, where the collaboration of the architect, Percival Goodman, the sculptor, Herbert Ferber, the muralist, Robert Motherwell, and the tapestry-artist, Adolph Gottlieb, has resulted in a singularly impressive and coherent place of worship, essentially modern yet not revolutionary. The illustrations do not show us any of the ritual appurtenances here, but it is to be presumed that the Torah-silver and the corresponding brocades are of the modern type which the author describes and illustrates in his chapter on artwork in the prayer hall.

At this point, however, unless I am mistaken, the pervasive influence of modernity ends completely. In all of these utterly contemporary synagogues, so far as I have seen, the modernistic Torah mantles and silver decorations by Wolpert or Schor are placed on Torah-scrolls whose hideous wooden staves remain all too visible to the naked eye. Moreover, the scrolls themselves are written by *Sopherim* —scribes—who will reproduce the unlovely, cramped Gothicized let-

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

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tering that became usual in Central and Eastern Europe during the past century. What would one not give to see a *Sepher Torah* copied by a pious and meticulous *Sopher* who combines a feeling for aesthetic values, in a contemporary sense, with a knowledge of his craft! This is not impossible, as any person familiar with, for example, the Italian Torah-scrolls of the 17th and 18th century can testify. So far as I know only one outstanding *Sopher* has emerged in the American environment: that curious person, Abraham Nieto, in his pious younger days.

DR. KAMPF'S book is fascinating, and the illustrations lavish, but more care could, and should, have been devoted to detail. There are, for example, repeated references to the B'nai Aaron Temple in St. Paul, Minnesota, ruining one of the most delightful of all American synagogue appellations: for the actual name is Temple Aaron. The stained glass windows here by William Saltzman (which won the artist a Guggenheim award) receive the special mention that they deserve, but if the central panel of the three reproduced on page 241 is the right way up, then the trees outside must be growing upside-down. According to the official account, incidentally, this represents Old Age, but Dr. Kampf identifies it with Marriage: abstract art forever!

Future prospects in the field with which this volume deals are almost unlimited. Renaissance art in Italy was largely conditioned by the existence of a wealthy and art-conscious public bent on embellishing the family places of worship without regard to financial expense, and it was largely on the basis of this patronage that the Renaissance artists, architects, and sculptors were able to establish their careers. In America at present, for the first time in history, it is economically possible for creative artists in all fields to make a high reputation and a more than adequate livelihood by working in the synagogal and the Jewish religious spheres. Something memorable should come out of this, and Dr. Kampf's book shows that the process is beginning.

MESSINESS

A ROMAN MARRIAGE. By BRIAN GLANVILLE. *Coward-McCann. 192 pp. $4.50.*

AGAINST ENTROPY. By MICHAEL FRAYN. *Viking. 256 pp. $4.95.*

CASUALTIES OF PEACE. By EDNA O'BRIEN. *Simon and Shuster. 176 pp. $4.50.*

Reviewed by ROBERT KIELY

THE NEWS HAS been out for some time now that London swings and a good part of England vibrates with it. Miniskirts are more minute and men's hair shaggier than almost anywhere and the blank look seems at last to have triumphed over the eccentric nod, the respectable smile, and the canny eye. After the war years and the bleak period which followed them, a generation arose which based its conduct not on a rule or even a rebellion against rules, but on a rhetorical question: "What more have we got to lose?" Those who were once the angry young men have carried their irritation toward middle-age and left room for another lot who don't, on the whole, seem mad at anyone. Their attitude is that things have gone beyond the stage where accusing fingers can be seriously pointed or threatening fists unself-consciously shaken. The basic assumption among them is that everything is in an irreparable mess. To attempt reform or coherent criticism is to make the ultimate fool of oneself by revealing a naivete about the extent to which the deterioration has progressed. For this group, even political satire—an art at which the British have excelled for centuries—has begun to dwindle down to a harmless pastime. Jolly satirists giggle at themselves and sweeten their nasty thrusts with the tacit admission that the poor fellows in government can't really do anything about it either. The mess damns and redeems all. Everybody is in it, nobody—at least nobody within reach—is responsible for it.

To try to define with any precision the components of a cosmic mess is almost as naive as to throw a rock at Parliament or to take up one's own broom and try cleaning the streets of London with it. Nonetheless, there are recognizable consequences of the mess which are talked and sung about and written about in novels. One, of course, is the city crowded with strangers and littered with filth. English novelists have written about the advantages and disadvantages of city life since the 18th century, but the city projected by the mess mentality is a place where everyone lives wherever he lives. It is a place of dead-ends, one-way streets, jams, collisions, opaque fumes, and undistinguishable dwellings. Nature has vanished for a large number of young writers even though they keep sending pairs of lovers on sexual errands into the countryside. Nobody sees or learns anything there which could not have been seen and learned in London or Liverpool. The same haste, the same confusion, the same sterility. The country is just the city in disguise.

Along with the English countryside, the English character has suffered from the mess. It is not the British "type" which is missed—since that was only a caricature created by foreigners anyway—but the plenitude of originals which used to populate English narrative literature. Once, it could be taken for granted that an English writer would willingly break almost any rule of composition for the sake of one of his characters, to give him another speech or another scene. Nowadays characters in novels receive few favors from authors. Not many are given personalities to call their own and few have brains enough to make their speeches worth prolonging. Intelligence and spirit have gotten lost in the mess, and the only sure way to tell one character from another is by his neurosis or by the size and behavior of his genital parts. The possibilities of both approaches are, for fictional purposes, finite. Somehow, when one is given no other reason for caring about a character, it doesn't matter to a mere reader whether or not he or she is good in bed.

Finally—well, not really finally, since there is no finality in the mess—human responsibility has become unthinkable. It is not treated as a bad word, but simply as the name for something which does not exist and never could have existed. Since no one is responsible for the way

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the world is or the way he himself is made, no one can possibly be responsible to or for anyone else. Terms like friendship and marriage are inconvenient symbols out of a mythical past which misunderstood the mutability of human nature. Of course, the unreality of sustained human relationships makes a subject like betrayal, once such a favorite with novelists, impossible to treat in a serious modern work. Promise nothing, deliver nothing, apologize for nothing. That is the plot summary of many mess-oriented novels.

One difficulty is that some authors, bent on demonstrating what a sham responsibility is, tend to neglect not only their characters but their readers. With all the other things they have to think about, it is certainly no responsibility of theirs to be interesting, entertaining, or instructive. Where their predecessors used to shock with brutal scenes and harsh words, they have learned to take the most lurid of subjects and make them pointless, dull, mess them up, until the Irish censors are the only ones left to be startled. The ordinary reader may simply yawn, but that does not necessarily disturb the kind of author whose literary style is meant to give the impression that he writes novels with one hand while whipping up an omelet or doing the crossword puzzle with the other. Such an author would rather die than be caught taking himself too seriously or expecting a serious response from his readers. He is perhaps content to have contributed to the newest of literary conveniences, fiction which can be read while watching television and put down without effort when it is time to go to bed.

OF THREE English novels recently published in America, Brian Glanville's *A Roman Marriage* is the purest representative of the new genre. Its pages are unadulterated by nature, personality, or coherent human relationships. Anglo-Saxon Barbara—fun-loving, food-loving, non-practicing Protestant socialist—meets Roman Claudio—wine-loving, woman-loving, semi-practicing Catholic monarchist—and falls in love with his pointed shoes and lean brown body. After asking herself the question, "Can a loose-moralled, emptyheaded English girl find happiness with a narrow-minded, unfaithful Italian husband?" Barbara sagely takes the fatal step and lives miserably ever after in a squalid apartment with her non-English-speaking mother-in-law. Mama is drab, Barbara is drab, Claudio is drab, and—shame on all barbarian invaders—Rome, by some act of black magic, is made to seem drab.

Such orthodox fidelity to the cult cannot be found in all contemporary British fiction. For example, Michael Frayn deviates somewhat in *Against Entropy* by taking a comic view of the mess. His success is sporadic but effective when it works. He can use humor to create situations which are full of a folly still recognizably human, or lapse into automatic jokes which have about them the same sort of lifelessness which, in his better moments, he is able to hold at bay. His world is the small office of a London daily newspaper and his two non-heroes, a nerve-wracked features editor and his phlegmatic young assistant. For the former, whose life is a series of long tube rides and repairs on his crumbling Victorian house, the great opportunity of his career comes when he is invited to appear on a television panel to discuss racial relations. The latter sucks toffee and wonders whether he should let himself be seduced by the frantic, middle-aged wife of one of his colleagues or finally give in and marry his unexciting but solid girlfriend from the provinces.

Mr. Frayn's sense of humor is sharp enough in parts of his novel to make it especially noticeable when he resorts to stale and repetitious situational jokes which evoke old Katharine Hepburn-Cary Grant movies. True, it is thought in some quarters that nothing brightens up the mess like a little chintz from the 1930's, but doorbells ringing at inopportune moments and girlfriends shivering in the hallway while the maid vacuums the rug—cute, but next to Mr. Frayn's better scenes, they won't do. By contrast, the features editor's appearance on television and his misadventures on a flight to the Persian Gulf are episodes which are funny, original,

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and, to the extent that they show how man is made to suffer by the communications and transportation mess, pathetic. In fact, in such scenes, specific absurdities come to represent the problems of a whole way of life which the protagonists yearn for and fear. They seek escape in electronic machinery and jet propulsion, and find instead a new and terrifying form of imprisonment. When the features editor finds himself shuttled from airport to airport and from plane to plane without getting any nearer to his destination, the author comments: "The terrible claustrophobia of travel began to descend on him. He was trapped in the channels of communication, suffocating in the nothingness of neither-here-nor-there."

It is the mark of most of Mr. Frayn's characters that they are "neither-here-nor-there." He obviously intends it that way. But such faithfulness to the mess mentality makes it difficult to put up with his major characters. They always seem about to melt into blandness or vanish among their own contradictions. His minor and supporting characters are, by contrast, much more substantial: old Eddie Moulton who writes a column entitled "100 Years Ago"; Erskine Morris, his machinelike replacement; and, above all, Tessa, the girl from Somerset, whose arrival in London convinces her that inside and out, from top to bottom, she is the wrong sort of person: "She wasn't a girl at all, in any sense that the fashion magazines would recognize. She was just a young female human being, fit only to be someone's cousin or aunt." In his best characterizations and most amusing episodes, Mr. Frayn demonstrates that even in the worst of all possible worlds, there are occasional signs of life.

If Michael Frayn probes the mess with humor, Edna O'Brien adorns a small bit of it with poetry in *Casualties of Peace*. Her subject matter seems as unpromising as that of the others, but of the three, she is really the one who can write. She is Irishborn, and that accounts for something. She had more to react against than her English contemporaries and the model of Joyce to train her ear and bolster her spirit. But she is not a professional Hibernian and despite the temptation to do so, she seems not about to devote the rest of her career to playing the liberated convent girl who smokes cigars and spits on the floor. True, there are moments of Mary McCarthy in her fiction, but at her best, she is more nearly an earthy Virginia Woolf, not so much a creator of characters but of *a* character with an enchantingly feminine voice which winds its delicate way along the edge of madness.

The "casualties of peace," two young women and the men in their lives, are all presented as slightly daft children, moving capriciously and fearfully through life as though it were a haunted house. Willa makes things out of glass and lives alone except for a young couple to whom she lets a room in return for domestic help from Patsy, the wife. When by themselves, Willa and Patsy behave like girlish playmates left to giggle and cheer one another up while the grownups are away. Actually, there are no grownups in the book, only phantomlike males who dance in and out of the shadows, flashing their virility. Some are seductive and some menacing, but all are intruders on the almost safe world the two women have whimsically built for themselves. The book begins with a nightmare in which Willa, the owner of the house, dreams that she is being pursued down dark streets by two men intent upon murdering her. Though she wakes up, the dreamlike atmosphere continues. We learn, through fragments of talk and scenes briefly glimpsed, that, having been psychologically maimed by marriage to a sadist, she looks on the relatively uncomplicated emotional life of her younger companion with affectionate envy. When the younger woman—whose husband is an oaf—has a love affair with a healthy, red-headed dockworker, the vulgar honesty of it appears to Willa—as it apparently does to the author—a thing of rare and exquisite beauty.

In fact, it is more or less the thesis of Miss O'Brien's novel that in a world of meanness, perversity, and violence, the only decent thing left is what used to be called "dirt." A good brisk four-letter word now and then or an unpremeditated physical response is treated as a charm against hypocrisy and madness. When Willa is held prisoner by her strange husband through a long Swiss winter, her first move in breaking away from his spell is to let a cow out of its neatly-kept barn: "The cow tossed her head, let out one of her dreary moans, and shat contentedly over the new snow. On its whiteness a treacle-colored pat spread scutterishly over a big area. It made a crazy shape and the liquid trickling out defiled still more snow. And how I welcomed it: slime on the unlimited whiteness. A song."

This, in essence, is the song Miss O'Brien sings. Despite its apparent brazenness, it is not altogether new. Romantics before Miss O'Brien have thought that cattle and children were better off than most creatures and that adults could probably learn more from them than from one another. The difference—the modern difference—is that Miss O'Brien recognizes that nowadays everything—including the longing for innocence—seems in danger of being overworked, mass-produced, corny. You aren't even allowed the uniqueness of your own misery anymore. When Willa seeks consolation by listening to a sentimental recording of a popular blond singer, the author comments: "The songs were trashy but the woman made them work nicely because she put new twists into the feelings about zoos and tears and pillows." It is not a bad description of Miss O'Brien's own fiction—among the best to come out of the mess so far.

Despite obvious differences, there are important similarities in the three books—a tone, a sense of suffocation, a desolate humor, and, perhaps above all, a preoccupation with images of imprisonment: Mr. Glanville's heroine in her Roman apartment, Mr. Frayn's newspaperman in his cluttered office or on the crowded plane going nowhere, Miss O'Brien's girl in a remote Swiss chalet or in the bed of a peculiar husband. The most unnerving thing is not always the prison itself, but the fact that none of the characters seems to know how he got there. In the realm of the nonplot novel there is not much in the

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way of cause-and-effect. At least, there are few causes which the characters are able to examine or control. Inexplicable appetites, traumatic childhoods, and jet transports—it hardly matters which—sweep individuals to their strange destinies like the three fates gone berserk. Everyone is on the move, but in the wrong compartment and without a steering wheel. Mess fiction, like mess music and mess art, does not reflect rational perception or moral vision. In fact, it is not an "approach" at all, but a reaction—largely visceral—to a fast, bumpy, and, for an increasing number of passengers, a thoroughly joyless ride.

PROTECTING THE POOR

THE POORHOUSE STATE. By RICHARD M. ELMAN. *Pantheon. 305 pp. $5.95.*

OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS: CITIZENS' PROTECTORS IN NINE COUNTRIES. By WALTER GELLHORN. *Harvard. 448 pp. $6.95.*

WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN: GOVERNMENTAL GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES. By WALTER GELLHORN. *Harvard. 239 pp. $3.95.*

Reviewed by LEONARD CHAZEN

SINCE Max Weber praised bureaucracies for the calculability of their rules, our image of the model official has changed very little. He is still an administrator who behaves like a judge, always deciding like cases alike and giving clear notice of his intentions. A passion for rules also defines the classic official villain, the pettifogging bureaucrat; his only fault is that he carries the rule-making virtue too far. Rules, however, are not the exclusive subject matter of bureaucracy, and officials commit worse sins than excessive attention to trivial regulations. Today many government agencies administer policies which give them almost boundless discretion; but we lack even a figure of speech, comparable to "red tape," for undisciplined bureaucracies that leave everything to the whim of their functionaries.

The notoriety of the rule book is a tribute to the influence of the post office and the motor vehicle bureau. Survivors from an era of more primitive bureaucracies, these institutions are irrelevant to an understanding of the FCC or the social welfare agencies, but they remain the places where most people endure bureaucratic effrontery. Grown men, who thrive within the complicated institutions of big business and academia, cringe as they are scolded by a clerk for using their middle initial where the full name is required. Under the best of circumstances, an applicant is likely to find himself returning to the end of an interminable line for violating the "no-cross-outs" rule on a transfer of title form. Survivors of this ordeal are proudly convinced that they have endured a "Kafkaesque experience," and gained precious insight into modern bureauracy.

Of course, the welfare recipients in *The Poorhouse State* also wait on lines and fill out pointlessly detailed official forms. But they suffer less from an excess of rules than from the unbounded authority of case workers who, with only a few loose standards to guide them, determine the size of a client's dole and decide what strings to attach. A Wisconsin mother receiving Aid for Depend-

ALEPPO...DAMASCUS...CAIRO...
keys to Asian urbanization

MUSLIM CITIES IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES
by Ira Marvin Lapidus

Based on an extensive survey of Arabic sources, this lively book examines the social structures and political processes of several Muslim cities and towns – Damascus and Aleppo primarily, but with supporting studies of Cairo, Alexandria, Beirut, Tripoli, and others—when they were part of the Mamluk Empire between 1250 and 1517. What Mr. Lapidus shows is how the life of these cities, which had no regular governmental agencies either bureaucratic or communal, was carried on. In particular, he shows how a foreign ruling caste was able to interact with indigenous populations, creating well-integrated social systems. Comparisons and contrasts with European cities of the same period highlight the specific qualities of the Islamic situation. *Joint Center for Urban Studies; Harvard Middle Eastern Studies.* $7.50

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

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ent Children (ADC), for example, may leave the labor market to raise her children only if she has convinced a case worker that the change would make her family more stable. Under the New York Welfare regulations, which Mr. Elman presents at some length, an investigator is required to determine "need" before releasing funds for anything from secondhand linoleum to a semi-automatic clotheswringer. If standards of this sort can be called "rules," they are radically different from the regulations of the conventional bureaucracy; for they invite the case worker to exercise his discretion and make essentially personal judgments that are useless as evidence of official policy.

Mr. Elman's book purports to show how this method of welfare administration demoralizes people on the dole. In its vignettes of life in the Poorhouse State, everyone is maimed by the public assistance machinery: the strong become cynical welfare chiselers, while the weak withdraw to the security of wretched apartments where they conduct half-imaginary battles with their case-workers. Indictments of bureaucratic welfare have always emphasized the psychological consequences of "dependency" on a case-worker's good will. But the social work theorists who originated this charge had nostrums of their own (usually participation in a social action group) to take the place of state-imposed therapy; and they could dismiss a government rehabilitation program as a cure that kills the patient, without suggesting that the illnesses welfare agencies attempt to treat are all of their own making. Mr. Elman, on the other hand, is principally concerned with detaching the strings from welfare benefits, and his absorption in administrative horrors has the effect of exaggerating the welfare system's responsibility for a malaise that undoubtedly would exist even if case workers were not heaping indignities upon their clients. Urban slums, after all, abound in sources of social pathology: prolonged unemployment, as well as simple financial pressures which depend less on the method of administering public assistance than the amount of money available for distribution. While Mr. Elman shows a down-to-earth appreciation of the second factor, it does not temper his appraisal of welfare bureaucrats.

The rhetoric in *The Poorhouse State* is much more effective when Elman argues the simple injustice of making welfare assistance a contingent benefit, when almost all other government subsidies are "entitlements," available to anyone who meets objective standards. No one thinks of asking farmers who live off the soil bank to account for their use of the subsidy, but in most cities public assistance is managed precisely as if it were a reward for good behavior.

Critics have fixed the blame for the discretionary administration of the welfare laws on middle-level officials who fail to understand that at least the federal laws, which are the source of funds for many state public assistance programs, give low-income families a statutory right to receive assistance. The language in the statutes, however, is contradictory. As Kenneth Handler has pointed out in the California *Law Review*, some of the most offensive welfare procedures are merely statutory policies put into practice by zealous administrators. One example, which has particular shock value, is the practice of forcing ADC mothers to cooperate with the police in their search for her missing husband. This coercive technique, far from being the invention of an insensitive bureaucrat, is a reasonable application of the statutory requirement that mothers on ADC notify officials when desertion of the father is the reason they qualify for the program.

If Congress is of two minds about the right to receive assistance, it accurately reflects the attitudes of a society that can summon great moral outrage for the indignities of the Poorhouse State without letting go of the idea that welfare administration need not honor the principle of consumer sovereignty. Some people simply regard welfare payments as charity which the government is privileged to reserve for worthwhile expenses; others, who find it more difficult to distinguish welfare from other government benefits, worry about protecting indigent children from their parents' improvidence. Whatever its source, the principle of surveillance seems to defy limitation once it is put into practice. There might be some advantage in restricting close supervision to the so-called "problem families," but administrative distinctions of this sort usually involve the same regimen of unannounced inspections that makes welfare offensive in the first place. Alternatively, the government could provide non-cash subsidies that would eliminate the need for a supervisory apparatus by making it impossible for the recipient to misappropriate the funds. The rent supplement program, which pays the subsidy directly to the landlord, may achieve this purpose in housing; but it is difficult to imagine subsidy-in-kind of food and clothing purchases without stamps or special welfare stores that would be as demeaning as close bureaucratic control.

The indignities of the Poorhouse State are no longer met with indifference by people outside the system. The sympathizers, however, have projected their own difficulties with the motor vehicle bureau or the tax authorities onto the fundamentally different relationship of a welfare client and case-worker. The result has been a confusion between the welfare offices' policy of discretionary administration and the routine snafus of bureaucratic government: thus, the extravagant hope that an institution like the Scandinavian ombudsman could bring justice and respect for human dignity to American public assistance.

As JIMMY CAGNEY asked of Pat O'Brien: who is this guy ombudsman, anyway? The leading American source on the ombudsman is the essays of Professor Gellhorn, and they give no indication that the ombudsman is particularly suited to deal with government bureaus whose administrators and critics are bitterly divided about the purposes they are supposed to achieve and the proper limits of their discretion. Instead, the descriptive parts of *Ombudsmen and Others* are filled with licenses withheld for petty administrative rea-

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sons and minor penalties applied to individuals who cannot even find out the reason for their punishment. These may be cases of clear injustice, but they do not signify a breakdown in the administrative process. No great differences of social policy divide the agency from its constituents, and the intervention of an ombudsman may thus be quite fruitful.

Functioning as a combination advocate-mediator-critic, the ombudsman brings the elixir of sweet reasonableness to the olive-drab halls of bureaucratic power. With patient didacticism, he will suggest to the administrative authorities that a particular regulation departs senselessly from an otherwise consistent policy or that a low-level functionary has violated the bureau's own rule book. If the ombudsman's case is at all persuasive, he and the supervising official will probably reach a painless meeting of minds.

Of course, most administrative agencies have appellate procedures that are intended to bring such aberrations to the attention of senior administrators. But administrative appeals are complicated and expensive, and in practice the vast majority of administrative decisions are summary judgments. The intervention of an ombudsman is not as expensive or as rancorous as an administrative hearing, but it gives the agency's constituents some protection against arbitrary bureaucrats. This seems to be the ombudsman's great attraction for Professor Gellhorn, who has a published record of concern about the practical limitations on administrative due process.

The ombudsman's appeal to reason has little impact, however, when there are no well-defined standards of behavior to brand an official who has overstepped the bounds. In the first place, the absence of rules gives bureaucrats a seductive opportunity to hide what they are doing. Occasionally, a misbehaving official is brash enough to announce his reasons; one recent example was the bureaucrat who decided that the Liunis' dark complexions made them undesirable parents for a blue-eyed child. But most administrators who are about to apply unpopular standards use their discretion less valorously and speak only in generalities about the welfare of the family. Such opinions make poor subjects for administrative review.

Even when the official accurately represents his reasoning, it is difficult for an appellate body to review his application of loose administrative standards. Most welfare supervisors are understandably reluctant to decide anew whether an ADC dependent really deserves a special appropriation for a new overcoat. What the board is really deciding, when it upholds the caseworker, is that he ought to have the authority to make this judgment, just as the family's best argument is that the agency has given the case worker excessive authority by promulgating a permissive set of regulations.

ADMINISTRATIVE agencies are not always unresponsive to the claim that they have delegated too much authority to their functionaries; Professor Gellhorn's book includes several cases in which ombudsmen succeeded in persuading administrators to fill areas of discretion with sensible regulations. But the administrators who allowed themselves to be persuaded probably shared the principle that a bureaucrat's discretion must be confined by clear and precise standards. The managers of public welfare agencies, on the other hand, are convinced that their case workers are a special class of bureaucrats who need to exercise something like parental authority over their clients. Professor Gellhorn makes much of the ombudsman's social prestige, which might allow him to threaten an administrator with public rebuke if he failed to conform to the quasi-judicial model of the bureaucrat. But unless the agency were already cracking under pressure from groups with a broader popular base than any ombudsman has, the client would emerge at best with a special dispensation that left the general practice unaffected. An ombudsman who hoped to impose objec-

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tive standards on welfare administration would have to appeal over the agency's head to the legislature where welfare policy is made, or to the courts which can decide that certain criteria are inappropriate for an agency disbursing government benefits.

Professor Gellhorn is aware that ombudsmen are most successful when "departures from accepted norms" rather than "clashes of values" are at the root of the disagreement. In his review of the ombudsman's achievements around the world, he remarks several times that social welfare institutions have accounted for a very small proportion of the ombudsman's activities. The Swedish ombudsman, for example, dockets 1,500 cases a year of which fewer than 4 per cent involve child and youth welfare agencies. Certainly, Gellhorn's books cannot be blamed for any illusion that the ombudsman would change the style of welfare administration in the United States.

With this reservation, however, Professor Gellhorn has enormous faith in the susceptibility of bureaucrats to an ombudsman's reasoned elaboration of "accepted norms." He proposes the ombudsman as an intermediary between police departments and the public, although there is virtually no general agreement about standards of behavior for the police.

Welfare administration and police interrogation do not exhaust our experience with offensive bureaucratic procedures, but they are at the heart of the recent outbreak of concern with the subject. Only when welfare investigators and station house operatives were forced out of their comfortable obscurity did society become somewhat less tolerant of arbitrary behavior from its bureaucrats. The special qualities that make these two institutions inappropriate for the ministrations of an ombudsman also explain why they seem to epitomize the problem of bureaucratic control: there are no "accepted norms" that offer a reasonable basis of compromise between the official and the people whose lives he regulates. Most welfare administrators could not conceive of giving up their discretionary mode of operation, but that is exactly what is required if we are to impart some dignity to life on welfare.

So long as welfare officials regard proposals for curbing administrative discretion as threats to the integrity of their jobs, the change must come from an institution with the authority to impose its will. Congress and the state legislatures obviously have this power. But the federal courts have taken the lead in revising criminal procedure, and they may perform a similar service to welfare administration by requiring that government benefits be disbursed according to standards that are both general and impersonal. Of course, the resort to litigation could cause animosities and resentments that make adversary proceedings so distasteful to Professor Gellhorn. But these discomforts always accompany any manifestation of social conflict that is not, at bottom, merely a regrettable misunderstanding. And until the government reaches an accommodation with the victims of bureaucratic abuse, there is little point in looking to the ombudsman to make this accommodation for them or in aspiring to the serenity of a Scandinavian welfare state.

BOOK REVIEWERS IN THIS ISSUE

DENIS DONOGHUE, *here making his first appearance in* COMMENTARY, *is professor of modern English and American Literature at University College (Dublin) and the author of, among other works,* Connoisseurs of Chaos.

ROBERT LEKACHMAN *is chairman of the economics department of the State University of New York at Stony Brook.*

CECIL ROTH, *the well-known Anglo-Jewish historian, contributed "An Only Kid" to our April issue.*

ROBERT KIELY, *whose review of* The Lord of the Rings Trilogy *by J. R. R. Tolkien appeared in the February* COMMENTARY, *has recently been appointed associate professor of English at Harvard.*

LEONARD CHAZEN, *a new contributor, is a recent graduate of the Yale Law School. Mr. Chazen will be teaching law at Rutgers next year.*

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

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